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Civil Procedure. Cassidy v. Lonquist Capital Management Co.,
et. al., 920 A.2d 228 (R.I. 2007). In deciding whether general or
specific jurisdiction can be exercised over a non-resident
defendant, it is appropriate to consider whether the defendant's
trips to the forum state were made only on behalf of an employer,
and never at his own direction or with his input; without
voluntary contacts outside of employment, personal jurisdiction
may be denied.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff and defendant in this case, both Massachusetts
residents, worked together at a distribution company in
Massachusetts; the defendant was a delivery truck driver who
made regular deliveries to restaurants throughout New England,
including Rhode Island. 1 At some time around July, 1998,
according to plaintiff, while on a delivery trip the defendant
viewed false information about plaintiff on a poster, and then
tortiously disseminated this information; although the defendants
and plaintiffs lived and worked in Massachusetts, and the
allegedly tortious dissemination occurred in Massachusetts, the
source of the information was a poster the defendant saw in Rhode
Island, while defendant was making a delivery as part of his
employment. 2 The plaintiff filed suit in Rhode Island, claiming the
defendant "had cast him in a false light, violated his right to be
secure from unreasonable publicity, and acted intentionally to
inflict emotional distress upon him."3
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction, which the trial judge granted, ruling that
Rhode Island lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over the
defendant.4
1. Cassidy v. Lonquist Capital Mgmt. Co., et. al., 920 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I.
2007).
2. Id. at 231.
3. Id. at 230.
4. Id. at 230.
686
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HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
Justice Goldberg's majority opinion noted the significance of
the defendant's reasons for his trips to Rhode Island: the
defendant "did not conduct business in Rhode Island on his own
behalf; he delivered goods at the behest of his employer," and he
had no "input into where he went or what deliveries he made."5
Thus, notwithstanding that the defendant made approximately
twelve trips to Rhode Island per year, the defendant could not be
said to have "continuous and purposeful" contacts with the state.
6
The Court found that allowing general jurisdiction over an
employee in any state to which he made deliveries for his
employer "certainly would be at variance with fundamental
notions of fairness" in personal jurisdiction, as required by cases
such as Casey v. Treasure Island at the Mirage, 745 A.2d 743, 745
(R.I.2000) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), because a visit is not purposeful when it is done
only at the direction of an employer. 7
Further, the Court held that there was no specific jurisdiction
in the case either, because the only connection between the
litigation and defendant's contacts with the state was a single
instance of viewing a poster made on a single delivery trip, which,
according to the Court, cannot be considered a "purposeful
availment of this state's jurisdiction," both because, again, the
reason for the visit to the forum state was solely for the sake of
the employer, and because all the allegedly tortious acts occurred
in another state, making the connection between the forum and
the litigation minor. 8
COMMENTARY
Although personal jurisdiction is a "mixed question of law and
fact" that requires a case-by-case analysis, 9 at the least, the
decision here adds a potentially significant factor to
determinations of personal jurisdiction: why a defendant visits a
state can affect the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
5. Id. at 233-34.
6. Id. at 233.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 232.
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In focusing on the motivation for a defendant's contacts with
the forum state, the Court has chosen to emphasize the
"purposeful" nature of those contacts, rather than their number;
despite a dozen visits yearly and despite the location and
discovery of information inside the forum state which was then
used in the allegedly tortious dissemination at issue in the
complaint, the lack of a personal motivation to visit the state
appeared to be determinative.
As Justice Robinson stated in his concurring opinion, joined
by Justice Flaherty, that the defendant came to the state "because
his employer sent him here rather than because he opted to come
here . . .has no bearing on the fact that he was indeed present
here and conducted commercial activity here," which would seem
to make the motive for the visits "legally irrelevant."10 The
concurrence notes that in deciding the defendant's "status as [an]
employee[]" can in fact "insulate [him] from jurisdiction," the
Court's reasoning would seem to conflict with statements of the
United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.
Interestingly, personal jurisdiction, as the concurrence also
notes, could have been defeated in this case without an analysis of
the defendant's motivation for his visits, because of the "de
minimus nature of [defendant's] business dealings here"; 11 that
the Court chose to address the issue could imply it intends this
line of inquiry to act as a primary focus for personal jurisdiction
analysis.
The argument for denying personal jurisdiction is stronger for
lower-level employees, whose jobs do not permit them the
authority to set their schedules or act in the decision-making
processes of a business - employees who have little personal stake
in a business are perhaps not availing themselves of any
opportunity to do business in a state, but are merely fulfilling
their own job requirements; refusing to extend personal
jurisdiction to such individuals acts to protect such defendants.
On the other hand, as Justice Robinson notes, some jobs so clearly
require travel - such as train conductors - that "one of the
consequences of ... accepting employment" of that type would be
"the likelihood that [defendant] may be subject to the jurisdiction
10. Id. at 235 (J. Robinson, concurring) (emphasis in original).
11. Id.
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of more than one forum"; 12 when regular travel to other states is
thus foreseeable, being haled to court in those jurisdictions
appears less unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
With this case, the Court adds the factor of employee status to
determinations of general and specific jurisdiction; if activities in
the forum state are "at the behest of [the] employer" only, contacts
may not be "purposeful" and personal jurisdiction may be
lacking. 13
Jessica Stanford
12. Id.
13. Id. at 233-34.
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Civil Procedure & Evidence. Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251
(R.I. 2007). The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial
justice's grant of plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law
and the submission of the question of damages to the same jury
after the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The defendant
identified a number of potential errors relating to the trial
justice's rulings on the defendant's expert testimony, the plaintiffs
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and defendant's motion
for a mistrial and the subsequent jury determination of damages.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that (1) striking the
defendant's expert witness opinion testimony was not an abuse of
discretion; (2) the trial court was justified in discounting the
defendant's testimony as an expert in ruling on the plaintiffs
motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) uncontradicted
testimony by plaintiffs experts on the applicable standard of care
was not inherently improbable; (4) failure to grant a continuance
after denying defendant's motion for mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion; and (5) submission to the jury as to the amount of
damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of defendant's
negligence was not improper.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On Super Bowl Sunday, 1996, the plaintiff, Linda J. Franco
experienced severe stomach pain unrelated to another Dallas
Cowboy championship win. 1  Franco was diagnosed with
gallstones and informed that her gallbladder likely required
removal. 2 Franco chose Dr. Joseph A. Latina, M.D. to perform the
surgery and met with him on January 29, 1996, when he
confirmed that her gallbladder did indeed require removal. 3
Franco expressed concern about the operation's timing because
she was scheduled to leave on a Florida vacation later in the
week. 4 Latina alleviated Franco's fears by informing her that the
690
1. Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1253-4.
4. Id. at 1254.
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surgical procedure he would use, a "laparoscopic cholecystectomy,
required a very short recovery period, and that there would be no
need to postpone her vacation."' 5 Franco decided to have the
surgery immediately and Latina completed the operation in
twenty-six minutes with initially no indication of any difficulties
or complications. 6
On February 2, 1997 Franco's scheduled departure day for her
vacation, she did not feel up to traveling and delayed the start of
her vacation until February 4, 1997. 7 The Franco's drove to North
Carolina on the first day of their trip, during which Franco did not
feel well and "notice[d] that her skin and eyes looked a little
yellow."8  Franco phoned Latina from Jacksonville, Florida the
next day because she believed her condition was deteriorating. 9
Latina told Franco "that she should wait a couple of days to see
whether the problems she was experiencing diminished" and to
seek medical attention in Florida if she did not improve. 10 Franco
arrived at her sister's house in Florida feeling worse and was
unable to sleep well or leave the house the next day.1 1 The
following day Franco sought medical attention at the emergency
room at Sarasota Memorial Hospital. 12
Franco met with a local gastroenterologist, Dr. Kuperman, in
addition to emergency room personnel and underwent testing,
revealing a blockage in her biliary system requiring a drain
"inserted into her, which was attached to an external bag into
which the excess bile produced by her system would flow."'1 3 Dr.
Kuperman brought in local physician Dr. Brock to assist with
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1254. The case reports that the consult with the surgeon
occurred on 1/29/96, where Franco was upset after learning that she would
need surgery because she was leaving on vacation "later that week." The
case also reports that Franco's planned departure date for vacation was
2/2/97, which does not make chronological sense given that the consult was
one year earlier. I suspect this is an error, but neither this case, nor the prior
history of the case clears the confusion up.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1255.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
20081
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Franco's case. 14 Dr. Brock concluded from the test results "that
during the laparoscopic cholecystectomy part of Franco's common
bile duct had been clipped and cut. ' 15 As a result, Franco would
require major reconstructive surgery of her biliary system, which
the two of them decided should be performed by Dr. Harold
Wanebo in Rhode Island. 16 Once back in Rhode Island, Franco
underwent successful reconstructive surgery. 17
Franco filed a medical malpractice claim in Providence
County Superior Court against Latina on May 21, 1996, alleging
that he negligently performed the laparoscopic cholecystectomy
and that he had failed to obtain her informed consent. 18 At a trial
held from October 15 - 24, 2001 the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Latina. 19 Franco presented expert testimony by Dr.
Brock and Dr. Moossa, both of which testified that the standard of
care "demands the correct identification of the cystic duct before
any clipping and cutting occurs." 20 Latina relied on an article
published by Dr. Strasberg, in which Dr. Strasberg posited that
the infundibular technique Dr. Latina used to locate the cystic
duct when performing Franco's surgery was inherently flawed. 21
Latina argued that the inherent shortcomings of this technique,
while still within the standard of care, was the cause of Franco's
injury and thus that he was not negligent.22 Franco filed a motion
for a new trial, which the Superior Court granted because Latina
admittedly deviated from the standard of care articulated by both
parties at trial. 23 Latina appealed the order for a new trial,
arguing that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting
it.24 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the motion for a
new trial and the case was returned to the Superior Court for a
new trial. 25 Franco filed a motion in limine to prevent Latina
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1255-56.
20. Id. at 1256.
21. Id. at n. 7.
22. Id. at 1256.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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from using the Strasberg article that was the foundation for the
flawed technique defense in the first trial. 26 The trial justice
granted the motion in limine in part, ruling that before evidence of
the flawed technique could come in, Latina must put on
"competent expert testimony that performance of certain
techniques satisfied the standard of care for this procedure." 27
The second trial began on February 14, 2006.28 Franco again
presented the same expert testimony that the standard of care
requires the correct, "unmistakable identification of the
anatomical structures to be cut."' 2 9 Latina offered the expert
testimony of Dr. Ferguson, who first testified that he objected to
the concept of a standard of care and then that the standard of
care was the same as that offered by Franco's experts. 30 When
asked his opinion regarding Latina's negligence, Dr. Ferguson
offered that Dr. Latina was not negligent, but rather Latina's
misidentification of the anatomical parts was human error. 31 On
cross-examination, Dr. Ferguson conceded that Latina had
misidentified Franco's cystic duct and plaintiff moved to strike Dr.
Ferguson's opinion that Latina was not negligent because it was
not grounded in any articulated standard of care. 32 The trial
justice granted plaintiffs motion to strike and defendant
immediately moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the decision
to strike the testimony was unduly prejudicial to defendant. 33
The trial justice denied the motion for a mistrial on the grounds
that defendant had been given fair warning of the dangers of
relying on the "flawed technique" defense and therefore reasoned
that striking the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial. 34
At the close of the second trial, Franco moved for a judgment
as a matter of law, arguing that expert testimony established an
uncontroverted standard of care, which was admittedly violated
by Latina when he misidentified her common bile duct as her
cystic duct and therefore his performance fell below the standard
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1256-57.
31. Id. at 1257.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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of care and was negligent. 35 The trial justice reserved ruling on
the motion and sent the case to the jury, which found for the
defendant. 36 At this point, the trial justice considered the motion
for judgment as a matter of law and decided that because the
opinion testimony of Dr. Ferguson had been stricken from the
record, the defense had not presented any expert testimony to
controvert plaintiffs expert testimony on the standard of care and
Latina's consequent negligence. 37  Therefore "it was legally
impermissible for the jury to render a verdict for [the] defendant"
because he had not adhered to the established standard of care. 38
The trial justice then asked the jury to make a determination on
the amount of damages. 39 The defendant objected, arguing that it
was "manifestly unreasonable and prejudicial to ask a jury to
assess damages in a case in which the trial justice has determined
that its verdict was unreasonable." 40  The jury, after some
deliberation on damages, was confused on the issue of negligence
and the trial justice instructed it that negligence was not an issue
and just to decide what monetary damages Franco had incurred. 41
The jury returned a damage award of $525,000 and Latina
appealed. 42
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Latina identified four rulings by the trial justice that he
believes compel reversal. 43 First, Latina argues that the decision
to strike the opinion testimony of Dr. Ferguson was an abuse of
discretion.44  Second, Latina asserts that the trial justice
improperly weighed the evidence and assessed the credibility of
witnesses when considering plaintiffs motion for judgment as a
matter of law. 45 Third, Latina advances that the trial justice
committed error when she denied his motion for a mistrial after
35. Id. at 1257.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1257-58.
38. Id. at 1258.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id..
45. Id.
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Dr. Ferguson's testimony was stricken.4 6 Finally, Latina claims
the trial justice's decision to submit the damages question to the
same jury that returned a favorable verdict on liability was
unfairly prejudicial and therefore error. 47
Doctor Ferguson's Opinion Testimony
The issue was whether the trial justice improperly struck the
opinion testimony of Dr. Ferguson, the defense expert, when he
opined that Dr. Latina was not negligent. 48 Expert opinion
testimony must be grounded in "sufficiently articulated facts" such
that the trial justice can "determine whether the opinion elicited
has probative force or is merely speculative." 4 9 A trial justice's
decision to allow expert opinion testimony may be reversed only
for abuse of discretion. 50 Here, the trial justice decided to strike
Dr. Ferguson's opinion testimony because it could not be
reconciled with his opinion regarding the proper standard of care
and not because Dr. Ferguson was unqualified as an expert or
that he based his opinion on incorrect or inadequate facts. 5 1
Latina argues that the discrepancy between Dr. Ferguson's
opinion and the proper standard of care does not warrant striking
the opinion but instead goes to the weight of the evidence. 5 2 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice's decision
to strike Dr. Ferguson's opinion testimony was not an abuse of
discretion because she did not question Dr. Ferguson's credentials
to testify as an expert but "aptly noted that his ultimate opinion
with regard to negligence was not logically tied to what he
conceded was the proper standard of care for the procedure." 53
Judgment as a Matter of Law
The issue was whether the trial justice improperly applied the
standard of review for a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1259.
49. Id. at 1258.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1260.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1261.
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Latina does not dispute the correct standard was applied, but
rather argues "that the trial justice did not properly apply [the]
standard because she invaded the province of the jury by weighing
the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses. ' 54 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice applied the
proper standard because her decision was based on her finding
that the expert testimony articulated an uncontroverted standard
of care. 55 Furthermore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted
that the trial justice did not mention any competing evidence that
she weighed or discuss the relative believability of the plaintiffs
experts as opposed to the defendant's witnesses. 56
Latina, however, argues that the trial justice could not have
reached her decision without weighing the evidence and assessing
the witnesses' credibility. 57 A trial justice's decision "granting a
motion for judgment as a matter of law will be overturned when
the trial justice has 'invaded the province of the jury by
impermissibly finding facts."' 58  Specifically, Latina points to
inconsistencies in the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
witnesses. 59 Latina argues that during discovery and litigation
Dr. Brock testified that Franco's injury could have happened even
if the standard of care were followed. 60  The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the specific testimony Latina pointed to
did not show that Dr. Brock believed misidentification of the cystic
duct could occur within the standard of care. 61 Both plaintiffs
experts' testimony agreed that the standard of care requires
conclusive, unmistakable, in-fact identification of the cystic
duct. 62 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
trial justice could not have 'found facts' when all she [did] is
accept uncontradicted testimony" and thus did not improperly
weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. 63
Latina next argues that the trial justice improperly dismissed
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1261-62.
56. Id. at 1262.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1263.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1262.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1263.
63. Id.
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his personal testimony as an expert that the standard of care
required only that a surgeon be certain in his own mind that the
anatomical structure he was cutting was the cystic duct.6 4 The
trial justice explained in ruling on the motion for judgment as a
matter of law that Latina's personal expert testimony "was
discounted because it was not elicited to a 'reasonable degree of
medical certainty,' as is required of expert medical testimony."
65
Furthermore, the plaintiff properly requested disclosure of all the
defendant's experts and the defendant was not on the list.
66
When deciding whether to grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the trial justice must find that the evidence in the
aggregate does not raise a legally sufficient question of fact to be
decided by the jury and not that there is no evidence in opposition
to the result sought by the moving party.6 7 Because Latina's
testimony did not meet the standard for expert medical opinion,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not
improperly apply the standard for deciding a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law when she found that Latina's
testimony did not present a question of fact for the jury. 68
Finally, Latina argues that the trial justice was not required
to accept the uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiffs experts
because it was inherently improbable. 6 9  Latina argues that
Moossa's testimony that Latina must have made two cuts when
cutting the common bile duct, even when the procedure calls for
one is inherently improbable because if true, then Latina must
have known he had made a mistake. 70 For a witnesses' testimony
to be improbable, it must go against common sense. 71 Here,
Latina would infer from Moossa's testimony that the defendant
made two cuts and was aware of that fact and chose not to correct
his mistake. 7 2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out that
Dr. Moossa never testified to that and nor was it a reasonable
inference from his testimony and therefore held that the trial
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1263-64.
67. Id. at 1264.
68. Id. at 1265.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1265 (emphasis provided).
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justice properly accepted the uncontroverted expert opinion
testimony of Drs. Brock and Moossa because it was not inherently
improbable. 73 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the trial justice properly granted plaintiffs motion for
judgment as a matter of law. 74
Motion for Mistrial
The issue was whether the trial justice abused her discretion
when she denied defendant's motion for a mistrial after striking
defendant's expert witness opinion testimony. 75 A trial justice
has discretion to determine whether to grant a mistrial. 76 Latina
argues that striking his expert's opinion testimony was unfairly
prejudicial and thus he should be granted a mistrial or at the very
least a continuance. 77 Here, however, Latina did not request a
continuance. 78  Furthermore, the trial justice explained that
defendant had fair advance warning that such testimony was
vulnerable to a motion to strike and therefore the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 79
Jury Determination of Damages
The issue was whether the trial justice erred by submitting
the question of damages to the same jury.80 Latina cites Rule 49
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure in support of his
argument. 8' Latina argues that submission of the question of
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1266.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at n.17.
Rule 49 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
"(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each
issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written
questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may
submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use
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damages to the jury was a special interrogatory that asked the
jury to render a new verdict inconsistent with its general verdict
and as such was impermissible. 82  Latina also argued that
because the jury knew the trial justice had overruled it, that it
would be inclined to return a higher than justified damages
award.8 3 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial
justice did not send a special interrogatory to the jury but rather
asked it to answer a second question that was only slightly
different from the question on the original general verdict form
and that defendant's second argument about the damages award
such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the
written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning
the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to
make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party
waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless
before the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury.
As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a
finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
"(b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a
general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of
fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall
give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable
the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a
general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make
written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general
verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment
upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered
pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers,
notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the
jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order
a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and
one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict,
judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new
trial.
"(c) Verdicts on Multiple Counts. In cases tried by a jury on more
than one count, the court may require the jury to return a separate
verdict as to each count."
82. Id. at 1267.
83. Id.
700 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:690
was "specious at best.' '8 4 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court rejected Latina's assertion that it was error to ask the same
jury to determine damages. 85
COMMENTARY
This case is significant because jury verdicts are rarely set
aside and judgments as a matter of law awarded. Here, not one
jury, but two, held Dr. Latina complied with the appropriate
standard of care. How could two juries both come to the same
'incorrect' conclusion? The reason for disregarding the jury's
verdicts in both cases was based on the same premise - that both
party's experts articulated an uncontroverted standard of care.
This reason exemplifies that the correct standard used was used
when reviewing the evidence in this motion for judgment as a
matter of law. The standard requires that the trial justice view
"the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
[and] determine[] that the nonmoving party has not presented
legally sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to arrive at a
verdict in his favor."86 Therefore, because there was no conflicting
testimony regarding the standard of care required of a surgeon,
the trial justice properly found that there was no basis that a jury
could find for the defendant in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found after a thorough
review of the record and examination of defendant's arguments
that the trial justice was correct when she entered judgment as a
matter of law for the plaintiff. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that (1) striking the defendant's expert witness opinion
testimony was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the trial court was
justified in discounting the defendant's testimony as an expert in
ruling on the plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3)
uncontradicted testimony by plaintiffs experts on the applicable
standard of care was not inherently improbable; (4) failure to
grant a continuance after denying defendant's motion for mistrial
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1259.
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was not an abuse of discretion; and (5) submission to the jury as to
the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of
defendant's negligence was not improper.
B Jen Lemieux
Civil Procedure. Lamarque v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. et al,
927 A.2d 753 (R.I. 2007). In this case of first impression, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court determined the proper scope of
review when an absent class member collaterally attacks on lack
of due process grounds the binding effect of a class action
judgment entered by a foreign court. 1 After discussing competing
views on the issue, the court adopted the narrower of the two
approaches and held that the scope of review is limited to an
examination of whether the procedures adopted by the foreign
court were adequate to insure due process was afforded. 2 The
court found that in the present case the notice procedures adopted
by the foreign court were adequate and there were no errors in
their application, and thus affirmed the Superior Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arises out of defendant Fairbanks Capital Corp.'s
("Fairbanks") foreclosure on property owned by Kathy Lamarque
("Kathy") and Andre Lamarque ("Andre"). 4  Fairbanks had
serviced the loan resulting from Kathy and Andre's 1995 refinance
of their property, the note for which was secured by the property. 5
In 2001, after a dispute regarding whether and by how much the
loan obligations were in default, Fairbanks foreclosed on the
property and it was sold to Anthony P. Ciccarone ("Ciccarone"). 6
Seeking damages and to have the foreclosure declared void, Kathy
and Andre filed suit on January 18, 2002 naming Fairbanks and
Ciccarone as defendants and alleging illegal foreclosure, breach of
an implied contract not to foreclose, and use of deceptive trade
1. Lamarque v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 927 A.2d 753, 759-60 (R.I.
2007).
2. Id. at 762-65.
3. Id. at 766-67.
4. Id. at 755.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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practices by Fairbanks. 7 According to Kathy, in the course of
negotiations regarding the status of the loan, Fairbanks had
advised her that foreclosure would not be initiated until 2002.8 In
addition, although she sent Fairbanks partial payment checks, it
would not cash or deposit them, and would continually change the
amount it stated was necessary to bring the mortgage current. 9
Concurrently, Curry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., a class action
suit making allegations almost identical to those made by Kathy
and Andre was filed against Fairbanks in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 10 After the
parties presented a settlement agreement to the court, it held a
fairness hearing and entered a final order certifying the class and
approving the settlement agreement on May 19, 2004.11 Kathy,
however, never received individual notice of the suit or the
settlement. 12
In September 2004, Fairbanks moved for summary judgment
in Rhode Island suit on the grounds that res judicata barred the
plaintiffs' action because, "as absent class members who had not
opted out of the class action, they were bound" by the final
judgment entered in Curry. 13 Kathy argued that "her claims
were not encompassed by the claims covered" in Curry; "that, even
if she was covered by the class action, her type of claim against
Fairbanks was expressly excepted"; and "that she was not
provided proper notice" of that suit or its settlement. 14 The
hearing justice disagreed with each of these arguments and thus
granted summary judgment in favor or Fairbanks. 15 The court
entered final judgment, and Kathy, but not Andre, appealed to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. 16 Ciccarone then moved for and
was granted summary judgment, only Kathy appealed, and her
two appeals were consolidated. 17
7. Id.
8. Id. at 757 n.12.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 755, 757 n.12.
11. Id. at 755-56.
12. Id. at 760 n.16.
13. Id. at 756.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at n.10.
17. Id. at n.11.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court initially addressed what it
found to be the least complex of plaintiffs arguments: that she
was not bound by Curry because her claims were either not
covered by the definition of the certified class or expressly
excepted from the settlement. 18 The court then devoted the
majority of its opinion to the less straight-forward issue of
whether plaintiff was not bound by Curry because she was not
afforded adequate notice and thus, the process she was due. 19
First, the court found that plaintiff clearly fell within the
class in Curry, which the settlement agreement defined as
including as all persons whose loans were serviced by the
defendant during a specified time period and who were either in
default, or treated by Fairbanks as being in default. 20 The court
quickly dismissed three arguments raised by plaintiff, finding that
she was in fact a borrower because she was listed as such on the
loan documents, that she was a class member within the
definition regardless of whether her name appears on the class
member list, and that the settlement "indisputably was intended
to encompass individual claims as well as pending or potential
class actions."21
Next, the court found that plaintiffs claim did not qualify for
exception from the settlement agreement as a reserved claim or
defense because the plaintiff commenced her action after
foreclosure on her property was complete, while the exception was
for claims or defenses asserted in regards only to pending or
future foreclosures. 22
Finally, the court discussed plaintiffs claim that the notice of
the Curry suit and settlement afforded to her was inadequate, and
that therefore, she was not bound by the final judgment in that
suit.23  Refraining from review of plaintiffs and defendant's
substantive arguments on the issue, the court instead turned its
attention to the "difficult threshold question: when a party seeks
to invoke a prior class action judgment against another party in a
18. Id. at 757.
19. Id. at 757-67.
20. Id. at 758.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 759, 765.
23. Id. at 759-60.
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foreign court, what scope of review should the latter court employ
when it determines whether due process was afforded to the party
against whom enforcement is sought?" 24
The court found that although the United States Supreme
Court had not yet directly addressed the issue of what the proper
scope is for collateral review of a class action judgment, two
different approaches had emerged from courts that had previously
considered the question.2 5 Agreeing with reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit and the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the narrow scope of review limited "to
consideration of 'whether the procedures in the prior litigation
afforded the party against whom the earlier judgment is asserted
a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the claim or issue."'2 6
Rather than "substantive analysis of the merits," which the
Second Circuit's more broad scope of review would involve, 2 7 the
limited scope of review adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court only requires determination of 'whether there were
safeguards in place to guarantee sufficient notice and adequate
representation"' and 'whether such safeguards were, in fact,
applied."' 2 8
Applying this newly adopted scope of review to plaintiffs
inadequate notice grievance, the court found that procedurally,
there were "adequate safeguards in place" in Curry "to guarantee
sufficient notice to all."' 2 9 The court noted that a fairness hearing
in Curry confirmed that the notice methods adopted had been
complied with and that "significantly" plaintiff "presented no
evidence showing any infirmity with the notice procedure either in
the mandate itself or in the manner in which it was complied. '30
Unable to reach the merits of plaintiffs complaint that notice
was inadequate because she received no notice, despite the fact
that the procedures in Curry should have afforded her notice if
properly followed, the court advised plaintiff her only recourse was
24. Id. at 760.
25. Id. at 762.
26. Id. (quoting Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
27. Id. at 763-64.
28. Id. at 765 (quoting Hospitality Mgmt. Ass'n v. Shell Oil Co., 591
S.E.2d 611 (S.C. 2004)).
29. Id. at 765.
30. Id. at 766.
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with the court that rendered the judgment in Curry.
Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Rhode
Island Superior Court.31
Justice Robinson's Dissent
In his brief dissent, Justice Robinson expressed his concern
that the narrow scope of review adopted by the majority did not
sufficiently respect a plaintiffs right to choose his or her own
forum, and that a more broad scope of review would better align
with fundamental right to notice protected by due process
guarantees. 32
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision bolsters the
finality of class action judgments because it closes off one avenue
of attack for an unsatisfied absentee class member seeking to
escape the binding effect class action judgment. On the one hand,
the decision is in accord with the principle of full faith and credit
and the goal of finality in class action litigation. To the extent
that finality provides an important incentive to settlement, the
more broad scope of review rejected by the court could, in theory,
have had the potential to dissuade some defendants from agreeing
to settle.
On the other hand, the decision seemingly conflicts with
traditional notions of due process. In a non-class action suit, a
party may collaterally attack, in a forum of his or her choosing,
the judgment of a foreign court on the grounds that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction, and the reviewing court will
undertake a substantive analysis of the claim. Under the court's
holding however, an absent class member wishing to collaterally
attack a class action judgment looses his or her choice of forum;
recourse is with the court that entered the judgment. In this case,
because the geographic distance between the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and the Curry court is not insurmountable, the
effect of the loss of choice of forum may not be dramatic. However,
geographic distance could potentially make a challenge by an
31. Id. 766-67.
32. Id. at 767.
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absent class member impracticable if the forum is restricted to the
court rendering the judgment.
The court did note that "[s]ignificantly, plaintiff [] presented
no evidence showing any infirmity with the notice procedure
either in the mandate itself or in the manner with which it was
complied," 33 which leaves open the question of whether the result
would have been different if Kathy Lamarque had presented such
evidence. However, the fact that if the notice procedures in Curry
had been properly followed, Kathy Lamarque would have been
mailed individual notice, might in itself be considered evidence
that there was an infirmity with Fairbanks' compliance with those
procedures.
Ultimately, the practical repercussions of the court's adoption
of this scope of review will depend not only on how often an absent
class member seeks to challenge a class action judgment in a
foreign court, but also whether recourse with the court issuing the
judgment is a geographically viable option for the party seeking to
escape the binding effect of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
In this case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the scope of review when a party collaterally
attacks a judgment in a class action suit entered by a foreign court
is limited to an examination of whether the procedures employed
by the foreign court adequately safeguarded the plaintiffs due
process rights. In the instant case, because the court found the
notice procedures adopted by the Curry court in the class action
suit were adequate and that the Curry court had also found that
the procedures were complied with, the plaintiffs collateral attack
failed and res judicata barred her claim. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and
entry of final judgment in favor of the defendant.
Stephanie J. Bowser
33. Id. at 766.
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Civil Procedure. Marcil v. Kells, 936 A.2d 208 (R.I. 2007). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict of civil
conspiracy and slander against two defendants who in the year
2000 were both on the ballot in the Providence, RI, Democratic
primaries. In a decision written by Justice Flaherty, the Court
vacated the Superior Court judgment because the Court
determined that the alleged statements made were not, in fact,
defamatory.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Plaintiff, James D. Marcil, was a serviceman at the
Providence Gas Company (hereinafter "Gas Company"). 1  In
August of 2000, the Plaintiff approached a Mr. John F. Morris at
Morris' plumbing supply store, Charron Supply, to discuss a
campaign sign which was displayed prominently on the premises. 2
The sign promoted the candidacies of the Defendants, Robert T.
Kells and Thomas C. Slater, for the state Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively. 3 At the time, Kells was involved in
a "hotly contested" primary race and Slater supported Kells,
although he himself had no primary opponent. 4
It was undisputed that a "pointed conversation" occurred
between the Plaintiff and Morris about the sign, but the parties
disputed what was actually said.5 In a statement to the police,
the Plaintiff claimed he told Morris that he was not comfortable
doing business with Charron Supply with the sign on the
premises, because it appeared the business was taking a political
position. 6 At trial, the Plaintiff testified that he told Morris "he
should take down the sign because Morris probably would lose
business by supporting any candidate in a contested race." 7
1. Marcil v. Kells, 936 A2d. 208, 209 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 210.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Morris testified that his decision to take the sign down was a
business decision made in direct response to his conversation with
the Plaintiff.8
In a letter memorializing his conversation, Morris wrote that
the Plaintiff "stated his opposition to... Mr. Kells and asked that
[the business] not support him for reasons he gave."9  Morris
recounted that the Plaintiff stated he worked at the Gas
Company, lived in the neighborhood and had spoken to many
neighbors and Gas Company employees who shared his view. 10
According to Morris, the Plaintiff further stated that if Charron
Supply supported Kells, that the community would not support
Charron Supply. 11 However, Morris wrote that the plaintiff
"never threatened any influence over gas company business."'12
When Defendant Kells learned of the sign's removal, he went
to speak with Morris. 13  Morris testified that he told Kells
someone in the neighborhood, who worked at the Gas Company,
had objected to the sign.14 Morris denied telling Kells that the
Plaintiff had threatened exercising influence over Gas Company
business if the sign was not removed. 15 Kells later testified that
Morris told him he had taken down the sign to avoid community
problems, because the Plaintiff had told Morris that the
community objected to the sign. 16
Kells related his conversation with Morris to Defendant
Slater. 17  Although his account of their conversation varies
slightly from Slater's, Kells testified he told Slater that the
Plaintiff, wearing his Gas Company uniform, had insinuated that
the Gas Company would not do business with Charron Supply if
Morris did not remove the sign. 18 Slater testified that Kells said
that the Plaintiff told Morris he had many friends in the
community who would look unfavorably on the store if Morris did
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 209-10.
12. Id. at 209.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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not remove the sign, but denied that Kells mentioned anything
about the Gas Company's not doing business with Charron
Supply. 19
Soon thereafter "an upset Kells" went to the Plaintiffs
home. 20 The plaintiff testified that Kells accused him of removing
the sign and said, "I'll get you, win or lose this election, I'm going
to get you." 21 The Plaintiff also testified that Kells then got in his
car, drove a few feet, stopped, got out, and yelled, "Do you know
who Bob Owens is?"' 22 At that time, Bob Owens was the Gas
Company's vice president. 23
Slater then took action of his own and called his longtime
friend, Helen Toohey, a community relations representative at the
Gas Company. 24 The parties dispute Slater's exact words to
Toohey. 2 5 Toohey testified "I guess... that [the plaintiff] found
those political signs to be offensive and in fact likely, if [Morris]
didn't remove those signs that [the] Gas Company would not do
business with him."26  Toohey said she accepted Slater's
comments as a complaint, treated the comments like any other
complaint, and referred the matter to her supervisor. 27 Slater
denied ever mentioning Gas Company employees in that
conversation.28
Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiffs supervisors called him in for
a meeting, along with his union representative. 29 The supervisors
said that if the Plaintiff was holding himself out as a
representative of the Gas Company when he confronted Morris,
his actions could amount to extortion for which he could be subject
to discipline or termination.30 The Plaintiff testified that the
references to possible allegations of extortion caused him
significant anxiety. 31
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 211.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Thereafter, the Plaintiff went back to see Morris who
subsequently wrote the above-referenced letter describing their
initial conversation. 32 The Plaintiff was "overjoyed" because he
believed that the letter exonerated him, but testified that he
continued to experience retaliation, recounting statements Kells
made to him when he went to vote on election night, as well as
various customer complaints that were placed in his personnel
file. 33 The Plaintiff testified that in his eighteen-year career at
the Gas Company he had never received a single customer
complaint prior to the incident. 34
A year after the initial conversation with Morris, the Plaintiff
filed this action alleging that the Defendants conspired to slander
his reputation and cause him injury by defaming him to his
employer, among other claims. 35 At the conclusion of their case,
the Defendants filed a motion arguing that no evidence had been
produced to support a claim of slander per se, and that any
statements made by either Defendant were not defamatory
because they were substantially true. 36 The trial justice denied
the motion because he found that reasonable minds could differ as
to both issues. 37
The jury found the Defendants guilty and returned a verdict
of $50,000 in the Plaintiffs favor. 38 The Defendants presented
motions for a new trial, judgment as a matter of law and
remittitur. 39 The trial court conditionally granted the motion for
a new trial unless the Plaintiff accepted a remittitur, reducing the
amount of the judgment to $20,000.40 Although the Plaintiff
accepted the remittitur, the Defendants appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. 41 The Plaintiff, in turn, filed a cross
appeal. 42
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 40.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Defendants presented a number of issues on appeal,
including that the lower court should have found that their
statements were not defamatory. 43 The Supreme Court agreed
that the statements were not defamatory and accordingly held
that the trial justice erred when he denied the Defendant's motion
as a matter of law. 44 As a result, the Court did not have occasion
to address the other issues raised on appeal. 45
When the Supreme Court reviews a denial of a judgment as a
matter of law it considers the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, drawing from the record all reasonable
inferences that support the position of the non-moving party.46
The court must deny judgment as a matter of law if factual issues
exist upon which reasonable people may draw different
conclusions. 47  Whether the meaning of a particular
communication is defamatory, however, is a question of law for
the court to decide, rather than a factual issue for the jury to
decide. 48
To prevail in a defamation action, a plaintiff must show that
the statement is "false and malicious, imputing conduct which
injuriously affects a man's reputation, or which tends to degrade
him in society or bring him into public hatred or contempt. '' 49 A
plaintiff must show that the statement was defamatory on its face,
or by way of innuendo. 5° The decisive question is what the
person(s) to whom the communication was made reasonably
understood as the meaning intended to be expressed. 51
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial justice that
the statements at issue were defamatory per se. 52 A statement is
defamatory per se if it charges improper conduct, lack of skill or
integrity in one's profession or business, and is of such a nature
that it is calculated to cause injury to one in his profession or
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 213.
49. Id. at 212.
50. Id. at 213.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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business. 5 3 The disparaging words must affect the plaintiff in
some way that is peculiarly harmful to one engaged in his trade or
profession; disparagement of a general character, equally
discreditable to all, is not enough unless the particular quality is
especially valuable to the plaintiffs business or profession.
5 4
Thus, "the imputation of moral misconduct is not actionable per se
to a tradesman, though it might be if spoken about a
clergyman."5 5
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the statements
were not defamatory per se "because they neither harmed the
plaintiffs business reputation nor alleged that he committed any
crime, either on their face or by any reasonable connotation."
' 56
The Court based its determination of the facts on Toohey's
testimony because they determined it was the version more
injurious to the Plaintiff.57 The Court held that even Toohey's
version of Slater's statements did not in any way harm the
Plaintiffs business reputation.5 8 The Court disagreed with the
Plaintiffs argument that Slater's statements did harm to the
Plaintiffs business reputation in that Slater accused him of
dishonesty. 59 The Court referred to a dictionary definition of
"dishonesty" which included a disposition to lie, cheat or steal, and
determined that Slater's words did not address any of these
characteristics. 60 Thus, the Court held that Slater's statements to
Toohey did not harm the Plaintiffs business reputation.
61
The Court further determined that the statements at issue, on
their face, did not accuse the Plaintiff of committing any crime.
6 2
A defendant must allege the essential elements of a crime for his
statements to be considered defamatory per se.6 3  Here, the
Plaintiff alleged that Slater accused him of committing
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 214.
63. Id.
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extortion. 64 In Rhode Island, extortion consists of an oral or
written threat to harm a person or property, which is accompanied
by the intent to compel someone to do something against his or
her will.6 5
The Court determined that none of Slater's words alleged that
the Plaintiff threatened Morris with the intent to compel him to
act unwillingly.66 Rather they held that his statements, at most,
amounted to a suggestion of a potential economic boycott of
Morris' business. 67 The court reasoned that Toohey's reaction to
the statements supported this conclusion, because she treated the
statements as a standard complaint, not a criminal charge. 68
Although the Plaintiffs supervisors later used the word extortion,
Toohey testified that Slater never used that word. 69
The Court further determined that no reasonable connotation
of Slater's statements about the Plaintiff could be said to be
defamatory because there were no extrinsic factors known by
Toohey that would have led her to believe that the statements
harmed the Plaintiffs business reputation or charged him with
the commission of a crime. 70 Innuendo may be used to define the
defamatory meaning of words, but it cannot be used to enlarge the
meaning of words or give to language a construction it will not
bear.71
The Court reasoned that the Plaintiff offered no extrinsic
factors known to Toohey that would support the proposition that
Slater's statement connoted defamation, or that Toohey
interpreted Slater's words to be defamatory. 72 Justice Flaherty
observed that none of the words Slater used are susceptible to a
secondary defamatory meaning.73 Because the Court determined
that the meaning of Slater's words could not be enlarged to show
that the statements either harmed the Plaintiffs business
reputation or alleged that he committed a crime, they held that
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 215.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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the Defendants' motion as a matter of law should have been
granted. 74
COMMENTARY
Justice Flaherty began his opinion with a reminder that
"political campaigning, especially on the party primary election
level, is not a game for the faint of heart. ' 75 The Plaintiff alleged
clearly inappropriate conduct on the part of Defendant Kells. 76
This case, however, hinged entirely on what Defendant Slater said
to Toohey. The extrinsic factors that the Plaintiff stressed,
including that Defendant Kells intimidated him at his home and
at the polls, could not add any meaning to the words spoken by
Defendant Slater because Toohey was not aware of those
encounters. 77
Justice Flaherty accurately characterized this case as a "he
said, she said" dispute. 78 I believe it can be further characterized
as a case in which, assuming the Plaintiffs account is true, at
least one of Defendants clearly behaved badly, but in which the
Plaintiff nonetheless failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The Court, by overturning a jury verdict, sent a
strong message that it is difficult to establish a claim of civil
conspiracy and slander in Rhode Island.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the lower court's
judgment of civil conspiracy and slander against the two
defendants because the court determined that Slater's statements
to Toohey were not, in fact, defamatory.
Sally P. McDonald
74. Id.
75. Id. at 209..
76. See Id. at 211.
77. Id. at 214.
78. Id. at 211.
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Constitutional Law. Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588 (R.I. 2007).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Rhode Island State
Constitution is not violated by § 42-128.1-8(e)(4), an exemption
from the Lead Hazard Mitigation Act for owner-occupied, two- and
three-unit rental properties. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that because the Rhode Island General Assembly might
conclude that the classification of rental properties was rationally
related to realizing the goal of targeting areas where lead
poisoning in children was most prevalent, the classification did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Lead Hazard
Mitigation Act (LHMA) in 2002, and after two postponements, it
went into effect on November 1, 2005.1 To "promote the prevention
of childhood lead poisoning in Rhode Island" the General
Assembly intended:
"(1) To increase the supply of rental housing in Rhode Island
in which lead hazards are, at a minimum, mitigated; (2) To
improve public awareness of lead issues and to educate both
property owners and tenants about practices that can reduce the
incidence of lead poisoning; (3) [and] [t]o resolve disjointed
insurance practices arising from lead liabilities exclusions. '2
As originally enacted, the LHMA required all owners of rental
residences constructed prior to 1978 to (1) attend a lead hazard
awareness seminar; (2) assess rental units and property for lead
hazards; (3) correct lead hazards to meet the lead hazard
mitigation standard; (4) provide tenants with information; and (5)
within thirty days after notification correct lead hazards. 3
However, before the LHMA came into effect in 2005 it was
1. Mackie v. State. 936 A.2d 588, 590-91 (R.I. 2007). (Originally, the
LHMA was scheduled to apply to the first change in tenancy after July 1,
2004. The Act ultimately came into effect on November 1, 2005 after
postponement first to July 1, 2005 and then to the November date.).
2. Id. at 590.
3. Id.
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amended to include an exemption from these duties for certain
property owners of pre-1978 rental dwellings. 4 Included in the
exception are units "comprised of two (2) or three (3) units, one of
which is occupied by the property owner."' 5 Finally, the call for
the department of health to "report to the legislature annually on
the number of children who are lead poisoned in any of the
exempted dwelling units" ensured monitoring of childhood lead
poisoning in exempted apartment units would continue, thereby
placing a check on the exemption. 6
Owners of rental properties in Rhode Island brought suit on
the grounds that the exemption from the LHMA found in
subsection (e)(4) for owner-occupied rental properties comprised of
two- or three-units. 7 The Plaintiffs claimed that the distinction
between owner-occupied two- and three-unit residences and
owner-occupied four- and five-unit residences was arbitrary.8 In
addition to seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the Plaintiffs
asked that the Court declare the LHMA unconstitutional and
enjoin the state from enforcing it.9
At trial the Plaintiffs and the state both introduced
numerous evidentiary exhibits and affidavits. 10 Despite evidence
presented by the State that showed conceivable reasons for
distinguishing between owner-occupied and non-owner-occupied
properties, the trial justice held that § 42-128.18(e)(4), an
exemption to the LHMA, violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Rhode Island Constitution and was therefore
unconstitutional. 11 The trial justice found 'no rationale basis for
allowing the children who live in these two- and three-unit owner-
occupied buildings to be at riskwhile children living in other units
4. Id. at 590. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-128.1-8(e) "Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to common areas
in condominium complexes that are owned and operated by condominium
associations, or to pre-1978 rental dwelling units that are: (1) Lead safe or
lead free; or (2) Temporary housing; or (3) Elderly housing; or (4) Comprised
of two (2) or three (3) units, one of which is occupied by the property owner."
5. Id. at 591.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 591-94.
11. Id. at 594.
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enjoy the protections of the [LHMA].'12 Furthermore, the trial
justice saw no reason for children of owner-occupied apartments to
be at the 'tender mercies"' of the building's owners, while children
in non-owner-occupied apartments enjoyed the "'salubrious
benefits' of the LHMA. 13
This case came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court in a
unique fashion because despite deciding that the LHMA was
unconstitutional, the trial justice did not enjoin the state from
enforcing the statute. 14 The trial justice instead encouraged the
state legislators to revisit and revise the LHMA. 15 The trial
justice refused to enter a final judgment from which appeal could
be sought denying the state's motion for entry of final judgment on
January 30, 2006 and subsequently denying the state's motion of
March 6, 2006 to stay the decision. 16 The state petitioned the
Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on March 14,
2006.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In its appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the state
asserted three legal errors. First, the state contended that the
trial justice erred in finding that the exemption to the LHMA
violates the Rhode Island Constitution.' 8 The second argument
the state made was that trial justice shifted the burden of proof
for the rational basis test improperly. 19  Finally, the state
complained that the denial of its motion for final judgment made
any other form of appellate review impossible. 20
12. Id. (quoting Mackie v. State, No. C.A. PC05-5144, 2006 WL 61053 at
*9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2006)).
13. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 595 (quoting Mackie, 2006 WL 61053 at *9).
14. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 595.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. When a trial judge in Rhode Island makes a final judgment, that
judgment is automatically appeallable to the Rhode Island Supreme Court
because the State does not have an appellate court. The Rhode Island
Constitution provides the Rhode Island Supreme Court with "final revisory
and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity." See R.I.
CONST. art. 10 § 2. Therefore, without a final judgment from the trial court,
it is harder for a party to have his case heard at the Rhode Island Supreme
SURVEY SECTION
The Supreme Court's Standard of Review
In the opinion written by Chief Justice Williams, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court began by establishing the standard of
review it employed for issues regarding the constitutionality of a
state law. The Court "presumes that [a] legislative enactmen[t]
[is] valid and constitutional" and will not find it unconstitutional
unless the challenging party can prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Act violates a specific provision of the Rhode Island or the
United States Constitution. 21
Equal Protection
Of the three issues raised on appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court specifically addressed only the plaintiffs'
argument that the exception to the LHMA violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution by
discriminating against owners of rental property with four or
more dwelling units.22 The Court applied the rational basis test
because the LHMA does not encroach upon a fundamental right.23
Under this test, the statute is upheld as constitutional if the Court
conceives any reasonable basis to justify the classification. 24 The
intent of the Legislature was when it passed the legislation is
irrelevant to the finding. 25
In applying the rational basis test, the Court established that
the proper inquiry was "whether the General Assembly rationally
could conclude that the legislation would resolve a legitimate
problem." 26  Therefore, LHMA would only violate the Equal
Protection Clause if the classification it established rested on
grounds "wholly irrelevant" to achieving the state's objective. 27
Finally, the Court established that the burden is on the
challenging party to "negate every conceivable basis" which might
Court because he must petition and have granted a writ of certiorari.
21. Id. at 595.
22. Id. (quoting R.I. CONST. art. 1 § 2 ("nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws.")).
23. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 596.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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support the legislative classification. 28
The exemption to the LHMA treats owners of owner-occupied
two- and three-units differently than owners of rental properties
the same size that do not live on the property, and owners of
properties with four or more rental units. Despite this disparate
treatment, the Court concluded that the General Assembly could
rationally have decided that the LHMA took a step toward
reducing the lead poisoning of Rhode Island's children. 29
The state was not required to support the LHMVA exemption
with empirical evidence, but provided affidavits from professionals
who identified studies showing that children with lead poisoning
were less likely to live in owner-occupied rental properties than
non-owner-occupied residences. 30 Persuaded by these affidavits,
the Court read the trial justice's holding that there was 'no
rational basis for allowing the children who live in these two[-]
and three-unit owner-occupied buildings to be at risk while
children living in other units enjoy the protections of the [LHMA]"'
as indicating the trial justice found the statute unconstitutional
because it did not equally protect all children living in rental
units.31 Instead the Court said that the proper inquiry should
have been "whether the General Assembly had a rational basis to
believe that its chosen solution would remedy a legitimate state
problem." 32
Using this inquiry the Court found that it would be
reasonable for the General Assembly to conclude that owners who
live on the premises would be more likely to address and fix lead
hazards for their own safety, thus making the rental units on the
premises safer.33 Additionally, the General Assembly could find
that owners living on the premises were more available and more
attentive to maintenance needs. 34 The legislators could further
conclude that rental properties with four or more units were
harder to maintain. 35 With larger rental properties more difficult
to maintain, even if the owner lived on the premises, the
28. Id. at 597.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Mackie, 2006 WL 61053 at *9).
32. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 597.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 598.
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legislature could also conclude that owners would not keep up
with their maintenance duties. 3 6  Finally, because rental
properties with four or more units can house more residents, the
number of children that could potentially suffer lead poisoning
would be greater. 3 7
While the Court's suggests that the LHMA and the exception
for two- and three-unit owner occupied properties would not
eradicate the lead poisoning problem, the Court reasoned that the
General Assembly could view it as one step toward that end. 3 8
The Court found that the plaintiffs failed "to carry their heavy
burden of negating every conceivable rational basis" that could
support the LHMA exemption. 39 The Court therefore concluded
that the trial justice erred in finding the exemption to the LHMA
unconstitutional. 40
While the Court did not find it necessary to decide the case
based on the other issues on appeal, the Court made a point to
address the actions taken by the trial justice. The Court noted
that while it would not sanction the trial justice for his refusal to
enter a final judgment, he "circumvented [the] Court's
constitutionally vested jurisdiction" and burdened the litigants
who were required to petition for a writ of certiorari. 41
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's application of the rational
basis test follows a standard and predictable pattern. Once the
Court established that the rational basis test was appropriate, the
state easily demonstrated a reasonable basis for its classification.
In declaring the exception to the LHMA constitutional, the Court
solidified the constitutionality of the entire LHMA. This brings a
new path to remedy for cases of childhood lead poisoning in Rhode
Island. The duties imposed by the LHMA on the owners of rental
properties built before 1978 means that renters can now expect
owners to search for and mitigate high lead levels in their rental
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 598 n.3.
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units. Perhaps more importantly, the implication of this holding
is that tenants now have grounds for filing suit under the LHMA
if their landlords fail to ensure that the properties they rent have
safe levels of lead. Although the exception excuses certain rental-
property owners from these duties, the Court's holding might lead
to concrete studies on the occurrences of lead poisoning in children
living in the different classifications of rental properties as
established by the LHMA. As a result of the Court's decision in
Mackie, Rhode Island courts can expect even more lead-paint
cases in its future.
The more interesting part of the Court's opinion in Mackie is
perhaps the tone of displeasure the Court sets when discussing
the trial justice's failure to issue a final judgment in the case. The
Court made a specific point to address the trial justice's failure to
enter a final verdict noting: "we pause to note our concern with
the trial justice's refusal to enter final judgment. ' 42 Additionally,
the Court specifically notes that it "cannot sanction such judicial
action," but gives as a reason the burden on the litigants rather
than the lack of wrongdoing on the trial justices part.43
Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court emphasizes the
requirement for final verdicts going forward because the failure to
issue a final verdict burdens the litigants who must seek a writ of
certiorari to have their case heard on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In Mackie v. State the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the exemption, which relieves owners of owner-occupied two- and
three-unit rental properties from duties under the LHIA, did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Rhode Island
Constitution. The Court further admonished the trial justice's
failure to enter a final judgment, thereby leaving the aggrieved
party in "legal limbo." 44
Gwen Hancock
42. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 598.
43. Id.
44. Id.
Contract Law. Bucklin v. Morelli, 912 A.2d 931 (R.I. 2007). In
Rhode Island, specific performance of a real estate agreement is
an available remedy if a purchaser can demonstrate that at all
times he or she was ready and willing to perform the contract. In
this case, the plaintiff sufficiently established by clear and
convincing evidence that she was ready, willing and able to pay
the agreed-upon consideration and accept encumbered title within
a reasonable time after the specified closing date. Also, the de
facto existence of an extended closing date can be inferred from
the conduct of the parties to a purchase and sales agreement
despite the absence of an explicit written extension, when no "time
is of the essence" clause is included in the contract. In Rhode
Island, the trial judge has broad discretion in a decision to grant
specific performance of a real estate contract.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
What began as the search for an affordable home for Mr. and
Mrs. Allan Bucklin's son, resulted in seven-year battle for the
right to purchase a parcel of real property at 126 Lakedell Drive in
Warwick. 1 On July 7, 2000, Frances Morelli (as the executrix of
her father's estate) entered into a purchase and sales agreement
with Judith Bucklin, in which Ms. Morelli agreed to sell Mrs.
Bucklin the Lakedell property for $77,000.2 The agreement
stipulated that the closing was to be held on September 1, 2000 at
the Office of the Registry of Deeds; however no "time is of the
essence" provision was included. 3 Of particular importance to this
case was Paragraph Ten of the purchase and sales agreement,
which provided that:
"If the Seller is unable to [convey good, clear, insurable,
and marketable title], Buyer shall have the option to: (a)
accept such title as Seller is able to convey without
abatement or reduction of the Purchase Price, or (b)
1. See Bucklin v. Morelli, 912 A.2d 931, 932 (R.I. 2007).
2. See id. at 932.
3. See id.
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cancel this Agreement and receive a return of all
Deposits."
In addition, the agreement required the approval of the
Probate Court as a condition of sale, and included an integration
clause. 5
After a title search conducted later that July by Mrs.
Bucklin's attorney revealed the existence of several liens on the
Lakedell property, Ms. Morelli's attorney was notified, and the
two parties communicated frequently as to how the issue may be
resolved before the upcoming closing. 6 During this process, the
attorneys came to acknowledge that resolving the marketable title
issue would be impossible by the September 1st closing date. 7
However, no written extension was ever executed, and
communication between the two ceased. 8 Believing the closing to
be only a "target" date, Mrs. Bucklin chose not to exercise her
rights under Paragraph Ten of the agreement on or before
September 1, 2000 in order to allow Ms. Morelli's attorney more
time to have the liens on the property removed. 9 In addition, she
suggested the closing date be extended to September 15th in a
letter to Ms. Morelli, dated August 30, 2000.10
At some time between September 15th and October 1st, Mrs.
Bucklin expressed her desire to exercise her rights under
Paragraph Ten of the agreement, which would allow her to
purchase the property without clear title. 11 This desire was
formalized in a letter sent by Mrs. Bucklin's attorney to Ms.
Morelli on October 16, 2000.12 Neither Ms. Morelli nor her
attorney responded to this letter, or communicated any intention
to terminate the purchase and sales agreement. 13 Mrs. Bucklin
maintained sufficient funds to purchase the property at all times
between the execution of the purchase and sales agreement and
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 933.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 934.
13. See id.
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the sending of the October 16th letter. 14 A deposit was still being
held in escrow at the time of trial. 15 However, Mrs. Bucklin did
acknowledge that at some point, Ms. Morelli's realtor attempted to
return her deposit check. 16
In both November and December of 2000, Mrs. Bucklin
reiterated her desire to purchase the Lakedell property without
clear title or inspections in two separate letters to Ms. Morelli.17
After no response from Ms. Morelli or her representatives, Mrs.
Bucklin brought an action for specific performance in Rhode
Island Superior Court.' 8 At trial, Ms. Morelli testified that
although she never personally communicated her desire to end the
deal, she did instruct her realtor to return the deposit check in
September of 2000.19 She also testified that despite the provision
in Paragraph Ten, she believed that she would not be legally
capable of selling the property without first resolving the liens
issue. 20 Thus, she understood the letter from Mrs. Bucklin's
attorney on October 16th, and any subsequent letters from Mrs.
Bucklin, to be offers to form a new agreement. 21
On May 25, 2001, Superior Court Justice Mark A. Pfeiffer
issued a bench decision in favor of Mrs. Bucklin, and ordered
specific performance of the purchase and sales agreement. 22 Ms.
Morelli appealed, asserting that the trial justice erred in granting
the plaintiffs request for specific performance of the real estate
sales contract. 23 She also contended that the trial judge abused
his discretion in allowing a certain realtor to testify as an expert
witness. 24
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 932.
19. See id. at 935.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 932.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Request for Specific Performance
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first held that the trial
justice did not err in granting the plaintiff, Mrs. Bucklin, specific
performance of the purchase and sales agreement. 2 5 The court
noted that specific performance is an available remedy when the
purchaser in a written real estate contract establishes that he or
she was at all times ready and willing to perform the contract. 26
In addition, the court recognized the availability of the remedy
when a party "unjustifiably refuses or fails to perform under the
agreement. '27
The court proceeded to review the lower court's conclusions,
noting that a trial justice has broad discretion in a decision to
grant specific performance. 2 8 Before specific performance could be
granted, the plaintiff was required to show that both a valid
agreement existed, and that she was ready, willing and able to
pay the agreed-upon consideration and accept encumbered title
within a reasonable time after the September 1, 2000 closing
date. 2 9  The trial justice found through clear and convincing
evidence that both requirements were met, and the Rhode Island
Supreme Court agreed with his analysis. 30 Importantly, the trial
justice reasoned that although there was no explicit extension of
the closing date, the "de facto existence" of an extension could be
inferred from the parties' conduct. 3 1
At trial, the defendant, Ms. Morelli, contended that she had
made an earnest effort to return the deposit check to the
plaintiff.3 2 She also maintained that the cash nature of the real
estate transaction created a time mandate. 33 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court found that the trial justice properly addressed,
and subsequently rejected both contentions, within his sound
25. See id. at 936.
26. See id. (citing Thompson v. McCann, 762 A.2d 432, 436 (R.I. 2000).
27. Id. (quoting Yates v. Hill, 761 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I. 2000).
28. See id. at 935-36.
29. See id. at 936.
30. See id. at 936-37.
31. Id. at 936.
32. See id. at 937.
33. See id.
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discretion. 34 Thus, the court found no abuse of discretion in either
the grant of specific performance, or the analysis supporting it.35
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also rejected the
defendant's second argument on appeal regarding the testimony of
a Rhode Island realtor as an expert witness at trial. 36 The
plaintiff called the realtor to testify that when there is an absence
of "time is of the essence" language in a purchase and sales
agreement, the closing date is viewed in the industry as merely a
target date. 37 The realtor also testified that without such a
provision, it is not uncommon for transactions to close after the
target date. 38 The trial justice allowed the testimony to help
clarify that ambiguity in the contract, and chose to determine the
probative value of the testimony at the close of trial. 39
The court reasoned that the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion in allowing the testimony of the realtor because the
statements were not actually relied upon in the making of the
decision. 40 Instead, the trial justice relied only upon the conduct
of the parties in making the determination that they wanted to
extend the closing to a later date. 41 Thus, both issues on appeal
were denied, and the judgment of the Superior Court was
affirmed.42
COMMENTARY
This case presented the Rhode Island Supreme Court with
little more than a typical abuse of discretion review. However, the
decision does help to further define the rights of a real estate
purchaser who may be strung along or left in the dark by a
confused or irresponsible seller. Conversely, it serves as a
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. .
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 938.
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warning to sellers who may believe that remaining silent after a
closing date has passed terminates the agreement. This dual-
purpose holding stems mainly from the newly-created rule that
closing date extensions can be inferred from the parties' conduct
in the absence of a written postponement. 43 However, this "de
facto extension" rule now leaves the door open for further
inquiries: What are the allowable types of conduct to consider?
How much conduct is needed? Could enough conduct ever
invalidate a written extension?
This case also serves as a reminder for any party to a
purchase and sales agreement interested in establishing a firm
closing date that one cannot undervalue the importance of even
the smallest contractual provisions. Here, the absence of a "time
is of the essence" clause left the closing date open to interpretation
using both conduct and industry standards. 44 However, some
buyers and sellers may actually find flexibility desirable,
especially if many loose ends remain untied. The testimony of the
realtor in this case showed that leaving out a time mandate
generally permits the closing to occur during a reasonable target
period, rather than on a fixed date. 45
Interestingly, the court opted not to rule on whether the
realtor should have been allowed to even testify as an expert
witness. 46 Because the trial judge had not relied on the testimony
in his decision, it was not necessary for the court to reach that
question. 47 However, Justice Robinson, writing for the court, did
acknowledge the issue as "intriguing."48 If the trial justice had
relied on the realtor's testimony beyond its ambiguity-clarifying
function, the court would have been forced to address this
"intriguing" issue, including an analysis on the qualification of the
realtor as an expert.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed the
defendant's appeal, finding no error in either the trial justice's
43. See id. at 936.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 937.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
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analysis or in his final decision to grant specific performance in
favor of the plaintiff purchaser. Particularly, the court affirmed
the trial justice's use of an inferred de facto extension of the
closing date in his reasoning. The court also found no abuse of
discretion in the admitting of testimony of a realtor as an expert
witness because the statements were not relied upon in the trial
justice's final decision. However, the interesting question as to
whether the realtor should have been allowed to even testify as an
expert remains unanswered.
Amanda J. Argentieri
Criminal Law. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397 (R.I. 2007). Evidence
of the defendant's prior manslaughter conviction is admissible at
the defendant's current murder trial to impeach his credibility if
he chooses to testify, as the evidence is of probative value with
respect to the defendant's credibility. Letters sent by the
defendant incarcerated at the ACI to his cohort while awaiting
trial for murder coupled with cohort's testimony were relevant,
and the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that
the probative value of the letters did not outweigh their
prejudicial effect at trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Prior to 2001, the victim Harold Jackson Andrews ("Jack")
and his wife had lived in relative normalcy, but this blissful
domestic interlude was shattered in 2000 when Jack came under
the bewitching influence of the jezebel Bobbie-Jo Dumont, an
abuser of alcohol, cocaine, methadone, and heroin in addition to
being the mother of four children and an exotic dancer at
Cheaters, a Providence strip club. 1 Jack met Bobbie-Jo while she
was working, and from that night they began a relationship in
which Jack acted as a personal taxi service for Ms. Dumont to
take her anywhere she asked, and furnished her with money to
buy drugs, clothes, and food, and to pay her rent and bills.2
Although their relationship was initially platonic, Jack began
to demand sexual gratification in exchange for the money he
supplied to Dumont, and she acquiesced to this arrangement. 3 In
2001, Dumont quit her gainful employment at Cheaters, replacing
this with a career in the world's oldest profession, and proceeded
to lose custody of her four offspring and get evicted from her
apartment, whereupon Jack paid for Dumont to stay in various
motels and occasionally snuck her into his home to allow her to
sleep next to his bed. 4 Around this time Jack confessed to his wife
1. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397, 400 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 400-01.
4. Id. at 401.
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that he was taking care of Dumont and, not surprisingly, the
Andrews' marriage began to disintegrate. 5 Jack was frequently
away from the marital home for days at a time, became surly and
laconic, lost weight, stopped going to work, frequently argued with
his stepson and ceased caring for his infirm mother.6 Mrs.
Andrews finally left Jack in 2002. 7
Also during that year, Ms. Dumont was admitted into SSTAR
of Rhode Island, a drug detoxification service in North Kingstown,
where she first met the defendant, Harold T. Drew.8 Ms. Dumont
stated that she and Drew "were just perfect for each other"-an
idyllic romance they were able to sexually consummate within the
week on SSTAR property, resulting in the expulsion of both of
them from the detoxification program. 9 After their expulsion,
Drew and Dumont stayed in abandoned buildings and cars,
eventually settling down to reside in a van on defendant's father's
yard.' 0 Despite Dumont's discovery of her "Mr. Right," Jack
continued to faithfully ferry Ms. Dumont to her morning
methadone dosage, while expressing his stern disapproval of the
dreamy coupling of Dumont and Drew. 11
Jack lost his job in 2002, leaving the doomed triumvirate
without further financial means to satisfy the $200 per day drug
habits of Dumont and defendant, and consequently the three
began a series of daily breakings and entering into residences in
the South County area, with Jack driving getaway. 12 According to
Dumont the only time Jack entered one of the abodes was to help
the defendant Drew carry a gun locker from the cellar of a house,
which they buried in a secluded field in Exeter after removing
some of the firearms which they stored in the defendant's father's
home. 13
On May 12, 2003, Jack told Ms. Dumont that he wanted to
cease his participation in the thefts the bizarre love triangle were
involved in and that she must choose between himself and the
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 401-02.
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defendant. 14 An altercation ensued in which Jack struck Ms.
Dumont, and upon her reporting this incident to the defendant, he
stated that he wanted to kill Jack. 15 The following day, at the
defendant's request, Ms. Dumont contacted Jack and persuaded
him to help defendant dispose of the firearm cache in the lonely,
distant Exeter field. 16
The cursed three returned to the field off of William Reynolds
Road, and under the instructions of defendant, Dumont and Jack
began wiping off fingerprints from the jettisoned gun locker. 17
Drew then picked up the weapons from Jack's pickup truck,
approached Jack from behind, and shot him in the back of the
head with a shotgun. 18 Drew then proceeded to steal Jack's wallet,
Ms. Dumont covered the corpse with a quilt and the gun locker,
and the two drove away in the former Jack's pickup truck. 19 The
defendant Drew proceeded to assure Dumont that things would be
alright and instructed her to say that if asked what had happened
was an accident. 20
On June 1, 2003 the lifeless remains of Jack were found, and
five days later Dumont and Drew were arrested for his murder. 21
On July 31, 2003 Ms. Dumont entered into a cooperation
agreement with the state to testify against the defendant, and
approximately one week following the grand jury indicted
defendant for murder in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-122,
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence in
violation of G.L 1956 § 11-47-3.2(b)(3) 23 and three counts of
14. Id. at 402.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 402.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2007) states, in relevant part, "[t]he
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing.. .is murder in the first
degree."
23. Id. R.I GEN. LAws § 11-47-3.2 (2007) states, in relevant part, "(a) No
person shall use a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a crime
of violence... (b) Every person who, while committing an offense violating
subsection (a) of this section, discharges a firearm shall be guilty of a felony
and be imprisoned as follows: ... (3) Life.. .if the death or permanent
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entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny therein in
violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-8-3.24 While in prison at the Adult
Correctional Institution ("ACI"), defendant and Ms. Dumont
penned several romantic missives which contained potentially
damaging admissions, and the defendant sought fruitlessly to
have three of his passionate written musings excluded from
evidence at trial.25
At defendant's trial, which began in October 2004, the state
presented an array of witnesses and physical evidence, including
the testimony of Dumont and Mrs. Andrews, the victim's former
wife, as well as William Reis, a man who had known the
defendant for a quarter of a century and was co-resident of a cell
at the ACI with him.26 Defendant reportedly confided to Mr. Reis
that the murder of Jack was an accident, and attempted to obtain
Mr. Reis's assistance in a plot to embroil one Donald Perraro as
Jack's murderer, later altering this connivance to point the finger
to Dumont as the killer of Jack. 27
A jury convicted the defendant on all five counts on November
10, 2004.28 On Februrary 7, 2005, defendant was sentenced to two
mandatory life sentences, one each for first-degree murder and for
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, to be
served consecutively, plus ten years to serve for each of three
counts of breaking and entering, to be served concurrently with
each other and the life sentence for first-degree murder. 29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGS
A. Jury Instructions
The defendant argued that the trial justice, committed
reversible error by erroneously omitting two instructions from his
charge, one a comprehensive accident instruction and the other an
accomplice instruction. 3
incapacity of any person (other than the person convicted) results from the
discharge of the firearm."
24. Drew, 919 A.2d at 402.
25. Id. at 403.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id..
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1. Accident Instruction
Based on the testimony of co-cellmate Mr. Reis that the
killing of Jack had been described by defendant as an "accident,"
the defendant sought a jury charge which gave a lengthy
explication on the niceties which exist between the concepts of
intent and accident. 31 The trial justice settled on a charge which
stated "[a]s to the word 'willfully,' you are instructed that an act is
done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not by
mistake or accident...,,.32 The defendant objected, but the trial
justice ruled that he had sufficiently instructed the jury on the
elements of first and second degree murder. 33
On appeal the defendant took specific issue with the weak
reference to "accident" in the jury charge. 34 However, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that considering the utter dearth of
evidence admitted at trial to support the defense's theory that
Jack's death was the result of an accident, the trial justice was not
obligated to give a more comprehensive accident instruction. 35
The court pointed out that the defendant admitted at oral
argument that he did not present accident as a defense at trial,
that defendant did not present evidence of accident at trial, nor
did he argue it in his closing argument. 36 In addition, the Court
pointed out that the only testimony supporting any possible
argument for accident was presented by Mr. Reis, a state's
witness. 37 Thus, the court concluded that based upon the paltry
evidence of accident at trial, a further mention of accident in the
jury charge would only serve to confuse or mislead the jury, and
the trial justice committed no error. 38
31. Defendant's proposed jury instruction as to accident stated in
relevant part "[T]he state must prove that the homicide was intentional.
Every crime involves a physical element-the doing of the act-and a mental
element-the wrongful or criminal intent. If the intent does not exist, then
the act is not a crime. An example would be an accidental death. Accident is
the opposite of intent. If a person kills another accidentally, he or she lacks
the wrongful intent, which, would, if the other elements were present, make
the act a murder." Id. at 404.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 405.
36. Id.at 404.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 405.
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2. Accomplice Instruction
The trial justice offered a jury instruction which defendant
contested did not include his requested accomplice provision which
read in part:"[T]he law now is that the jury must look with
particular care at the testimony of an accomplice and scrutinize it
very carefully before they accept it." '3 9 However, the court noted
that the well-settled law of Rhode Island is that it is not necessary
for a trial justice to give an accomplice charge. 40 The court pointed
out that the role of a trial justice is not to act for the prosecution
or defense, and that counsel, not the court are the proper agents to
contest to the jury the credibility or lack thereof of a particular
witness. 41 The court stated specifically that it will overturn such
firm precedent only "if the motivating purpose is to eliminate
inconsistency and anomalous results" and that because in the
defendant's imploration of the court he proffered no evidence that
the instant case undermined existing law, and all supporting
authority cited by the defense were from foreign jurisdictions, the
defendant's contention on this point was meritless.
42
B. Evidentiary Challenges
1. Admissibility of Letters
The defendant's first evidentiary challenge contended that the
trial justice erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude from
evidence three of the amorous writings the defendant scribed to
Ms. Dumont while both were in the ACI, all of which contained
"cryptic passages" that Ms. Dumont testified alluded to the
murder of Jack.4 3 Defendant claimed the letters were irrelevant or
alternatively unduly prejudicial, but the Supreme Court held that
the amatory epistles were indubitably relevant, the first two of
which explicitly hinted towards defendant's motives for killing
Jack and thus were probative of premeditation, an element of
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing State v. Sivo, 809 A.2d 481, 491 (R.I. 2002)).
41. Drew, 919 A.2d at 405-06.
42. Id. at 406, quoting State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049, 1056 (R.I. 2005).
43. Id. at 406.
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first-degree murder. 44 The third writing also demonstrated
relevance in that it could be cognized as illustrative of defendant's
guilty knowledge-an attempt by the defendant to enlist Ms.
Dumont, the sole witness to the defendant's crime, in a stratagem
to conceal the truth of the murder. 45 Furthermore, the Court held
that defendant's argument that the letters were unduly
prejudicial was meritless in that although the compositions failed
to show defendant in his best possible light, the Court could not
say that the trial justice abused his discretion by ruling that any
prejudice the letters instilled was not outweighed by their
probative value. 46
2. Rule 609 (Admissibility of prior conviction)
Defendant also contended that the trial justice misapplied
Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 47 by permitting
the state to introduce defendant's prior conviction for
manslaughter to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify.48
Irrespective of defendant's formidable litany of violations against
the law, the trial justice ruled that only four prior convictions
would be admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to
testify, one being a 1982 conviction for manslaughter, the others a
2002 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 1997
conviction for possession of heroin, and evidence of a 1990
breaking and entering. 49 On appeal the defendant contended that
the admission of the manslaughter conviction was probative of
propensity rather than veracity, and that the similarity of the
offense and the homicide for which he was being tried created a
44. Id.; see R.I.GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2007), supra, note 21.
45. Drew, 919 A.2d at 407.
46. Id.
47. Id. R.I.R.EvID. 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
reads in relevant part: "(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public
record. "Convicted of a crime" includes (1) pleas of guilty, (2) pleas of nolo
contendre followed by a sentence (i.e. fine or imprisonment), whether or not
suspended and (3) adjudications of guilt. (b) Discretion. Evidence of a
conviction under this rule is not admissible if the court determines that its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the
conviction..."
48. Drew, 919 A.2d. at 407.
49. Id. at 407-08.
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high degree of prejudice and outweighed the conviction's probative
value. 50 Based upon this the defendant argued that the trial
justice abused his discretion in permitting the state to use the
prior manslaughter conviction to impeach the defendant's
credibility should he choose to testify, and that this error
prevented the defendant from testifying in opposition to his
constitutional rights. 51
The Court held that in Rhode Island a prior conviction which
is similar or identical to the charged offense is not presumptively
prejudicial; and that rather the similarity of a prior conviction to a
charged offense is only one factor for the trial justice to consider
when balancing probative value of a prior conviction against its
prejudicial effect. 52 The Court reasoned that under 609(b) any
conviction can be used for impeachment purposes unless its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 53
This is based upon Rule 609's manifestation of the recognition
that the testimony of "one who has lived within the rules of society
and the discipline of the law" is of more credence than that of a
person who has exhibited "antisocial tendenc[ies]" by being
involved in and convicted of a serious crime. 54 The Court noted
that in the past it had frequently upheld the use of prior
convictions which were similar or identical to the crime the
defendant was on trial for. 55
The Court expressed dismay at the reasoning of the trial
justice-because he found two prior convictions admissible that
were similar to the charged offenses, and excluded other prior
convictions apparently because they were unlike the pending
charges, the Court said the trial justice mistakenly encouraged
the inference that the prior manslaughter conviction was
admissible as probative of propensity rather than for the purpose
50. Id. at 408.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 409.
53. Id. at 408.
54. Drew, 919 A.2d. at 408. (quoting State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098,
1117 (R.I. 1992); State v. Sands, 386 A.2d 378, 386 (1978)).
55. Drew, 919 A.2d. at 408-409 (citing State v. Remy, 910 A.2d 793 (R.I.
2006); State v. Rodriguez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-32 (R.I. 1999); State v. Taylor,
581 A.2d 1037, 1039 (R.I. 1990); State v. Maxie, 554 A.2d 1028, 1031-32 (R.I.
1989)).
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of impeachment. 56 However, because the Court had the power to
affirm a trial justice's evidentiary ruling even though the grounds
the justice relied on at trial were erroneous, the Court could not
conclude that the trial justice's ruling was an abuse of discretion
regardless of his reasons for finding the prior conviction
probative. 57 Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the
defendant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated
because the admission of the manslaughter conviction caused him
not to testify.58 The Court noted that a defendant may choose to
not take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-
examination, but his constitutional right to testify does not
include the right to prohibit impeachment by prior convictions. 59
C. Limited Cross Examination of State's Witness
The defendant next argued that the trial justice violated his
constitutional right to confrontation when he limited the cross-
examination of Dumont. 60 During cross-examination Dumont
resisted attempts by the defendant to portray her as an aggressor,
and she instead was adamant that she had previously struck Jack
only in self-defense-thus undermining Mrs. Andrews testimony
that Jack was in fear of Dumont and consequently the defendant's
contention that Dumont was the true murderer of Jack. 61 The
State objected, and after discussion at sidebar the trial justice
ruled that defendant's question of Dumont about Mrs. Andrew's
prior testimony was impermissible because it asked Dumont to
comment on the credibility of Mrs. Andrews's testimony. 62
The court reasoned that based upon the U.S. and Rhode
Island Constitutions a criminal defendant has the fundamental
right to cross-examine his or her accusers, but that this right is
not without limits.63 The decision of a trial justice to limit the
scope of cross-examination is reviewed only for clear abuse of
discretion and can only be overruled if such a decision constitutes
56. Drew, 919 A.2d at 409.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 411.
61. Id. at 411.
62. Drew, 919 A.2d at 411.
63. Id. at 411, (quoting State v. Stansell, 909 A.2d 505, 509 (R.I. 2006)).
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prejudicial error. 64 The court mentioned the principle that the
determination of the truthfulness or credibility of a witness lies
within the exclusive province of the jury, from which emerges the
rule that a witness is not permitted to offer an opinion concerning
the truthfulness of the testimony of another witness. 6 5 This is
because questions as to the truthfulness of the statements of
another witness as a general rule have no probative value, and are
improper and argumentative because they fail to assist the jury in
determining witness credibility. 6 6  Because the defendant's
question would not have assisted the jury in any way, it was
consequently irrelevant and the court held that trial justice did
not abuse his discretion by curtailing the defendant's cross-
examination on this point. 67
D. Refresh Recollection
Lastly, the court held that the trial justice had committed no
error in refusing to allow the defendant to refresh Ms. Dumont's
recollection with a document that was a district court complaint
charging an offense which listed the perpetrator as "Bobbie-Jo
Dumont a/kIa Angela Wilkinson."68 Defendant was apparently
attempting to impeach the testimony of Dumont by having her
admit to a prior conviction, but failed to get Dumont to
acknowledge use of such an alias. 6 9 Over the state's objection the
trial court allowed the defendant to lay a foundation for using the
document, but determined that it would disallow the document if
Dumont did not say that it either would or might refresh her
recollection to see the complaint. 70 Dumont refused to cave in to
the defendant's queries, repeatedly answering that the document
would not refresh her memory. 7 1 The court reiterated prior case
law that stated that the only foundational requirement for
refreshing a witness's testimony is that the witness must clearly
be unable to remember something of relevance to the matter being
64. Id.
65. Id. at 412.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 413.
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litigated, and a witness's recollection cannot be refreshed simply
on the basis that it conflicts with another written statement. 72
Thus the Court held that the trial justice's exclusion of the
District Court complaint was proper because it was made on the
basis that admitting the document would not refresh the witness's
memory, not on the basis that the document itself was somehow
improper. 73
COMMENTARY
This case is certainly far more notable for the tragic and
outlandish set of factual circumstances behind it than any novel
issues of law it raises or confronts. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court expressed great deference to the decisions of the trial court
on all issues of the defendant's appeal. Furthermore, there seemed
to be no contentious issues which fell at the margins of either
statutory or case law in Rhode Island. The defendant's appeal
thus appears as a desperate grab for clemency from the court
crossing over areas of jury instruction, evidence, and
constitutional law, which the court all found to be resoundingly
meritless.
If any of the court's holdings or reasoning could be argued to
be in any way groundbreaking or controversial, it would be the
holding that a prior manslaughter conviction is admissible to
impeach the credibility of a witness on trial for murder under
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 609. Although at first blush the
situation seems to potentially raise the sensitive evidentiary issue
of the admission of propensity or character evidence, the fact that
nothing in the evidentiary rule itself excludes similar or identical
convictions squarely puts the power with and onus upon the trial
justice to determine if the probative value of the prior conviction is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The extension of
the admissibility of a similar or identical prior conviction from
assault, 74 or robbery, 75 to the instant case involving homicide
seems to be an extension of degree rather than a change in kind,
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Remy, 910 A.2d at 796, 799.
75. See Rodriguez, 731 A.2d at 731-32; Taylor, 581 A.2d at 1039; Maxie,
554 A.2d at 1031-32.
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and firmly rooted in Rhode Island precedent.
The logic of the court here was crystal clear: the jury is free to
believe that a person who has committed serious crimes in the
past is more likely to lie than a law-abiding citizen, regardless of
whether those crimes were similar to the current one at issue or
not, and it is firmly within the trial justice's discretion to
determine whether any possible adverse influence on the jury
obviates the use of such evidence at trial. In Rhode Island, the
similarity between a prior conviction and the crime being tried is
no more than one factor of many for the trial justice to enter into
the calculus of weighing the conviction's probative value against
its prejudicial effect.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice in
a murder trial was not required to provide a comprehensive jury
instruction on accident; letters written by the defendant to his
cohort while they were imprisoned, in conjunction with the
cohort's testimony at trial, were relevant; the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that probative value of the
letters outweighed their prejudicial effect; evidence of the
defendant's prior manslaughter conviction was admissible to
impeach his credibility if he chose to testify; the trial court did not
violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation when
it prohibited him from continuing to ask questions which required
the witness to comment on the credibility of another witness's
testimony; and the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in
refusing to permit the defendant to refresh a witness's recollection
when she repeatedly testified that showing her a document would
not aid in refreshing her recollection.
Alec Rice
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Criminal Law. State v. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d 1282 (R.I. 2007). A
trial justice abused his discretion by not granting a mistrial as a
result of the State's discovery violation by failing to furnish
defendant with FBI reports about uncharged drug purchases that
an informant had made before the date of the first offence
charged.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 13, 2006, the defendant Radames Gonzalez was
arrested and charged with three counts of delivery of cocaine,
possession of one ounce to one kilogram of cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, and resisting arrest. 1 Prior to his
arrest, Gonzalez engaged in several cocaine transactions in the
presence of and with Detective Michael Douglas, who was working
undercover for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Narcotics
Task Force (Task Force) formed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Rhode Island State Police. 2 Initially,
Detective Douglas accompanied an informant on these drug
transactions. 3 During the course of these meetings, Detective
Douglas learned where Gonzalez lived and his vehicle
registration. 4 He also obtained a photograph of Gonzalez and
verified that he was the person engaged in selling drugs. 5
Furthermore, these encounters afforded Gonzalez an opportunity
to become familiar with Detective Douglas. 6 Significantly, the
State did not provide much of this information and the FBI
Reports of these earlier encounters to Gonzalez in discovery. 7
Eventually, Gonzalez began dealing with Detective Douglas
directly and the two would meet at a prearranged location on West
1. State v. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d 1282, 1285 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 1284.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Friendship Street in Providence. 8 Detective Douglas testified that
when he arrived at the location in his undercover vehicle,
Gonzalez would motion for him to approach his vehicle, and the
two would exchange money for a bag of cocaine. 9 These meetings
occurred several times prior to Gonzalez's arrest. 10
On August 13, 2003, Detective Douglas had arranged to meet
again with Gonzalez, purportedly to purchase $400 worth of
cocaine. 11 However, this time Task Force officers who planned to
arrest Gonzalez accompanied Detective Douglas. 12 As Detective
Douglas approached Gonzalez's car at the West Friendship Street
meeting spot, Gonzalez became aware of the other officers and
attempted to escape through the vehicle's window. 13 Gonzalez
resisted arrest, but eventually the officers apprehended him. 14
Before the arrest, the officers had obtained search warrants
for Gonzalez's person, as well as for his home and vehicle. 15 A
search of Gonzalez's vehicle produced a small black film canister
that contained six bags of cocaine, as well as a cellular telephone
that corresponded to the number Detective Douglas had called to
set up the drug transactions. 16 The officers also seized cash,
cocaine, and drug paraphernalia from Gonzalez's home.17
Detective Douglas testified that at the home, he and Gonzalez
"responded to an upstairs bedroom" and that defendant "had
informed us that that was his bedroom." 18 In the bedroom, the
officers found thirty-eight plastic bags of cocaine, a larger block of
cocaine, cash, and two scales. 19 In total, between five and six
ounces of cocaine were seized. 20
At trial, the jury found Gonzalez guilty of all charges against
him and he was sentenced to fifteen years in the Adult
8. Id. at 1285.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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Correctional Institution, with three years to serve, and twelve
years suspended, with probation for the cocaine offenses and a
concurrent sentence of one year to serve for resisting arrest. 21
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Gonzalez argued that three separate discovery
violations by the State denied him a fair trial.23 First, Gonzalez
contended that the State failed to produce three of the four
toxicology reports for the cocaine allegedly purchased during the
investigation and defense counsel prepared for trial with the
assumption that the reports did not exist. 24 The Court rejected
this assignment of error and held that Gonzalez did not preserve
the issue because he failed to object until after the State admitted
the reports into evidence without objection. 25 Under the "raise-or-
waive" rule, issues not preserved by specific objection at trial will
not be considered on appeal. 26 The State further argued that it
mentioned these reports numerous times in its answer and
defense counsel could have inspected or copied the evidence, but
failed to do so. 27
Gonzalez's second contention was that the State violated Rule
16 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure 28 when it
failed to furnish him with FBI reports, known as Form 302 reports
(302s),29 about uncharged drug purchases that Detective Douglas
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1287.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see State v. Wiggins, 919 A.2d 987, 990 (R.I. 2007) (holding that
in accordance with the well settled "raise-or-waive" rule, issues not preserved
by a specific objection at trial will not be considered on appeal).
27. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1287.
28. Id. R.I. Sup. CT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(5) requires the State, upon written
request, to provide defendant with "all results or reports in writing, or copies
thereof,... made in connection with the particular case[.]"
29. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1287, n.3, (citing United States v. Torres-
Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 143 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that a "302 is
prepared by an agent after an interview based on the agent's recollection of
the interview, that other agents may assist in the preparation of the 302,"
which is "prepared in anticipation of prosecution"); United States v. Urciuoli,
470 F.Supp.2d 109, 111 (D.R.I. 2007) (describing FBI 302 report that
summarizes statements by key witness during interviews)).
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made with the informant before August 7, 2003, the date of the
first offense charged. 30 Detective Douglas revealed for the first
time during cross-examination that he had prepared reports of the
earlier drug purchases, which were in the custody of the FBI. 31
Both the prosecution and the defense agreed that the
nondisclosure was not deliberate; the prosecutor was not made
aware of the 302s until after trial commenced. 32 The Court held
that it would grant a mistrial in order to remedy the State's
discovery violations which were highly prejudicial albeit
unintentional, because they deprived Gonzalez of evidence tending
to show prior criminal conduct.33 Furthermore, the Court agreed
that, the defense counsel's unawareness of the 302s irreparably
impaired his trial strategy because he unwittingly opened the door
to this evidence of uncharged drug offenses through his
questioning of Detective Douglas. 34 The Court held that the trial
justice's refusal to grant the defendant a mistrial was erroneous
and a clear abuse of discretion. 35
Gonzalez's final contention was that he suffered irreparable
harm by the State's failure to turn over evidence of what the
defense characterized as a confession. 36 Gonzalez contended that
the trial justice should have declared a mistrial because the
absence of this evidence denied him the opportunity to litigate the
voluntariness of the "confession" pretrial, and left him unprepared
to address this statement during his case in chief. 37 The State's
answer referred Gonzalez to an FBI 302 report dated August 13,
2003, for any statements made by him. 38 The court found,
however, that the 302 report was silent with respect to any
admission or statement that Gonzalez made about his bedroom,
30. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1287.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1288.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1287-1288. Defense counsel argued that he would not have
asked Detective Douglas if, on August 7, 2003, he had approached defendant,
"a man you never met in your life" and "he [sold] you drugs" if he had been
provided with the 302s and knew that the witness would tell the jury that he
and Gonzalez had become acquainted during the course of several drug
transactions that occurred before the charged offenses.
35. Id. at 1289.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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and it did not reflect Detective Douglas's direct examination
testimony that Gonzalez "had informed us that that was his
bedroom."39 The Court did not agree with defense counsel that
the alleged statement amounted to a confession. 40 However, it
was evidence about Gonzalez and his bedroom, where most of the
narcotics were found, and that should have been provided to
defense counsel under Rhode Island Criminal Procedure Rule
16(a)(1). 41 Notwithstanding, the Court held that, standing alone,
this violation, although error, was not so prejudicial as to warrant
a mistrial, and could have been remedied by an adequate
continuance. 42
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island State Legislature designed the rules of
discovery to apprise the accused of the charges against him or her
and the evidentiary basis for those charges. 43 Because the goal is
to prevent trial by ambush and unfair surprises, the prosecution
may not gain a strategic advantage by violating, whether
intentionally or not, the rules of discovery. 44 However, in the
past, Rhode Island trial justices and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court have found that sanctions are not always warranted for
unintentional discovery violations. 45
Sanctions for discovery violations are set out in Rule 16(i) of
the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
addition to the enumerated sanctions, a trial justice "may enter
such other order as it deems appropriate," including declaring a
mistrial. 46  The trial justice has flexibility in determining
appropriate sanctions under Rule 16(i), including the ability to
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1290. R.I. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) requires the State, upon
written request, to provide defendant with "all relevant or recorded
statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, or written summaries of oral
statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof[.]"
42. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1290.
43. Id. at 1285.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also State v. Horton, 871 A.2d 959, 971 (R.I. 2005); State v.
Pona, 810 A.2d 245, 250 (R.I. 2002).
46. R.I. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 16(i); See State v. Darcy, 442 A.2d 900,902
(R.I. 1982).
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impose no sanction at all. Unless the defendant can show harmful
prejudice that no other measure can neutralize, it is unlikely that
the court will grant a mistrial for unintentional discovery
violations.47
Gonzalez was able to meet the criteria for a mistrial by
showing that he was significantly prejudiced and his counsel's
trial strategy irreparably harmed by the unintentional discovery
violation. Evidence of uncharged criminal conduct coming before
the jury could not be addressed by anything short of a mistrial. 48
By granting a mistrial for the unintentional discovery violation,
the Gonzalez Court reaffirms the importance of defense counsel
being apprised of all evidence against the accused in order to
present his or her best case. This decision is in accordance with
Rhode Island and other States' case law. 49 However the Court's
willingness to accept that argument, even though it was the
defense counsel who unwittingly brought out that evidence, is
significant. The State did not introduce the evidence of prior,
uncharged criminal conduct to gain a tactical advantage. In fact,
the prosecutor herself was unaware that the evidence existed. 50
Instead, the defense counsel brought out the evidence his own
cross-examination. 51  This decision highlights the fact that
unintentional violations of the discovery rules are still violations,
though they may not have been made with the plan to gain any
sort of tactical advantage over opposing counsel. In a criminal
case, where the accused faces years in prison, tactical advantage
ought not to be the only consideration. Prejudicial effect should
and does play a large role in determining the appropriateness of
discovery violation sanctions. The Court rightly recognizes this
when it weighs the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
trial justice's decision to impose sanctions or not. 52
47. See State v. Barrett, 710 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1986);
Pona, 810 A.2d at 250; Darcy, 442 A.2d at 902; State v. Greiff, 10 P.3d 390,
395 (Wash. 2000).
48. Id.
49. See State v. Kutzen, 696 P.2d 351, 352 (Haw. 1985); Evans v. State,
499 A.2d 1261, 1268 (Md. 1985); State v. Evans, 668 A.2d 1256, 1260 (R.I.
1996); Darcy, 442 A.2d at 902;
50. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1288.
51. Id.
52. On Appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court examines the totality of
the circumstances, including four, well-established factors: (1) the reasons for
2008]
748 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:742
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the lower Court's
decision and held that a mistrial was required as result of the
State's unintentional discovery violation by failing to furnish the
defendant with FBI reports containing information about
uncharged drug purchases that an informant had made before the
date of the first charged offense. The Court found that the
prejudice of this information was significant because the jury
learned about prior, uncharged criminal conduct of the defendant.
The Court also found the introduction of this information
irreparably altered the defense's strategy. The Court held that
the trial justice's refusal to grant the defendant a mistrial was a
clear abuse of discretion.
A. Chace Wessling
the violation/nondisclosure, (2) the prejudice caused to the aggrieved party,
(3) the ability to rectify the prejudice, and (4) all other relevant factors. See
Gonzalez, 923 A.2d at 1286; see also State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56, 60 (R.I.
1998); State v. Verlaque, 465 A.2d 207, 213 (R.I. 1983).
Criminal Law. State v. Matthew Thomas et al., 936 A.2d 1278
(R.I. 2007). In this highly publicized case involving the execution
of a search warrant at a smoke shop operated by the Narragansett
Indian Tribe, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to rule on
whether or not it would recognize an executive testimonial
privilege for the state governor. Instead, the Court ruled that the
Governor's alleged testimony was not relevant to the defense's
theory that the state troopers used excessive force in effectuating
the warrant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On July 14, 2003, the Rhode Island State Police executed a
search warrant at a smoke shop operated by the Narragansett
Indian Tribe. 1 The search warrant was issued by a District Court
judge after finding there was probable cause to believe the smoke
shop violated state law by selling unstamped and untaxed
cigarettes. 2 When the troopers attempted to execute the search
warrant, a violent confrontation with the seven defendants
allegedly occurred. 3 All seven defendants were arrested and
charged with various criminal misdemeanors. 4
The Superior Court consolidated the seven cases for trial.
Among the State's pretrial motions was a "motion in limine to
preclude evidence of an alleged instruction by the Governor to
Colonel Steven M. Pare, then superintendent of the state police,
during the days leading up to the raid."'5 The trial justice denied
the motion in limine after concluding that the Governor's alleged
1. State v. Matthew Thomas et al., 936 A.2d 1278, 1280 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Defendants Matthew Thomas and Hiawatha Brown were arrested
and charged with misdemeanor counts of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct,
and simple assault. Id. Defendant Bella Noka, was charged with disorderly
conduct, simple assault, and obstructing a police officer. Id. Thawn Harris
was charged with resisting arrest and simple assault, while John Brown,
Randy Noka, and Adam Jennings were charged with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest. Id.
5. Id.
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statement may have been "relevant to some of the charges and
defenses in th[e] case."6 Likewise, the defendants subpoenaed the
Governor to compel his appearance and testimony at trial. 7 In so
doing, the defendants hoped to elicit testimony from the Governor
establishing that he had ordered the superintendent of the police
to retreat if the troopers encountered any resistance in executing
the warrant. 8 In response, the Governor filed a motion to quash
the subpoena alleging that his testimony was protected by the
executive privilege. 9 The trial justice denied the motion to quash,
10 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the Governor's
petition for a writ of certiorari and his motion to expedite."
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The existence of an executive testimonial privilege is an issue
of first impression for the Rhode Island Supreme Court.12 The
Governor argued that Rhode Island should follow the lead of other
jurisdictions that have adopted an executive testimonial privilege.
According to the Governor, the privilege provides that "the chief
executive of the state cannot be haled into court unless he or she
has personal knowledge of a matter that is highly relevant to the
issues before the court and the information cannot be obtained by
other means." 13 The defendants on the other hand argue that this
Court should not recognize this privilege; however, in the event
the privilege is recognized, the defendants argue the Governor has
waived any such privilege. 14
In deciding the case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
declined to rule on the existence of an executive privilege, and
instead held the Governor's testimony irrelevant and thus
inadmissible regardless of the validity of the privilege. 15 The
defendants argued that the Governor's testimony would be
6. Id.
7. Id. The defendant, Thawn Harris, did not subpoena the Governor,
and therefore he is not a party to these appellate proceedings. Id. at fn. 2.
8. Id. at 1280-81.
9. Id. at 1281.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1282.
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relevant to their theory that the state troopers used excessive
force, which they claim is a defense to the charges against them. 16
The defendants, however, argued that the issue of relevancy
should not be before the court because the Governor failed to
challenge the trial court's denial of the state's motion to quash in
limine.17 The Court disagreed with the defendants and found the
issue of relevance was properly before the Court. 18 The Court
found the trial justice's ruling on the motion to quash indicated
that she found the subpoenaed information to be relevant because
she explicitly stated that the defendants could only compel the
Governor to testify on matters "deemed relevant to the case." 19
Moreover, in finding the Governor did not waive his right to
challenge the relevancy of the evidence the Court noted that the
first opportunity the Governor had to challenge the trial justice's
ruling regarding the relevancy of the evidence was after the ruling
on the motion to compel. 20 When the state's motion in limine was
before the court, the Governor had not been subpoenaed nor had
he been ordered to appear. 21
In describing the standard of review, the Court noted that the
determination of whether evidence is relevant is vested in the
sound discretion of the trial justice,22 and on appeal the Supreme
Court will not disturb such a determination absent an abuse of
discretion. 23 Although an appellate court will rarely reverse a trial
justice's ruling, in this case, the Court found there was a clear
abuse of discretion. 24 The Supreme Court could not perceive of
any possible grounds to support the trial justice's ruling that the
Governor's testimony was relevant to the defense's theory that the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Additionally, the court noted that even if a party has knowingly
waived an objection, the court may excuse it when an "extreme injustice
would be done." Id. at 1282-83 (quoting Broadly v. Mashpee Neck Marina,
Inc., 471 F. 3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2006)).
20. Id. at 1283.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1281 (citing State v. Silva, 898 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2006)).
23. Id. (citing Silva, 898 A.2d at 716). Only when there are no grounds to
support the trial justice's decision, will the Court hold that the trial justice
abused his or her discretion. Id. (citing State v. Carvalho, 892 A.2d 140, 148
(R.I. 2006)).
24. Id. at 1283.
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state police used excessive force. 25
The Court explained that the search warrant provided the
only instructions legally binding on the state troopers. 26 The
Governor's alleged conversation with Colonel Pare occurred
several days before the search warrant was issued, and thus the
search warrant superseded any informal directions the Governor
may have given. 27 Therefore, being bound by bound by the
warrant's command, and not the Governor's alleged order, the
state troopers executed the warrant and used their own judgment
about the amount of force necessary to execute the warrant. 28
Consequently, the Court found that the testimony defendants
sought to elicit from the Governor had no impact on the trier of
facts determination of the reasonableness of the troopers'
judgment.29
The Court noted that "all allegations that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force to effectuate an arrest are
subject to the Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness standard"'. 30
Under the Fourth Amendment, whether the force used was
reasonable should be evaluated 'from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene.' 31 Whether or not the troopers'
conduct was reasonable depends on the circumstances at the
moment that force was employed, not on any prior events or
circumstances. 32 Thus, the Governor's instructions would not aid
the trier of fact in determining whether the troopers used
reasonable force under the circumstances. 33 Even if the troopers
did not comply with the Governor's instruction to back down if
they encountered resistance, this fact has no bearing on whether
the amount of force used at the time of execution was reasonable
under the Forth Amendment. 34 Moreover, the Court noted that
25. Id. at 1283.
26. Id.
27. Id. There is no precedent which would allow the Governor's
instructions to interfere with a court order such as the search warrant at
issue here. See id.
28. Id. at 1283-84.
29. Id. at 1284.
30. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
31. Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
32. Id. (quoting Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1999)).
33. See id.
34. Id.
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the introduction of the Governor's statement would confuse the
jury, and the avoidance of confusion is another permissible reason
for excluding the evidence. 35Thus, the Court held the Governor's
intent and instructions were not relevant to the determination of
the whether the troopers' use of force was objectively reasonable,
and thus the Governor's petition for certiorari is granted and the
order of the Superior Court is quashed.36
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court correctly ruled that
Governor Carcieri's instructions were not relevant to the defense's
theory that the state police used excessive force in executing the
warrant. In so doing, the Court avoided ruling on whether or not it
would recognize an executive testimonial privilege. The disputed
privilege was an issue of first impression in Rhode Island;
however, the Court was able avoid addressing it by deciding the
case on less controversial grounds.
The presidential testimonial privilege was first recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of United
States v. Nixon.37 In Nixon, the prosecutor issued a subpoena for
tapes and records possessed by President Nixon. 38 The tapes and
records were going to be used as evidence in criminal prosecutions
against governmental officials linked to the Watergate break-in. 3 9
The Court recognized that the President's unique role in the
government made the privilege necessary. 40 The Court, however,
rejected President Nixon's contention that the privilege was
absolute, and instead recognized that the presumptive privilege
could be overcome by a demonstration of need in a particular
criminal case. 41 In Nixon, the President alleged a generalized
interest in confidentiality, and the Court held that such an
interest, unsupported by claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, yielded to the
35. Id. (citing State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 122 (R.I. 2006)).
36. Id. at 1285.
37. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
38. Id. at 688.
39. Id. at 687.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 713.
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"specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. '42
As the Governor's petition for a writ of certiorari mentioned,
executive privilege has been extended to state executive officials.
Many states have looked to the Nixon decision for guidance in
applying executive privilege to governors; 43however, a review of
the cases makes it clear that there is no uniform standard in the
way state courts apply the privilege. 44 In fact, state courts that
have analyzed and applied the federal doctrine of executive
privilege have produced decisions that seem to blur the executive
privilege, recognized in Nixon, with the deliberative process
privilege. 45  However, under either one of the recognized
privileges, the outcome of Matthew Thomas would be the same:
Governor Carcieri's statement would be deemed inadmissible.
That is, if a privilege was recognized the evidence would be
inadmissible because it would be protected, and if no privilege was
recognized the evidence would be inadmissible because it was not
relevant.
In the event this issue comes before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court again, it should be aware that most states that
recognize either privilege have done so by drawing an analogy
between the role of the president and the governor. 46 The United
States Supreme Court, however, has explained that the
"President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes
him from other executive officials," 47 and thus perhaps the
presumption in favor of nondisclosure should be weaker at the
state level.
CONCLUSION
42. Id. at 713-14.
43. Matthew Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1281.
44. See Arch T. Allen, III, A Study in Separation of Powers: Executive
Power in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2100-03 (Sept. 1999).
45. See Matthew W. Warnok, Stifling Gubernatorial Secrecy: Application
of the Executive Privilege to State Executive Officials, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 983
(2007) (discussing how state courts' application of executive privilege has
blurred the distinction between executive privilege and the deliberative
process privilege); Russel L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative
Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REV. 279 (1989) (discussing the distinction
between the deliberative process privilege and the executive communication
privilege).
46. See Warnok, supra note 45 at 1012.
47. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 750 (1982).
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to rule on
Governor Carcieri's assertion of an executive testimonial privilege
by correctly holding that the Governor's testimony was not
relevant to the defense's theory.
Ashley Taylor
Criminal Law. State v. Quinlan. State v. Sanchez-Collins, 921
A.2d 96 (R.I. 2007). A trial court does not err when it holds that a
vehicle with items hanging from the rear view mirror is proper
justification for stopping of a vehicle and is not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. A trial court has also not abused its
discretion in holding a vehicle occupant does not have standing to
challenge the search of a vehicle if the occupant neither owns the
vehicle nor uses it on a regular basis. Therefore, the occupant of
the vehicle does not have the necessary subjective and objective
expectation of necessary privacy to support standing. A mere
assertion of selective prosecution based on race without any
supporting evidence is not sufficient without demonstrating both a
discriminatory effect deliberately based an such an unjustifiable
standard as race. A trial court has not abused its discretion in
refusing to grant a mistrial when a juror made statements to
other jurors of having observed where the crime too place. In
absence of any finding that the juror's statements went toward
other jurors' determination of guilt or innocence, the court did not
abuse its discretion. A trial court has not abused its discretion by
sentencing a defendant to life without the possibility of parole so
long as both mitigating and aggravating factors have been
weighed.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In March 2001 Officer Costa of the Somerset, Massachusetts
Police Department was on routine traffic patrol when he saw a
Jeep, bearing Rhode Island license plates. 1 Officer Costa observed
materials, including a fringed flag, beads and various cardboard
air fresheners, hanging from the rearview mirror and extended
down the to the dashboard of the car. 2 Officer Costa determined
the obstruction of the windshield was in violation of Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 90, §13 which prohibits any item which would
1. State v. Quinlan, State v. Sanchez-Collins, 921 A.2d 96, 100-101 (R.I.
2007).
2. Id.
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"interfere with or impede driver's safe operation."' 3 Officer Costa
pulled into the road to stop the vehicle and observed the four
passengers, one white and three either Hispanic or African
American, "fidgeting, leaning forward and turning around in their
seats and looking back at him," at which point officer Costa
requested backup due to the "occupants' suspicious behavior."'4
The vehicle then made an "abrupt" turn into an adjacent parking
lot, at which point Officer Costa stopped behind the vehicle. 5
Officer Costa observed continued movement by the occupants
within the vehicle while awaiting backup, and when Sergeant
Leonard arrived, the two officers approached the vehicle. 6 The
driver, later identified as Osiris Parra (Parra), had no license or
registration. 7 Parra averted eye contact while responding to
questions and the officers observed that none of the passengers
were wearing seat belts. 8 Officer Costa requested the names and
social security numbers of all the occupants in order to issue
citations. 9 Officer Kerrigan arrived on scene and, shortly after,
Officer Costa learned of an outstanding warrant for defendant
Quinlan, who was then taken into custody.10 Officer Kerrigan
observed continued movement of the vehicle occupants who
"ignored her directions to keep their hands where she could see
them" and "defendant Collins continuously reached to the floor of
the Jeep."11 Officer Kerrigan testified that their conversations
with occupant Parras was "highly unusual and an attempt to
distract her from what was going on in the vehicle." 12 Officer
Kerrigan informed the other officers of the disregard of her orders
and stated she saw a dark mask and dark clothing in the back of
the vehicle, at which point the officers decided to "pat-down the
occupants and conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle for
3. Id. at 101. (Items hanging from mirror included a fringed flag
measuring several square inches, string of beads and cardboard air
fresheners, and went from the mirror to the dashboard)
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 102.
12. Id.
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weapons." 13
Officer Costa swept the vehicle for weapons and focused on
the front passenger seat where defendant Collins had been seen
fidgeting and reaching for the floor, and found a shirt tied in a
bundle which was heavy, wet and hard. 14 Within the shirt Officer
Costa "discovered a white plastic grocery bag covered in blood; he
opened the bag and saw a human hand and a rock." 15 All four men
were handcuffed and transported separately to the police station
and the vehicle was impounded. 16 Pursuant to a search warrant,
police found two knives, including a machete, within the
impounded vehicle. 17
Parra, the driver, and passenger Marcos Quinones
(Quinones), denied involvement in the crimes involving the
severed hand and cooperated with police, as well as testified at
trial.18 Parra testified that both defendants Collins and Quinlan
carried combat knives and "regularly hung out with the
victims." 19 Parra stated that shortly before the murder Quinlan
got upset about the quality of the used car which Michael Batista
(Batista), one of the victims, had sold him. 20 Quinones similarly
testified that Quinlan was angry after having to walk home from
work because the battery died in the used car he bought from
Batista. 21 Quinlan stated he planned to kill Batista, and asked
Quinones to participate, which Quinones did not take seriously.22
Quinones further testified that Collins participated in the
murders because Quinlan owed $300 to both Collins and Batista
and with Batista dead, Collins believed he would be more likely to
get paid. 23 Parra stated that defendants arrived at his home the
morning of the murders to smoke marijuana, at which point Parra
borrowed his mother's vehicle, the Jeep, and was told to drive to
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Parras initially fainted on scene when the bloody hands were
found. Id.
17. Id. at 102 n.2.
18. Id. at 102.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 103.
22. Id.
23. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
Quinones house.24
After picking up Quinones, Collins removed a plastic bag
covered in blood from a dumpster in Providence and showed Parra
the four human hands it contained. 25Collins then placed a rock in
the bag and wrapped it in a shirt and refused to return home until
they had disposed of the hand.26 Defendants had planned to
discard the bag at India Point Park, but too many people were at
the park so plans changed to throw the hands off the Braga Bridge
in Fall River, Massachusetts. 27 Parra testified that during the
ride Collins discussed the events from the prior night.28 Collins
stated he and Batista had been drinking and doing drugs with
victims Batista and Ortega when, based on the "premeditated
plan," Quinlan stabbed Ortega in the neck and Collins hit Ortega
in the head with a claw hammer. 29 The two then "laid in wait" for
Batista, and later sliced off his ear and killed him as he begged for
his life. 30 The two defendants then cleaned the apartment and
dismembered the hands. 3'
The plan of dumping the hands off the Braga Bridge also
failed due to traffic and the bridge's fencing.32 When the police
pulled the car over in Somerset, Collins told them to remain silent
and if caught say that a "Dominican" had paid them to dispose of
the hands. 33 Somerset police notified Providence police of the
hands being found, which they believed to be connected with a
double murder in Providence. 34 Providence Police detectives,
based on statements by Parra and Quinones, found the crime
scene and the bodies of both victims, Ortega and Batista, whose
hands had both been severed. 35 At trial, medical examiner Doctor
Laposata, who performed Batista's autopsy, testified that Batista
suffered from multiple traumas, a minimum of seventeen wounds,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id.
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numerous skull fractures, his brain was torn in two places, his
"scalp was 'nearly pulverized,"' along with thirty-one punctures to
his face and wounds to multiple vital organs all consistent with
the combat knives and a hammer claw. 36 Dr. Laposata also stated
that Batista's ear had been severed before death and his hands
were likely removed post-mortem. 37 Dr. Sikirica performed
Ortega's autopsy and found him to have suffered from "multiple
traumatic injuries to the head, face and torso," his left eye was
ruptured and teeth, as well as nearly a pint of blood, were found in
his stomach; all puncture wounds were consistent with the use of
the combat knives. 38
Angelo Isom (Isom), defendant Collin's cousin, testified that
he had been present in the house the night of the murder.39 He
awoke and observed "Quinlan standing over Ortega, hitting him in
head with a hammer" and the "apartment was covered in blood."
40 After being told by Collins that he and Quinlan were waiting for
Batista, Isom stated he then left the apartment. 41
Both defendants admitted to being present in the apartment
the night of the murder but denied killing the victims. 42 Instead,
each defendant accused Isom of killing the victims while the
defendants claimed to only be part of the clean up and cutting off
the hands.43 Both defendants were convicted of two counts of
murder and two counts of conspiracy to murder Michael Batista
and Rafael Edwards Ortega. 44
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On December 4, 2006, the defendants separately appealed to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which the Court consolidated
for oral argument, regarding constitutional challenges to the
initial stop and search of the motor vehicle. 45 Defendant Collins
also argued selective prosecution based on race, and by defendant
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 105.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id. at 100.
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Quinlan claiming mistrial based on juror misconduct and
inappropriateness of sentence. 46
The Vehicle Stop
Traffic stops constitute seizures under the 4th Amendment for
that reason must be "reasonable under the circumstances." 47 The
Supreme Court conducted a de novo review of the questions of
law. 48 After reviewing the record and photographic evidence, the
Court held that the officer was "legally justified in stopping the
vehicle" under Massachusetts law and held that the items
hanging from the mirror interfered with the view though the
windshield and were within the statute's prohibition. 49 The Court
further held that exceptions for decals and window tinting on out
of state vehicles had no relevance, and that the stop was justified
on Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 13 which applies to both in
state and out of state vehicles and contains no such exception for
out of state vehicles. 50 The Court held that this case was unlike
Commonwealth v. Brazeau, where the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals held that a small one inch prism hanging from a mirror
did not constitute a warranted vehicle stop. 51 The Court
distinguished the present case from Brazeau, indicating that the
"cluster of items. . .spanned from the review mirror to the
dashboard" and was not only visible from far away, but
photographs verified the size of the obstruction. 52
The Court also held that the officers' actions after the traffic
stop were reasonable under the circumstances. 53 Officers can have
the driver and passengers get out of the vehicle as well as conduct
a search for weapons in the outer clothing of the person without
violating the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure. 54 The Court held that the pat down for
46. Id. at 110-111.
47. Id. at 106, (citing Whren v. U.S. 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 106-07; See MASS.GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 90 § 13.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 107-08, (citing 831 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Mass. 2005)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 108.
54. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); State v.
Collodo, 661 A.2d 62, 65 (R.I. 1995)).
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weapons was further justified due to the "furtive and suspicious
behavior" and the fact that the vehicle's occupants "repeatedly
ignored orders to keep hands" visible. 55
Standing to Challenge Search
Both defendants allege error in the trial justice's finding that
they lacked requisite standing to challenge the vehicle search
because they did not own the vehicle and were not "regular
passengers."56 The defendants bear the burden of establishing
standing and the Supreme Court examined the standing issue de
novo. 57 "A party has standing when he or she is found to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the thing
seized. ' 58  Factors in determining whether there was an
expectation of privacy include: ownership, prior use, ability to
control the property or exclude other's use in the property. 59 The
determination is both whether the defendant had a "subjective
expectation of privacy" and whether the expectation is one which
"society accepts as objectively reasonable." 60 The Court held that
because he did not own the vehicle and only used it occasionally as
passengers the situation "did not give rise to any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. '61 The Court distinguished
the present case from State v. Milette, where a defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle owned by his father,
which he possessed keys to, kept his possessions in and frequently
used, which was unlike the defendants in the present case who
had "no possessory or ownership interest" in the vehicle. 62
Therefore, the Court held that the defendants lacked standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle. 63
Defendant Collins- Selective Prosecution Based on Race
Defendant Collins claimed that the stop of the vehicle for the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 109.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129-31 (R.I. 2006)).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing State v. Bertram 591 A.2d 14, 19 (R.I. 1991)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 109-10 (citing 702 A.2d 1165, 1166 (R.I. 1997)).
63. Id. at 110.
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items hanging from the mirror was pretextual and was instead
"motivated by race and discriminatory intent. ' 64 In order to
establish elective prosecution must show both that there was a
discriminatory effect and prosecution was "deliberately based
upon unjustifiable standard" including race or religion. 6 5 The
Court rejected this claim as allegations with no evidence to
support either required element of the claim. 66
Defendant Quinlan- Mistrial Based on Juror Misconduct
Defendant Quinlan appeals the refusal to grant a mistrial and
admonish the jury when during trial "jurors spoke about the case,
visited the crime scene, and possibly read a news report about the
murder."6 7 The Court stated it was within the trial judge's
discretion whether or not they declare a mistrial and that
extraneous information does not create a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice, instead the court must consider the effect on the jury.
68 The trial judge had found that the juror's statements did not
relate to guilt or innocence and did not influence other members of
the jury, who ignored his statement, to justify a mistrial. 6 9 The
juror had merely commented that he viewed the scene while
passing it on a bus and that it was in a 'working-class' or 'low
class' neighborhood." 70 The judge dismissed the juror at issue and
the defendant waived objection to instructions by not requesting
any such charge. 7 1
Defendant Quinlan- Life without the Possibility of Parole
Defendant Quinlan appealed his sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. 72 The Court made an independent review of
the factors considered in the sentencing, de novo, and stated
"based on the degree of brutality evident in the entire record, we
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting State v. Ricci, 704 A.2d 210, 211 (R.I. 1997)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 110-11 (quoting State v. Suero, 721 A.2d 426, 429 (1996)); State
v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 961-62 (R.I. 1995).
69. Id. at 110-11.
70. Id. at 111 n. 12.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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are hard pressed to envision a case that is more deserving of the
most severe punishment under our law."73 The state had provided
proper notice of its recommendation of the sentence and jury was
specifically asked to determine whether the murders were
"committed in a manner involving torture or aggravated battery to
the victims." 74  The jury answered unanimously in the
affirmative. 75 The Court held that the trial court considered both
aggravating and mitigating factors, including the "nature of the
offenses and balanced Quinlin's relative youth against his refusal
to accept responsibility for these murders and his failure to show
any real remorse."76 The trial judge had stated that "the depth
and depravity of these two murders knew no bounds" and that
drugs and alcohol were not the "root" of the crimes, demonstrated
by the extensive efforts to cover up the crimes. 77 The trial court
denied the possibility of parole, and held that the pre-mortem
evidence of "torture and mayhem" and little evidence of potential
rehabilitation, without even considering the "post-mortem
dismemberment," the Supreme Court held the sentences were
"entirely just and proper."78
COMMENTARY
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of the perpetrators of one of the most gruesome and
brutal murders in recent Rhode Island history without any
significant departure from existing law. This case demonstrates
the practical need of upholding the precedent Whren v. U.S, which
allows for vehicles to be reasonably stopped if the officer has
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation or other infraction
has occurred. 79 While such stops may appear pretextual they
often lead to the apprehension of either the drivers or occupants
for more serious crimes.
What is slightly worrisome is how quickly the Court
73. Id. at 112.
74. Id. (quoting G.L. 1956 § 11-23-4(4)) (consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances)
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 112-13.
78. Id. at 113.
79. Id. at 106. (Citing Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).
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dismissed the claim that the traffic stop was based on race and
that the traffic violation was merely pretexual. While the Court
asserted that one cannot make a bare assertion of race based
prosecution and the defendants put forth no evidence to support
there claim. The Court does not even touch on the difficulty in
asserting such a claim or where one would get evidence that in the
mind of the officer, and whether objectively or subjectively the
officer pulled the vehicle over on account of the occupants being
four males, three of which were minorities. While the holding in
Whren, which is clearly the basis for upholding the traffic citation
here, states that if a vehicle stop is objectively reasonable, even if
it is based on a minor traffic violation, it does not matter what the
officer's subjective intentions were. Such a holding leaves no room
at all for pretexual or race based stops absent blatant and
outward discrimination or animus.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the convictions of
both defendant's Quinlan and Collins for first degree murder and
conspiracy to the murders of Michael Batista and Rafael Edwards
Ortega and affirmed the sentences of life without the possibility of
parole, and in doing so denied all grounds of appeal.
Alexandra Pezzello
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State Criminal Law. State v. Rodriguez, 917 A.2d 409 (R.I.
2007). The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled a defendant was
not impermissibly subject to double jeopardy for the same offense,
in violation of both the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions, when prosecuted for a felony, which earlier served
as the predicate felony for a felony murder charge in a different
state, because under the principle of dual sovereignty the same act
can result in separate offenses in two jurisdictions. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On a date around May 23, 1999, Ricardo Gomez was
kidnapped in Rhode Island, and his remains were later discovered
in New York.2 After investigations by the Rhode Island and New
York police officials, it was theorized the defendant, Marcos
Rodriguez, kidnapped Mr. Gomez in Rhode Island, and later
murdered him over an outstanding cocaine debt.3 Rodriguez was
tried and convicted in New York of second-degree felony murder
and sentenced to twenty-five years to life. 4 Subsequently, the
defendant was brought to Rhode Island under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act. 5 Upon his return to Rhode Island
the defendant was tried for the offenses of kidnapping with the
intent to extort money and conspiracy to commit the crime of
kidnapping. 6
Before the trial court, the defendant moved to dismiss the
kidnapping count on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the United
States and Rhode Island Constitutions precluded prosecuting
1. See State v. Rodriguez, 917 A.2d 409, 411-12 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 412.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 412 n.4 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 13-13-2) ('[Ilt is the policy of
the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges [against prisoner
detainers] and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers
based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints."').
6. Id. at 412.
SURVEY SECTION
him. 7 Additionally, the defendant argued the cooperation between
the two states to prosecute him created a merger of the two
jurisdictions, and therefore, invalidated the doctrine of dual
sovereignty.8
The defendant's motion for dismissal was denied, and the
defendant appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant asserted the same arguments he did
before the trial judge: that the Rhode Island charge placed him in
double jeopardy for the same offense, and that Rhode Island
waived any right to dual sovereignty because of its cooperation
with New York officials to convict the defendant. 10
Double Jeopardy
The defendant contended a line of Rhode Island and United
States Supreme Court cases barred prosecuting him for a lesser
included offense, "e.g., kidnapping, after conviction for a greater
offense, e.g., felony murder."11  However, the court found the
principle of dual sovereignty to be dispositive of the defendant's
double jeopardy claim. 12 Dual sovereignty is the principle that
the federal government and each state are independent and
separate sovereigns which possess, "'the power, inherent in any
sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense
against its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so
each 'is exercising its own sovereignty.""13 Therefore, when a
defendant commits a single act which violates the laws of two
distinct sovereigns, the defendant has committed two separate
7. Id.
8. Id. at 412-413.
9. Id. at 413.
10. See id. at 413-414.
11. Id. at 413. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998);
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682 (1977) (per curiam); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932);
State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1980); State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I.
1978).
12. See Rodriguez, 917 A.2d at 414.
13. Id. at 414 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978))
(quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
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and distinct offenses. 14
Of course, the federal Double Jeopardy Clause, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires no defendant
be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." 15  However, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held identical offenses are not considered double
jeopardy if prosecuted by separate sovereigns. 16 Additionally, the
court noted that Rhode Island cases have followed the same line of
reasoning when applying the Rhode Island double jeopardy clause
in the Rhode Island Constitution. 17 Thus, while the federal and
state double jeopardy clauses forbid multiple prosecutions by a
single sovereign, multiple prosecutions by independent sovereigns
are not prohibited. 18
According to the court, the critical determination to be made
in applying the doctrine of dual sovereignty is whether, "the entity
that seeks to prosecute a defendant for the same course of
conduct, for which another entity previously has subjected the
defendant to jeopardy, draws its authority to punish the offender
from a distinct source of power." 19 The court found no reason to
suspect a state was not a separate sovereign with respect to the
federal government, because the authority to prosecute is derived
from each state's 'inherent sovereignty"' and not the federal
government. 20 Additionally, states are no less sovereign with
respect to each other, because, again, the power to prosecute
criminal cases "derives from 'separate and independent sources of
power and authority originally belonging to them before admission
to the Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment."' 21
As such, a state's sovereign interest is never satisfied by another
state's 'enforcement of its own laws,"' because the state, as an
independent sovereign, is entitled to determine its own interests
have not been sufficiently vindicated. 22 Therefore, a state is free
to prosecute a defendant for any crime committed within its
14. Id. at 414.
15. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
16. See Rodriguez, 917 A.2d at 414.
17. Id. at 415.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320 n.14).
21. Id. (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)).
22. Id. (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)).
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jurisdiction, regardless of whether the defendant has been
previously convicted for the same crime in a different state.23
The Barktus Exception
The defendant in this case also contended Rhode Island had
waived any right to its enforcement of dual sovereignty because of
its cooperation with New York to convict the defendant. 24 In
Barktus, the United States Supreme Court inferred dual state and
federal prosecutions may violate double jeopardy if one authority
"was acting as a 'tool' of the other, or if the state prosecution
merely was 'a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution."' 25
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted this exception is
incredibly narrow and difficult to prove, and applies only to
situations in which one sovereign, "'so thoroughly dominates or
manipulates the prosecutorial machinery of another that the
latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings.' 26
Applying this standard to the present case, the court found no
merit in the defendant's contention Rhode Island waived its right
to dual sovereignty because of the joint efforts of New York and
Rhode Island police officials. 27  To support his claim, the
defendant alleged the extradition of his accomplice to Rhode
Island, while he was awaiting trial in New York, evidenced an
agreement between the Rhode Island Attorney General and the
New York District Attorney to divide the prosecutions for murder
and kidnapping.28 Further, the defendant alleged the offer of
immunity to the defendant's girlfriend, by both jurisdictions, for
her alleged involvement in the kidnapping, in exchange for her
testimony, demonstrated the existence of an agreement. 29
However, the court found no reason to infer any type of
agreement, either express or implied, from the defendant's
assertions and .'[t]he purely speculative conclusory allegations of
the defendant ... do not demonstrate that either state was acting
23. Id. at 414-416.
24. Id. at 414.
25. Id. at 416 (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24)).
26. Id. (quoting United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir.
1996)).
27. Id. at 416.
28. Id. at 417.
29. Id.
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as the prosecutorial tool of the other."' 30 According to the court
nothing in the conduct alleged by the defendant was close to rising
to a level "insidious" enough to "devastate the sovereignty of
either jurisdiction." 31
COMMENTARY
This case clearly delineates the difference between double
jeopardy and dual sovereignty law. The court's decision serves to
reinforce Rhode Island's right to charge a defendant for any crime
they commit within the state's jurisdiction. Indeed, the court does
not expound a new theory, or alter the current state of the law,
and in large part the decision simply recites United States
Supreme Court opinions. Functionally, the purpose of this
decision was likely to eliminate future appeals from defendants
who committed a crime in Rhode Island and another state, and
were then charged with the crime in both states. The opinion
serves as a clear line of demarcation between what constitutes
double jeopardy and a state's right to vindicate its interests when
its laws have been violated under the doctrine of dual sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found no merit in the
defendant's contention Rhode Island had waived its right to
exercise dual sovereignty because of its interaction with New
York. As such, Rhode Island was perfectly within its right to
charge the defendant for the kidnapping offense under the
doctrine of dual sovereignty, and did not need to address the
defendant's substantive double jeopardy claim. Consequently, the
court affirmed the order denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss the kidnapping charge against him.
Scott M. Carlson
30. Id. (quoting trial judge).
31. Id.
Employment Law. Horn v. Southern Union Co. et al, 927A.2d
292 (R.I. 2007). An employment discrimination claim filed under
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42
is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Lynore Horn was employed by Southern Gas
Company and New England Gas Company for approximately 16
years. 1 She filed a complaint in United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island, alleging the defendant, her employer,
sexually discriminated against her in violation of the Rhode Island
Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (RICRA).2 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claim
was time-barred. 3 Attempting to rule on the motion, the district
court determined there was no controlling precedent concerning
the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims
asserted under RICRA. 4 The Court noted, the First Circuit and
the United States District Court have been faced with the same
issue in the past and have had differing outcomes. 5 As a result,
the Court certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the
question: "what is the statute of limitations applicable to an
employment discrimination claim asserted under the Rhode
Island Civil Rights Act?''6
The Rhode Island Supreme Court focused on two Rhode
Island statues: the RICRA and the Rhode Island Fair Employment
Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA).7 These
statutes are complementary because they both provide protection
for employees against discrimination by their employer.8  More
1. Horn v. Southern Union, 927 A.2d 292, 293 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 294 (citing Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.
2004) and Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 2d 226 (D.R.I. 2003)).
6. Horn, 927A.2d at 293.
7. Id. at 294.
8. Id.
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specifically, the General Assembly enacted FEPA in 1949 to
eliminate discriminatory practices and assure equal employment
opportunities for all persons. 9 FEPA contains a one-year statute
of limitations. 10
On the other hand, RICRA was enacted in 1990, to provide
broad protection against all forms of discrimination. 11  The
General Assembly enacted RICRA in response to the United
States Supreme Court case Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in
which the Court narrowly construed 42 U.S.C. §1981, the federal
counterpart to RICA.12 The Act allows an employee to file directly
with the court and no statute of limitations is enumerated.13 In
this case, the Defendant argued that FEPA's one-year statute of
limitations should apply to RICRA employment discrimination
claims. 14 The plaintiff countered that the three-year, Rhode
Island residual statute of limitations for injuries to the person,
G.L. 1956 §9-1-14(b), should be applied to employment
discrimination claims filed under RICRA.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Majority
The Rhode Island Supreme Court harmonized the FEPA and
RICRA by reading them in pari materia. Accordingly, the court
held that FEPA's one-year statute of limitations should be applied
to employment discrimination claims filed under the RICRA. 16
The court pointed out that the General Assembly specifically
enumerated a statute of limitations for employment
discrimination claims, for the first time when it enacted FEPA.17
According to the court, the foregoing fact "reflects the General
Assembly's weighing of policy considerations and its legislative
9. Id. at 293.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 294.
16. Id.; the principle pari materia provides that two statutes, on the
same subject and enacted by the same jurisdiction, will be read in relation to
each other.
17. Id. at 295.
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judgment that one year is the appropriate amount of time within
which claims of employment discrimination should be brought."1 8
When it crafted a brief statute of limitations, the General
Assembly's intent was to encourage prompt investigation of
claims. 19 Notwithstanding the administrative process required
under FEPA, the same necessity of prompt investigation applies to
employment discrimination claims brought under RICRA. 20
Additionally, other courts have pointed out similar policy
rationales for brief periods of limitations in employment
discrimination claims brought under FEPA. 2 1
According to the court, it is unnecessary to consider the Rhode
Island residual statute of limitations which pertains broadly to
"injuries to the person," because the General Assembly has
expressly chosen to treat employment discrimination differently
from other injuries to the person. 22 The majority argued that it is
being true to the legislative intent of the General Assembly by
reading the FEPA and RICRA in pari materia, and engrafting the
one year statute of limitations from FEPA (which it has
specifically determined is the appropriate limitations period for
employment discrimination claims) onto RICRA. 2 3
Accordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's answer to the
certified question, is that a one-year statute of limitations applies
to employment discrimination claims brought under RICRA. 2 4
18. Id.
19. Id. at n. 10.
20. Id. at 295-96.; the one year statute of limitations for FEPA claims is
not a result of its administrative process requirements, but rather a result of
the General Assembly's effort to preserve evidence. According to the court,
that same rationale should apply to claims brought under RICRA.
21. Id. at 296 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for
Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I. 1980) (the time limit also ensures that
persons charged with violating the Act will receive notice of those charges
within one year of the alleged violation. Prompt notification will enable such
persons to investigate alleged violations and to preserve evidence) and
Ferguson Perforating and Wire Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human
Rights, 415 A.2d 1055, 1056 (R.I. 1980) (These procedural protections are
designed to provide respondents with adequate time for such matters as
scheduling witnesses, hiring lawyers, and gathering and compiling evidence
of the alleged violations before witnesses' memories of the incidents become
too obscure)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 295-96.
24. Id. at 296.
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Dissent
In dissent, Justices Flaherty and Suttell argued that the
appropriate statute of limitations for employment discrimination
claims should be three years, as set forth in G.L. 1956 §9-1-14(b),
which governs actions for injuries to the person. 25 As the dissent
pointed out, RICRA was passed in response to the United States
Supreme Court decision, Patterson v McLean Credit Union,26 in
which the Court narrowly interpreted the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §1981, to protect only discrimination based on race. 27 The
RICRA statute is broader than the Civil Rights Act and expands
protection to discrimination based on age, sex, religion, disability,
and national origin. 28
According to the dissent, application of the three year statute
of limitations provided by G.L. 1956 §9-1-14(b), for injuries to the
person, is more appropriate for employment discrimination claims
than the statute of limitations for FEPA claims. 29 The dissent
states that the legislative intent behind §9-1-14(b), "was to enact a
comprehensive statute that included 'all actions that reasonably
could be viewed as arising out of injuries to the person. '' 30
Both federal and Rhode Island state courts have determined
the type of violations that constitute injuries to the person. 31
According to precedent, federal civil rights violations constitute
injuries to the person. 32 For example, in Partin v. St. Johnsbury
Co., the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, held that §9-1-14(b), includes the appropriate statute of
limitations for a federal employment discrimination claim filed
25. Id. at 299.
26. Id. at 297.
27. Id. (citing Patterson, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
28. Id. at 298 (citing Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.
2004)).
29. Id. at 299.
30. Id. (citing Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 19
(1964) (resulting injures from violations of rights to which one is entitled by
reason of being a person in the eyes of law, are included within the period of
limitation provided for in §9-1-14(b). Such rights are distinguished from those
which accrue by contract)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 300 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)
(the United States Supreme Court held that §1981 claims were subject to the
relevant state statute of limitations governing personal injury claims)).
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under 42 U.S.C. §1981. 33 The Court determined that the statute
of limitations in §9-1-14(b), is not limited to physical injuries, but
also covers injuries to personal dignity. 34 Other injuries that fall
under §9-1-14(b), are written defamation or libel and civil rights
actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 35 The dissent concluded that
because the RICRA includes almost identical language as its
federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. §1981, similar violations under
RICRA would also constitute injuries to the person. 36
Because the imposition of a statute of limitations is a matter
of policy, the General Assembly should determine the appropriate
statute of limitations rather than the court.37 When drafting
RICRA, the General Assembly presumably knew the precedent
applying the three-year statute of limitations from §9-1-14(b), to
federal civil rights violations and it "must have intended the state
law to trigger the same limitations period.'' 38 Further, in Nappi v.
John Deere & Co., the Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged
that it was the intent of the legislature to subject all injuries to
the person to the same statute of limitations. 39
By applying a one-year statute of limitations to employment
discrimination claims filed under RICRA, the court has essentially
divided RICRA into subclasses that will be governed by differing
limitations depending on the type of claim. 40  The dissent
concluded that it is unlikely the legislature's intent was to divide
RICRA into subclasses because such division conflicts with the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Nappi.41
According to the dissent, there should be a uniform statute of
limitations for all claims filed under RICRA, whether or not
employment related. 42
33. Id. (citing Partin, 447 F.Supp. 1297 (D.R.I. 1978)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1985);
Walden, III, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1978)).
36. Id. at 300.
37. Id. at 297.
38. Id. at 300; see also Goodman, 482 U.S. 656.
39. Id. (citing 717 A.2d 650, 651 (R.I. 1998)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 301 (citing 717 A.2d at 650); see also Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 66
(when a rights-creating statute is silent as to what limitations period should
apply, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's practice has been to look first to
residual statutes of limitations).
42. Id.
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The dissent further argued, even though FEPA and RICRA
protect related interests, they are independent of one another and
each has a separate foCUS. 4 3 The FEPA was enacted to eliminate
discriminatory practices and assure equal employment
opportunities for all persons. 44 Whereas, the RICRA was enacted
to provide broad protection against all forms of discrimination. 45
Harmonization of FEPA and RICRA statutes might frustrate
the conciliatory purpose of FEPA.46 The dissent compared the
relationship between FEPA and RICRA to the relationship
between Title VII and §1981, the respective federal counterparts,
and cited the United States Supreme Court decision, Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. to support its conclusion. 47  In
Johnson, the Supreme Court held:
The filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at
conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could
weaken the Commission's efforts to induce voluntary
compliance, and that a suit is privately oriented and
narrow, rather than broad, in application, as successful
conciliation tends to be. 4 8
The Court held that even though Title VII and §1981, are
directed towards most of the same ends, they are separate,
distinct, and independent. 49
Finally, the dissent argued the FEPA and RICRA may co-
exist under differing timeliness requirements and still serve their
purpose of protection of individual rights. 50 The FEPA may
continue to "foster the employment of all individuals in this state
in accordance with their fullest capacities [... ] and to safeguard
their rights to obtain and hold employment without
discrimination" and the RICRA may continue "to provide
compensatory and/or injunctive relief to those people whose civil
rights have been violated."' 51  The dissent would ultimately
43. Id. at 301.
44. Id. at 293.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 302.
47. Id. (citing 421 U.S. 454 (1975)).
48. Id. (citing 421 U.S. at 461).
49. Id. (citing 421 U.S. at 461).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 303 (citing Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 69).
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answer the certified question by applying the three-year statute of
limitations set forth in §9-1-14(b), to employment discrimination
claims brought under RICRA.
52
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with the difficult
task of determining the applicable statute of limitations for
employment discrimination claims brought under RICRA. The
task was difficult because the statute is silent on what the
timeliness requirements are for employment discrimination claims
asserted under RICRA. The majority's conclusion that a one-year
statute of limitations applies to employment discrimination claims
brought under RICRA is appropriate. The holding substantiates
policy considerations in support of prevention of stale claims and
preservation of memories. However, as the dissent pointed out,
the issue may have been better served if left to the General
Assembly.
The intent of the legislature with regard to the statute of
limitations is ambiguous. The difference of opinion between the
majority and dissent elucidates that fact. The majority pointed
out that the legislature specifically set forth what it believed to be
an appropriate statute of limitations for employment
discrimination claims when it drafted FEPA, and therefore it
probably intended that same limitation to apply to employment
discrimination claims brought under RICRA. On the other hand,
the dissent argued that the legislature surely knew about the
tremendous amount of precedent applying §9-1-14(b) to injuries to
the person, and must have intended the three-year statute of
limitations to apply.
Additionally, the reading of the FEPA and RICRA statute in
pari materia makes sense, because the two statutes were enacted
by the same jurisdiction and provide for similar remedies in
successfully proved employment discrimination claims. However,
FEPA is narrower because it applies only to employment claims.
Whereas, RICRA is much broader because it applies to all civil
rights claims. Providing a statue of limitations for employment
discrimination claims brought under RICRA leaves many other
52. Id.
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discrimination claims under that statute without clear timeliness
requirements. As the dissent pointed out, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has held that all injuries to the person should be
subject to the same statute of limitations. And, substantial
precedent supports the contention that civil rights claims are
injuries to the person.
The dissent further pointed out that the Supreme Court of the
United States has faced the issue of determining the appropriate
statute of limitations with regard to the federal statutory
counterparts of the Rhode Island statutes. The Supreme Court
held that even though Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §1981 provide for
similar protections, they are separate, distinct and independent. 53
FEPA and RICRA should be examined the same way.
Nevertheless, a shorter statute of limitation supports the
policy of preventing stale claims and preserving evidence, which is
essential in employment discrimination claims. However, there is
enough discrepancy with regard to the proper classification of an
employment discrimination injury and the intent behind RICRA
and other statutes protecting individuals from discrimination,
that the matter is better left with the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Both the majority and the dissent support their arguments
with compelling case law and analysis, but the intention of the
General Assembly with regard to the appropriate statute of
limitations for employment discrimination claims filed under
RICRA is still unclear. The majority explicitly avoided a
determination with regard to the statute of limitations for other
RICRA actions. Next time there is a discrepancy about the
appropriate statute of limitations for a discrimination claim other
than employment, the answer will not be any simpler as a result
of this decision. Instead, it may be more confusing. However,
going forward, the statute of limitations for employment
discrimination claims brought under RICRA is one year.
Jillian N. Taylor
53. Id. at 302 (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461).
Employment Law. Rhode Island Telecommunications Authority
v. Russell, 914 A.2d 984 (R.I. 2007). Plaintiff, a veteran, sued his
employer, the Rhode Island Telecommunications Authority, and
the Department of Administration, after being laid off, seeking a
position of similar grade to the one he previously held, as well as
back pay, under Rhode Island Gen Law §36-5-7 (2007). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that while the Department of
Administration did have a duty to place the plaintiff in a position
of similar grade, that duty seized when plaintiff voluntarily
submitted a retirement request. Also, because the plaintiff had
failed to notify the state of his veteran status at the time he began
working, the Department of Administration was only liable for
back pay that had accumulated from the time the department
found out about the veteran status.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Glenn F. Russell, was for many years a
familiar person on Rhode Island's public television station
(Channel 36), until he was notified that due to state financing
reductions, his position of director of public affairs had been
eliminated and he was being laid off. 1 That act of laying Russell
off began this saga in which Russell is seeking to return to the
television station, or in the alternative, to secure a similar position
within state service. 2
Mr. Russell's service with the state of Rhode Island began in
1978 when he was hired by the Department of Education to work
as an unclassified state employee at Channel 36. 3 At that time,
he had filled out an application for employment, on which he
misrepresented his age, the year he graduated from high school,
the years he attended college, and his status as a war veteran. 4
He continued working as a non-classified employee when the
1. Rhode Island Public Telecomm. Auth. v. Russell, 914 A.2d 984, 986
(R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority took Channel
36 over in 1982. 5 On July 23, 1992, Russell was notified by Susan
Farmer, the president and chief executive officer of the authority,
that his director of public affairs position had been abolished, and
he would be laid off as of August 21, 1992.6 At this point, Russell
notified his union, who concluded that pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the union and the authority, a
sixty day notification was needed before a layoff. 7 There was a
subsequent agreement that in exchange for a waiver of all claims
and grievances associated with the layoff by Russell, the date of
the layoff would be pushed back accordingly. 8
On September 18, 1992, now Russell's official lay-off date, he
applied for and received a Certificate of Veteran's Status from the
Department of Administration (DOA) Office of Personnel
Administration. He admitted that he had known of the statute9
regarding veteran's status, but was unsure of his standing until
he received the certificate. 10 He admits that he did not raise his
veteran status at any time during the layoff or negotiations with
5. Id. at 986-87.
6. Id. at 987.
7. Russell, 914 A.2d at 987
8. Id. This agreement was set forth in a memorandum of agreement
dated August 21, 1992. The relevant part read as follows: "The effective date
of the placement of Mr. Glenn Russell on lay-off is hereby extended by the
Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority from August 21, 1992 to
September 18, 1992. In consideration of said extension all grievances and
claims by or on behalf of Glenn Russell regarding his lay-off from Channel 36
are hereby withdrawn, waived and settled. From August 21, 1992 to
September 18, 1992 Mr. Russell is not assigned duties on Station premises."
Id.
9. See R.I. Gen. Laws §36-5-7 (1956); The pertinent part reads as follow:
"(a) Any person who is an honorably discharged veteran of the armed forces
of the United States and who has completed fifteen (15) or more years, not
necessarily consecutive of service credits, those credits having been earned in
either the classified, nonclassified, or unclassified service of the state or a
combination of both, shall be deemed to have acquired full status in the
position he or she holds at the time of obtaining fifteen (15) years of service
credit... (2) That in case of layoff or the abolition of a position through
reorganization or otherwise, any person in that position or subject to layoff,
who has full status, otherwise qualified under this section, shall be retained
within state services in a position of similar grade; (3) That this section shall
not apply to employees of the state government whose method of
appointment, salary, and term of office is specified by statute." Id.
10. Russell, 914 A.2d at 987.
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Channel 36.11 Channel 36 said they received no notice of the
veteran status until they received a letter from Russell's attorney
more than a year after the layoff. 12 At trial, Russell stated that
he had attempted to gain employment within the state based on
this status. 13
In a letter to the DOA dated September 3, 1993, Russell
questioned the lack of attention given him and asked "how and
when the state intended to honor my Tenure under R.I.G.L. 36-5-
7." A preliminary hearing was scheduled, at which time the
administrator of adjudication held that Russell did qualify for
veteran's status and that he was "hereby restored to his previous
classification or, if that is impossible, to a position of similar grade
at Channel 36."14 Russell's attorney then sent Channel 36, whom
at no point had known of the proceeding, a letter asking when
Russell should return to work. 15  Channel 36 responded on
December 30, 1993 by filing this action for declaratory relief in
Superior Court seeking: (1) a declaration that the administrator of
adjudication lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since Russell was
a nonclassified employee and therefore not subject to the merit
system laws; (2) a declaration of Channel 36's rights under the
August 21, 1992 agreement; and (3) appellate review of the
administrator of adjudication's decision. 16 Russell
counterclaimed, seeking enforcement of the decision. Then
Channel 36 amended its complaint and joined the DOA as a
defendant, resulting in Russell amending his counterclaim and
also filing a cross-claim against the DOA.17 Russell's claims
stated that Channel 36 and/or the DOA must comply with §36-5-7
and provide him with a new, equal position. 18 Prior to trial,
Russell submitted a retirement request and began to collect a
pension. 19
A bench trial in the Superior Court ensued in two phases, the
first concerning Russell's veteran status, the second focusing on
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 988.
15. Id.
16. Russell, 914 A.2d at 988.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
2008]
782 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:779
the damages. 20 On May 2, 2000, the trial justice ruled that
Russell was entitled to veteran's status and the waiver clause did
not bar Russell from pursuing his claim. 21 The court also ruled
that DOA was responsible for placing Russell in state
employment. 22 On November 13, 2003, after the damages phase
of the trial, the court found that DOA was responsible for placing
Russell in a new, equal position, while Channel 36 was liable for
paying Russell back pay. 23 After each party filed a motion for
reconsideration, "on July 23, 2004, the Superior Court ordered
Channel 26 to pay Russell $439,306.17 without prejudgment
interest and $362.34 for 15 percent of his sick leave accumulated
at the time of his payoff."' 24 Each side filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Mr. Russell's Veteran's Status
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's holding
that Mr. Russell is eligible for veteran status under Rhode Island
Gen. Laws §36-5-7 (2007).25 Both Channel 36 and the DOA
stipulated in an "Agreed Partial Statement of Facts" that Russell
is an honorably discharged veteran with fifteen years of service. 26
Because of this, the DOA and Channel 36 cannot now argue that
Russell has not met one of the two statutory prerequisites for "full
status" in his job, and this issue is no longer a question for
consideration. 27 The court also found that this issue was not
saved for appeal because neither Channel 36 nor the DOA moved
at trial to withdraw or repudiate any of the agreed stipulations. 28
Because of these stipulations, the validity of Russell's "Certificate
of Veteran's Status" and the jurisdiction of the administrator of
adjudication is not relevant. 29
The DOA and Channel 36 also argued that the exception for
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Russell, 914 A.2d at 989.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 992.
26. Id. at 990.
27. Id.
28. Russell, 914 A.2d at 991.
29. Id.
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"employees of the state government whose method of
appointment, salary and term of office is specified by statute" puts
Russell outside the scope of the statute. 30 However, the court
found that this exception did not apply to the case at bar because
Russell's tenure was not "coterminous" with Mrs. Farmer's
incumbency as general manager. 3 1
For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial court's finding
as to Mr. Russell's veteran status.
Liability of Channel 36
The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment
holding that Channel 36 was "solely responsible to compensate
Russell for the income that he would have received during the
period of his lay off."' 3 2  This decision stemmed from the
memorandum of agreement discussed earlier between Russell and
Channel 36 which stated that "all grievances and claims by or on
behalf of Glenn Russell regarding his layoff from Channel 36 are
hereby withdrawn, waived and settled. '3 3 The trial court found
that the waiver "does not prevent Russell from pursuing his
statutory right to veteran's status" and that Russell "did not waive
his right to veteran's status under § 36-5-7." 34 Although the
Supreme Court agrees that this is not a complete waiver of all of
Russell's rights, it does "relieve Channel 36 of any liability it
might otherwise have borne relative to his veteran's status."35
His post-layoff claim against Channel 36 is too intertwined with
his layoff to not be within the scope of his employment. At the
time of the layoff, Channel 36 did not know of Russell's veteran
status, due to his misrepresentation on his application. While
Russell argues that his veteran's status involves a post-layoff
right, the statute ensures that any qualified veteran whose
position has been abolished or is subject to layoff shall be retained
within state service. 36 The agreement at issue waived all of his
claims against Channel 36 and his post-layoff claim invokes the
30. Id.
31. Id. at 992.
32. Id. at 993.
33. Id. at 992.
34. Russell, 914 A.2d at 992.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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same status that might have secured his uninterrupted
employment if it had been correctly raised. 37 Therefore, while
Russell is entitled to his veteran's status, he cannot presently use
this status against Channel 36.38
Liability of the DOA
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the
DOA is liable for paying Mr. Russell back pay, although not to the
extent the trial court found. 39 After determining that Russell did
in fact qualify for veteran's status, the trial court found that the
DOA had the responsibility to place Russell in a position "of
similar grade" to the one he had held at Channel 36. From this, it
followed that DOA was liable for the "income he would have
received during the period of his lay-off."'40 However, this case
was not so easy. Because Mr. Russell was not classified as an
employee having veteran's status, Channel 36 had no duty to
notify the DOA of Russell's impending layoff.4 1 Even if Channel
36 had notified DOA of Russell's impending layoff, due to the
misrepresentation Russell made about his veteran's status on his
application, his employment records would not reflect his status. 42
However, the language of § 36-5-7 makes it clear that the General
Assembly intended for all honorably discharged war veterans,
whether in the classified, unclassified, or nonclassified service of
the state, to receive the benefits of full status. Based on this,
although the Supreme Court was willing to place responsibility on
the DOA to place Russell in state employment, the court was
unwilling to award back pay for the part of his unemployment
that preceded DOA's awareness of his circumstances. 43 The court
also found that Russell's voluntary retirement, which he requested
prior to trial, relieved the DOA of all responsibility it had in
finding him a state job. 4 4
37. Id.
38. Id. at 992-93.
39. Id. at 993-94.
40. Id. at 993.
41. Russell, 914 A.2d at 993.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id at 994.
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Vacation and Sick Leave Benefits
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that
neither vacation time nor additional sick leave should be included
in the calculation of back pay. These items are not additional
income, but provide payment of an employee's regular salary when
the employee is authorized to be out of work. 45 Mr. Russell
pointed to Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.4 6 and Cox v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co.4 7 to support his argument that
vacation time and sick leave should be included in his back pay,
however the Court distinguished these cases from the case at bar.
While in those cases the court had found instances of "egregious
discrimination" and the damages were calculated under federal
employment discrimination statutes, in this case, there were no
allegations of discrimination. 48 Nor was he wrongfully
terminated, as in Wilkinson v. The State Crime Laboratory
Commission.49 Because of these reasons, the court found that his
back pay should not include sick leave and vacation time.
Prejudgment Interest
Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding
that there should be no prejudgment interest added to the award
of back pay. While Mr. Russell contended that once a statute
establishes a property right, here in the award of back pay, the
government cannot invoke sovereign immunity to escape liability
from that right. 50 While the court agreed with Mr. Russell's
interpretation up to a point, the court found that "liability for back
pay and liability for prejudgment interest are two separate
matters; the latter does not automatically flow from the former."51
The text of § 36-5-7 does not include a right to prejudgment
interest.52 Therefore, absent any statutory provision to the
contrary, the court held that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity
45. Id.
46. 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir. 1986).
48. Russell, 914 A.2d at 994.
49. Id.; see 788 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2002).
50. Russell, 914 A.2d at 994-95.
51. Id. at 995.
52. Id.
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insulates the state from paying prejudgment interest. '53
COMMENTARY
In this complex case, the Supreme Court was confronted with
the issue of what rights a veteran who has been laid off by the
state has under § 36-5-7 when the veteran initially failed to notify
the state at the time of his employment of his veteran status. The
court successfully managed this issue when finding that Mr.
Russell was due the full rights under the statute, yet also
decreasing his total award amount due to his earlier
misrepresentation. In this way, the Supreme Court followed the
plain language of the statute, but made it clear that it was not
going to tolerate such a blatant misrepresentation to the state.
The main lesson that can be taken from this case is how
important it is to disclose all information at the time of
employment. Although the case does not make clear the reasons
for Russell's misrepresentations, it is clear that he would have
fared much better during the course of the layoff if the state had
been aware that he was an honorably discharged veteran. The
DOA would immediately have been notified of the impending
layoff, and it is very likely that Mr. Russell would never have had
the span of unemployment. Even if he still had to go through a
period of unemployment, the DOA would have had to provide him
with back pay for the entire length of time he was out of work. If
he hadn't made this misrepresentation, it is also very possible that
this piece of litigation would not have ensued.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
finding that Mr. Russell did qualify for veteran's status under §
36-5-7, and it was the DOA's responsibility for placing him in a
similar position within the state. However, the court reversed the
finding that the DOA had an ongoing duty to place him in state
services. The court also reversed the trial court's finding of
liability against Channel 36. The court directed judgment against
the DOA, awarding him an award of back pay without
prejudgment interest, vacation time, or sick leave.
53. Id.
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Employment Law. Shoucair v. Brown University, 917 A.2d 418
(R.I. 2007). An employee's limited opportunity to be heard during
later stages of employment review does not, as a matter of law,
indicate that an independent investigation has taken place,
purging all traces of a retaliation-based discrimination claim.
Additionally, a retaliation-based discrimination claim requires
evidence beyond the prima facie case of retaliation when an
employer introduces an alternative justifiable explanation for
termination. Unless an employer participated in, authorized, or
ratified the retaliatory act of its employee, punitive damages
cannot be properly awarded against that employer. In the context
of a professor being unable to find work in academia, he or she is
obligated to search for a position outside of academia to mitigate
his or her damages for awards of back pay and front pay from an
employment discrimination claim. Likewise, reinstatement is not
an appropriate remedy for a professor who is denied tenure if he
or she has not stayed current with research and experience in the
field of his or her profession.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Professor Fred Shoucair, Ph.D., was hired by the
defendant, Brown University ["Brown"], as an assistant professor
in the Electrical Services group of the Division of Engineering in
July 1987.1 Not long after arriving at Brown, Shoucair was
invited to join the Laboratory for Engineering Man/Machine
Systems ["LEMS group"] by Professor Harry Silverman. 2
Shoucair joined the LEMS group, which consisted of a number of
professors in the electrical sciences group who met on a regular
basis to discuss common academic and research interests. 3 In
May 1990, however, Shoucair left the group following a
disagreement with Silverman concerning a grading controversy in
one of Shoucair's undergraduate engineering classes. 4
1. Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 421 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 422.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Specifically, Silverman felt that Shoucair had "a
disproportionately large number of noncredit grades" for his
"Engineering 52" class. 5 Apparently, Silverman demanded that
Shoucair change the grades and he refused. 6 Silverman then left
the room and came back with two other professors and proceeded
to alter the grade sheets, which Shoucair signed under protest,
acknowledged by the other two professors in a written note.
7
After Shoucair wrote a letter of complaint to the Dean of
Engineering, Alan Needleman, the original grades were restored.
8
In 1992, Silverman, who was then Dean of Engineering,
recused himself from Shoucair's tenure proceedings, since the two
had not spoken since the 1990 grading dispute.9 Silverman
appointed Professor Maurice Glicksman to chair Shoucair's tenure
review committee ['TRC"], who subsequently enlisted Professors
Nabil Lawandy and Subra Suresh to fill the committee. 10 During
the 1992-93 academic year, the TRC compiled and evaluated
Shoucair's tenure dossier. 11 Simultaneously, Glicksman was co-
chairing a search committee to hire a new professor in the
electrical sciences division to replace a retiring faculty member. 12
In February 1993, it was announced by Dean Silverman that the
search committee recommended hiring Eli Kapon.13 The tenured
faculty voted to approve the recommendation, but Brown's
Affirmative Action Monitoring Committee would not accept the
recommendation until one more "viable underrepresented
minority candidate (Asian)" was interviewed. 14 Shortly thereafter
in early March, Glicksman's secretary contacted Shoucair to ask
him to interview the additional minority candidate for "some
affirmative action considerations." 15 Shoucair declined, indicating
that that "it might be illegal to interview a candidate for a position
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 423.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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that had already been offered to someone else."'16 A week or two
later, Glicksman appeared in Shoucair's office, unannounced, with
the minority candidate whom Shoucair had declined to
interview. 17  Shoucair agreed, reluctantly, to spend fifteen
minutes with the candidate. 18
Shortly after this episode, on March 23, 1993, the TRC voted
to recommend Shoucair for tenure, but with a significant
disclaimer that the committee was unable to endorse him "with
enthusiasm."'19 On March 24, 1993, the tenured faculty of the
electrical sciences group met and voted 5-0 (with Glicksman and
Dean Silverman abstaining) to allow Shoucair's contract to lapse
and not extend him tenure. 20 Shoucair made himself available for
questioning (none were asked) at a meeting of all tenured faculty,
which voted 15-5 (with four abstentions) to not extend tenure to
Shoucair. 21 On May 17, 1993, Shoucair appeared before the
Committee on Faculty Reappointment and Tenure ["ConFRaT"],
which would make a recommendation to the provost about
tenure. 22 The ConFRaT members asked questions of Silverman,
Glicksman, and Lawandy, before asking Shoucair questions,
including some by Provost Frank Rothman. 23 ConFRaT voted 7-1
to deny Shoucair's tenure application. In response, Shoucair filed
a grievance with the Faculty Executive Committee ["FEC"], which
in September 1993 heard testimony concerning the grievance. 24
Here, Shoucair alleged for the first time that Glicksman "had
undermined [Shoucair's] tenure bid in retaliation for Shoucair's
misgivings about interviewing the minority candidate" for the
open faculty position. 25 After the FEC decided that Shoucair's
grievance was without merit, and a failed plea to Brown's then-
President Vartan Gregorian, "Shoucair was effectively finished at
Brown." 26 After Shoucair's contract expired on June 30, 1994, he
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 423-24.
21. Id. at 424.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 425.
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submitted "around the order of a hundred" employment
applications to colleges and universities through 1995, but
received no offers until 1996, when he accepted an adjunct faculty
position at the University of California-Berkeley. 27 He worked at
UC-Berkeley until 1999, when he believed that the position
offered him no opportunity for advancement. 28
Shoucair filed the underlying lawsuit in May 1996, alleging
"(1) Brown had 'tolerated and even condoned' an ethnically hostile
work environment created by Dean Silverman in the division of
engineering; (2) Professor Glicksman, acting as an agent of Brown,
had retaliated against Shoucair for opposing Glicksman's
discriminatory interviewing practices; and (3) Shoucair was
denied tenure because of his national/ancestral origin."29 In May
2003, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for Shoucair on
the retaliation claim only, and awarded him $400,000 in back pay,
$175,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive
damages. 30 The trial judge denied Brown's renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, motion for a new trial, and motion to
strike the punitive damages. 31 However, the trial judge reduced
Shoucair's back pay by 30 percent. 32 The trial judge denied
Shoucair's motions for reinstatement and front pay, but awarded
Shoucair's motions for attorney's fees and costs. 33  Brown
subsequently appealed and Shoucair cross-appealed. 34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Brown argued, on appeal, that the evidence failed to establish
Shoucair's retaliation claim as a matter of law. 35 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court found that evidence existed to show that
Glicksman acted in retaliation, and that Shoucair overcame both
his initial burden of a prima facie case and his second burden of
showing that the defendant's alternative explanation for
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 425-26.
32. Id. at 426.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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termination was "unworthy of credence." 36 Brown also maintained
that the trial judge erred when not requiring expert medical
testimony in order to sustain an award for compensatory damages
to prove that Shoucair suffered from physical and emotional
ailments. 37 The court held that expert medical testimony was not
necessary for a jury to determine whether a person would suffer
from emotional distress and humiliation following a retaliatory
discrimination act. 38 Brown's final argument on appeal asserted
that the trial judge erred when she sustained the award of
punitive damages because an employer must participate in,
authorize, or ratify the retaliatory act of its employee, which was
not present in this case. 39 The court found that the trial justice
erred when she sustained the punitive damages because the
evidence did not implicate anyone other than Glicksman as
participating in the wrongful retaliatory act and punitive damages
are only appropriate against an employer when it expressly
participates in the discriminatory act.40
Shoucair contended on appeal that the trial judge abused her
discretion when she reduced the jury's back pay award by 30
percent, as well as by denying his motions for reinstatement and
front pay.41 The court held that trial judge did not abuse her
discretion as Shoucair's lack of mitigation provides a rational
basis for the reduction of back pay award 42 as well as the lack of a
front pay award, 43 and reinstatement would be an improper
remedy, as Shoucair did not stay up to date on the evolving field of
engineering. 44
Professor Shoucair's Retaliation Claim
The Fair Employment Practices Act ["FEPA"] prohibits
employer discrimination "against any individual because he or she
has opposed any practice" under the act, such as discriminating
36. Id. at 429.
37. Id. at 432.
38. Id. at 433.
39. Id. at 434.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 432, 435-36.
42. Id. at 432.
43. Id. at 436.
44. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
based on race, religion, gender, or country of ancestral origin. 4 5
Rhode Island uses the three-step burden shifting analysis
established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.46 Under this test, the employee must
first make out a prima facie case of retaliation. 47 If a prima facie
case is made, then discrimination is presumed with the burden of
production, not persuasion, falling to the employer to show some
legitimate reason for the act at issue. 48  If the burden of
production is met by the employer, the employee then must
demonstrate that the employer's given justification is merely an
excuse. 49
Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
evidence allowed for more than one legitimate conclusion about
whether Brown's reason for denying him tenure was pretextual. 50
A reasonable jury could find that based on Shoucair's testimony,
the presented testimony of respected authorities in the field, and
the TRC recommendation, "albeit without enthusiasm," showed
that Shoucair was entitled to tenure. 5 1 While Brown met its
burden of production of a justifiable reason of "publish or perish" 52
to deny Shoucair tenure, there was evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that Brown's justifications were
"unworthy of credence." 53  Specifically, Shoucair presented
evidence that had a tendency to show that Glicksman was aware
of Shoucair's refusal to interview the minority candidate and then
shortly thereafter, "authored a very qualified recommendation for
Shoucair," as well as testimony that "this was the first instance
[multiple witnesses] could recall in which the recommendation of
the TRC was rejected by the tenured faculty.'15 4
45. Id. (See R.I. GEN. LAwS §28-5-7(5) (2007)).
46. Id. (citing McConnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
47. Id. at 427 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
48. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
49. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
50. Id. at 428.
51. Id.
52. This is the concept that, in order to receive tenure, a professor must
stay current within his specialization, receive grants to conduct research
within his specialization, and publish the results of such research on a
constant basis. Id. at 421.
53. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 429 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).
54. Id.
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The court also rejected Brown's argument that, as a matter of
law, the multiple layers of the tenure approval process and
Shoucair's opportunity to be heard by subsequent reviewers
showed that Shoucair's denial of tenure was not the result of a
single retaliatory act by Glicksman. 55 The court distinguished a
Massachusetts case56  that concluded courts should place
"considerable emphasis" on the independence of the ultimate
decision maker and the employee's opportunity to address the
underlying allegations. 57 Specifically, the court held that while
the opportunity to be heard is a "strong indicator that an
independent investigation has taken place, we are not prepared to
say that as a matter of law by granting Shoucair a limited
opportunity to be heard during subsequent stages of review[,]
Brown completely purged all traces of Glicksman's alleged
retaliation."58
Damages
The court found that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion when she reduced Shoucair's back pay award because
he bore some responsibility to mitigate his damages. 59 The trial
judge based her ruling on two decisions 60 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, where the plaintiffs who
failed to "sustain reasonably diligent efforts to find suitable new
employment saw their back pay damages reduced as a result. '61
Here, Shoucair admitted that he abandoned his "systematic" job
search after three years, after it began vigorously.62 Brown
additionally produced testimony that Shoucair's knowledge and
expertise could lead to many opportunities outside of academia. 63
Taken together, the court could not detect an abuse of discretion
55. Id. at 431.
56. Id. (citing Mole v. University of Massachusetts, 814 N.E.2d 329
(Mass. 2004)).
57. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 431 (citing Mole, 814 N.E.2d at 344).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 432.
60. Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Ctr, Inc., 236 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2001);
Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998).
61. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 432 (citing Conetta, 236 F.3d at 77; Carey, 156
F.3d at 40-41).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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in the trial judge's decision to reduce Shoucair's back pay by 30
percent. 64
The court reaffirmed earlier jurisprudence in Rhode Island
when it held in Shoucair that expert medical testimony was not
necessary in order for a claimant to receive compensatory
damages. 65 Brown had argued that a claimant seeking recovery
in a claim for tortious infliction of emotional distress, a causal
relationship between the defendant's misconduct and the
plaintiffs physical and psychic injuries must exist and proved by
expert medical testimony. 66 The court found, however, that the
present case was more similar to Adams v. Uno Restaurants, Inc.,
794 A.2d 489 (R.I. 2002).67 Adams involved a claim under the
Whistleblowers' Protection Act 68 and held that ordinary lay people
would be able to determine if emotional distress and humiliation
would result from a loss of employment. 69 The court in Shoucair
thus held that a jury does not need expert medical testimony to
determine whether emotional distress flowed from the ending of
Shoucair's career at Brown. 70
Citing previous case law restricting punitive damages in cases
involving liability based on respondeat-superior theory, the court
vacated Shoucair's punitive damage award of $100,000.71 The
court cited AAA Pool Service & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., which stated:
It has long been the law in this state that punitive or
exemplary damages will not be allowed in situations in
which a principal is prosecuted for the tortious act of his
servant, unless there is proof in the cause to implicate the
principal and make him particeps criminis of his agent's
act.... In Rhode Island, unless an employer participated
in, authorized, or ratified the noisome act of its employee,
punitive damages cannot properly be awarded against
64. Id.
65. Id. at 432-33.
66. Id. at 433 (See e.g. Wright v. Zielinksi, 824 A.2d 494, 499 (R.I. 2003)).
67. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 433.
68. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws §28-50 (2007)).
69. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 433 (citing Adams, 794 A.2d at 493).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 433-35.
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that employer. 72
The court in Shoucair held that unless the employer as an
entity participated in the retaliatory act, then there could be no
punitive damages. 73  Here, Shoucair failed to show that the
university was even aware of, much less participated in,
authorized, or ratified Glicksman's alleged retaliatory act. 74
Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to impute liability for
punitive damages against Brown. 75
The court affirmed the trial judge's decision to deny
Shoucair's motion for reinstatement, or in the alternative, for
front pay.76 Citing Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 77
the court held that reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy
unless the person discriminated against "is presently qualified to
assume the position sought. ' 78 Here, the trial judge exercised her
sound discretion, as "[t]he science of engineering undoubtedly has
advanced in numerous ways while Shoucair has been out of the
loop." 79
The court in Shoucair also held that remedy of front pay is
the province of the sound discretion of the trial judge.80 The court
adopted the holding of Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc.,81
that restricted the availability of front pay to a "more limited set
of circumstances than back pay."8 2 Here, Shoucair advanced the
same arguments for front pay as he did with back pay. 83 As it was
not an abuse of discretion to reduce the back pay award of
Shoucair, and in light of the remedial relief that he was awarded
otherwise, the court found that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion to deny Shoucair's front pay motion.8 4
72. Id. (citing 479 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I. 1984)).
73. Id. at 435.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 435-36.
77. Id. at 436 (citing 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979)).
78. Id. at 436 (quoting Kamberos, 603 F.2d at 603).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 364 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. 2004).
82. Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 436 (quoting Johnson, 364 F.3d at 380).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Shoucair fleshed out
what is necessary for a claim of discrimination based on a
retaliatory act by a fellow employee. Much like other
discrimination claims under FEPA, the three-step burden-shifting
framework applies to retaliatory acts, not just overtly
discriminatory acts. Here, the jury found that Shoucair was not
discriminated against on the basis of his ancestral origin, but
rather that he was "retaliated against" for communicating
displeasure with a possibly discriminatory act by his employer.
This holding has the potential to open up more claims, by
professors denied tenure and others, under FEPA as a
discriminatory act does not necessarily need to take place - only a
retaliatory act in response to commentary based on possibly
discriminatory acts. This is not to say, however, that this holding
opens the proverbial "floodgates of litigation." It merely allows
more claims to get to a jury on an employment discrimination
claim.
Another significant holding is the court's narrowing of the
circumstances in which punitive damages can be awarded. While
the employer generally is still ultimately responsible for the
actions of its employees through the vicarious liability theory of
respondeat superior, the court likewise clarifies that actual
participation, authorization, or ratification of the retaliatory act
on the part of the employing entity is necessary for an award of
punitive damages. This is not only a high threshold to reach, but
also may be hard to prove given the facts of this case. The provost
of an institution is clearly a management level position in an
entity with the authority to ratify decisions on behalf of that
entity and, in this case, was the ultimate decision maker for
whether a professor receives tenure. Yet, Provost Rothman was
deemed not to have participated in a retaliatory act based on the
recommendation of his employee (Glicksman), even with as much
oversight as Brown was claiming in this case. In other words, it
may be difficult, and may be near impossible, to prove an entity's
knowledge or intent other than by the actions of its employees and
management. Perhaps this will not be a problem if Shoucair is
read strictly on its facts on this issue, namely the idea that
Glicksman poisoned the tenure process at the beginning, and each
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step afterwards was a matter of "rubber-stamping."
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Shoucair also resolved
the issue that, unlike tortious infliction of emotional distress
claims, employment discrimination claims do not require expert
medical testimony for a jury to determine that a claimant has
suffered physical and psychic harm as a result of a retaliatory act.
The stricter standard is not applied by the court, allowing for
employment discrimination claimants to receive compensatory
damage awards for medically unsubstantiated injuries. Tort
reformers will probably not be pleased with such a ruling.
A final noteworthy issue from Shoucair concerned the need
for a professor who is denied tenure to stay up to date in the field
of his or her expertise, even if not in academia, in order to remain
eligible for reinstatement or front pay resulting from a
discrimination action. Granted, the level of staying up to date will
vary, depending on the profession (e.g. a lower burden for a
history professor, where changes are less frequent, than for a
biological sciences professor, where the field is always changing).
The notion that a professor must even seek work outside of
academia in order to be eligible for an appropriate remedy,
including reinstatement, will probably seem radical to many in
the education profession. Nonetheless, at least in Rhode Island,
such pursuit of nonacademic employment will be required in order
to mitigate damages from an employment discrimination claim.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found an employee's limited
opportunity to be heard during the later stages of an employment
review does not indicate, as a matter of law, that an independent
investigation has taken place to purge all traces of a retaliation-
based discrimination claim. The court held that expert medical
testimony was not necessary for a jury to determine whether a
person would suffer from emotional distress and humiliation
following a retaliatory discrimination act. Additionally, the court
reaffirmed the three-step framework for a retaliation-based
discrimination claim, by requiring evidence beyond the prima
facie case of retaliation, when an employer introduces an
alternative justifiable explanation for termination. Furthermore,
unless an employer expressly participated in, authorized, or
ratified the retaliatory act of its employee, punitive damages
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cannot be awarded against that employer.
David R. Petrarca, Jr.
Evidence. State v. Oster, 922 A.2d 151 (R.I. 2007). The presence
of a seal, or a "satisfactory explanation" for its absence, is an
independent condition precedent to the use of wiretap evidence.
Even a defendant who is not an "aggrieved person" has standing
to challenge a sealing violation and move to suppress the evidence.
Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not require the State to provide a defendant with a definitive list
of witnesses and summaries of their anticipated testimony, the
specification of defendant's prior statements it intends to use, the
specification of the precise trial exhibits it intended to use, or a
list of 404(b) material it intends to introduce.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In February 2002, the defendant, Jonathan Oster, was
arrested and indicted on two counts of obtaining or attempting to
obtain a bribe, and two counts of conspiracy to do the same.1
Leading up to the arrest, the Financial Crimes Unit of the Rhode
Island State Police had been intercepting the telephone
conversations of codefendant Robert Picerno pursuant to an order
from the Superior Court Justice authorizing the wire-tapping
under R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 §12-5.1.2 After arresting Picerno, the
State Police convinced him to participate in a sting operation to
implicate Oster. 3 The operation involved a telephone call from
Picerno to Oster, and a subsequent meeting in which Picerno
delivered $10,000 to Oster while under police surveillance. 4 The
sting operation led to Oster's arrest and indictment. 5
The Wiretap Evidence
Before trial, the defendants moved to exclude the wiretapping
1. State v. Oster, 922 A.2d 151, 153, 155 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 154; R.I. GEN. LAws §12-5.1-4(a) (... presiding justice . .. may
enter an ex parte order .... authorizing the interception of wire, electronic, or
oral communications...").
3. Oster, 922 A.2d at 154.
4. Id. at 154-55.
5. Id.
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evidence based on the State's failure to properly seal and store it
pursuant to § 12-5.1-8(a). 6 At an evidentiary hearing on the motion
in April 2004, the State called six witnesses whose testimony
established the chain of custody of the wiretap tapes.7 Within
three days of the commencement of the surveillance operation, a
detective brought the tapes to the Superior Court where an
Assistant Attorney General sealed them and placed them under a
desk. 8 Instead of being kept in a commercial bank vault or safe
deposit box pursuant to the Presiding Justice's explicit and
implicit instructions, 9 the box remained under a paralegal's desk
for almost a year. 10 It was not until 2003, when a change in
administration resulted in a new assistant taking over the
paralegal's desk, that someone moved the box to a secured storage
area. 11 At some point before being moved to a secure location, the
seal on the box had been intentionally broken.12 After the State
produced the unsealed and opened box of wiretap tapes, Oster and
Picerno argued that the circumstances surrounding the sealing
and storage of the wiretap evidence violated §12-5.1-8(a). 13 The
trial justice's first decision in the case found that because the clear
language of §12-5.1-8 requires that the evidence must be properly
sealed in order to be used; the wiretap evidence at issue must be
excluded. 14
Prior to the April 2004 evidentiary hearing establishing the
chain of custody of the wiretap tapes, Picerno entered a plea of
6. Id. at 155; R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-5.1-8(a) ("The presence of the seal
provided for by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall
be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication.).
7. Oster, 922 A.2d at 155.
8. Id. at 156-57.
9. Id. at 156 n.9. (It was the understanding of the Presiding Justice that
he had instructed the tapes to be kept in a bank vault or safe-deposit box.
The trial justice found that this, coupled with historic storage practice
created an implied order that the tapes be stored in such a place.)
10. Id. at 156.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 156-57
13. Id. at 157; R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-5.1-8(a) ("The presence of the seal
provided for by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall
be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication..
14. Oster, 922 A.2d at 157.
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nolo contendere and received his sentence. 15 Subsequently, the
State argued that Oster lacked standing to challenge the sealing
violation of the tapes because he was not an "aggrieved person."'16
The trial justice rejected this argument, reasoning that because
the sealing requirements were meant to preserve the integrity of
the evidence and not to further Fourth Amendment protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures, it did not matter
whether or not the recorded conversations included Oster. 17
Because the State offered no explanation for the sealing violation,
the trial justice granted Oster's motion to suppress the wiretap
tapes. 18
The Discovery Orders
In October 2003, the trial justice granted defendant's motions
for a bill of particulars and for so-called "Verlaque" material. 19
Relying on State v. Verlaque20 and Rule 16 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 the trial justice ordered the State
to "identify the evidence, witnesses, and aspects of prior testimony
it intend[ed] to introduce . . . [and to] clarify and identify any
evidence it propose[d] to elicit pursuant to Rule 404(b)" of the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 22 After the order and following
Picerno's conviction, the State responded by reducing its witness
list from sixty-six to almost twenty-five names, yet simultaneously
"reserve[d] the right to call any additional witnesses. . . or to
introduce any additional evidence referenced" in its previous
discovery disclosures. 23 Oster again moved to compel more
detailed discovery. 24 He argued that the State's summaries of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 157-58.
17. Id. at 158. Although it did not matter whether Oster was a subject of
the surveillance, the trial justice nonetheless found that at least some of the
taped conversations included Oster. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 158-59.
20. 465 A.2d 207 (holding that to allow for the defendants to properly
prepare a defense, timely disclosure of discoverable information is necessary).
21. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. Pro. 16
22. Oster, 922 A.2d at 158-59; (providing that although "evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" is not admissible for propensity purposes, it may be
"admissible for other purposes").
23. Oster, 922 A.2d at 159.
24. Id.
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testimony were too general, and that its reservation of the right to
use witnesses and evidence listed in previous discovery documents
removed all significance from the decreased witness list.25 In
response, the trial justice exercised her "trial management"
authority and followed the alleged "dictates of Rule 16" to issue
the discovery order addressed in this appeal. 2 6 This final
discovery order provided that the State must identify all
witnesses, their anticipated testimony, and any of their prior
statements it intended to introduce. 27 It also required the state to
identify any of Oster's previous statements that it intended to
introduce; any specific documents or tape recordings it intended to
introduce; and any Rule 404(b) material it intended to introduce. 28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the State
challenged both Oster's standing to seek exclusion of the wiretap
evidence, 29 and the trial justice's discretion to order discovery not
explicitly required by Rule 16 or Rule 404(b).3 0 Even though the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The judge provided that:
"1. The [sltate is ordered to clearly indicate and identify those
witnesses who the [s]tate intends to call as witnesses at the trial.
The [s]tate is further ordered to detail whether the anticipated
testimony is based on a prior statement and/or prior testimony and,
if so, the portion(s) * * * the [s]tate intends to use; and insofar as
there are no prior statements and/or prior testimony of witnesses or
the witnesses' expected testimony goes beyond the identified
statements/prior testimony in material part, the state shall
summarize the witnesses expected testimony.
"2. The [sitate is ordered to specify the statements of the defendant
that it intends to introduce at trial. The defendant's statements
should be summarized and clearly itemized.
"3. The [s]tate is ordered to specify the documents and specific tape-
recorded telephone calls that the [s]tate intends to introduce at trial.
"4. The [s]tate is ordered to identify any Rule 404(b) material the
[s]tate intends to introduce at trial.
"5. The [s]tate is ordered to deliver a transcript of Robert Picerno's
testimony from the suppression hearing and plea." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 160.
30. Id. at 159.
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State did not challenge the trial justice's finding that there was a
sealing violation, the Supreme Court nonetheless commented on
the "shocking" character of the State's failure to adequately store
the wiretap evidence. 31
Standing to Challenge the Wiretap Evidence
The State argued that because the Superior Court Justice
directed the interception order at Picerno's telephone, and because
Oster participated in only some of the intercepted conversations,
Oster was not an aggrieved person and therefore did not have
standing to challenge the admission of the wiretap evidence. 32 In
support of its argument, the State found similarities between §12-
5.1-8(a) and 18 U.S.C. §2518(8)(a), and argued that the Court
should follow federal decisions that have suppressed wiretap
evidence for "aggrieved persons. ' 33 The State argued that Oster
did not fall under the definition of an "aggrieved person" as
defined under 18 U.S.C. §2510(11). 3 4 The Supreme Court never
decided whether Oster qualified as an "aggrieved person," 35 but
instead focused only on the language of § 12-5.1-8(a) 36 to conclude
that "the presence of a seal or a 'satisfactory explanation' for its
absence" is an "independent condition precedent to the use of
wiretap evidence." 37
To reach this conclusion, the Court contrasted the language of
§12-5.1-1238 with the language of §12-5.1-8(a). 39 §12-5.1-12
31. Id. at 162.
32. Id. at 160.
33. Id. at 160-61; 18 U.S.C. §2518(8)(a) ("The presence of the seal
provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence
thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom under
subsection (3) of section 2517.").
34. Oster, 922 A.2d at 161; 18 U.S.C. §2510(11) (defining "aggrieved
person" as "a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or
electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was
directed[.]").
35. Oster, 922 A.2d at 161 n.18 (although it was unnecessary for the
Court to decide whether Oster was an aggrieved person, it noted that he was
one of the named targets of the wiretaps and that some of his conversations
were in fact intercepted).
36. Id. at 161.
37. Id. at 162.
38. Any aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of any
intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from
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explicitly restricts relief to aggrieved persons and lists specific
grounds for suppression of the evidence that are distinct and
separate from §12-5.1-8(a). 40 On the other hand, §12-5.1-8(a)
states that "the presence of the seal . . . or a satisfactory
explanation for its absence, shall be a prerequisite for the use or
disclosure of the contents[.] ' ' 4 1 The Court found that §12-5.1-8(a)
offers the exclusion of wiretap evidence as an independent remedy
for a sealing violation, supplementary to any remedy given to
aggrieved persons under §12-5.1-12(a). 42 Therefore, regardless of
whether Oster was an "aggrieved person,"4 3 he had standing to
challenge the use of the wiretap evidence. 44 Because the trial
justice found that there was a sealing violation and the State
offered no reason for such a violation, the wiretap evidence was
them on the grounds that:
(1) The communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(2) The order under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its
face;
(3) The interception was not made in conformity with the order;
(4) Service was not made as provided in § 12-5.1-11; or
(5) The seal provided in § 12-5.1-8(b) is not present and there is no
satisfactory explanation for its absence.
39. The contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if practicable, be
recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication under this section
shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other
alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or
extensions of the order, the recordings shall be made available to the
presiding justice of the superior court issuing the order and sealed under his
or her directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the presiding
justice of the superior court orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon
an order of the presiding justice of the superior court, and in any event, shall
be kept for ten (10) years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or
disclosure pursuant to the provisions of § 12-5.1-10(a) or (b) for investigations
and bail hearings and any pre-trial hearings. The presence of the seal
provided for by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall
be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them at any bail
hearing or pre-trial hearing. R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-5.1-8(a).
40. Oster, 922 A.2d at 161.
41. See infra. note 38.
42. Oster, 922 A.2d at 161-62.
43. Id. at 161 (noting that whether Oster is an "aggrieved person" is a
close question).
44. See id. at 161-62.
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inadmissible. 45
The Sealing Violation
The State declined to challenge the finding of a sealing
violation, but the Supreme Court discussed it nonetheless. Though
the evidence was left under a paralegal's desk, the seal was
broken, and the contents removed; the State offered no
explanation for its condition. 46 According to the Court, "the
gravity of the State's laxity and negligence in the mishandling and
storage of this evidence . . .[was] shocking. ' 47 The Court easily
determined that because the seal was absent without an
explanation, the condition precedent to its admissibility had not
been met, and therefore it was inadmissible. 48
The Discovery Order
The State appealed the final discovery order issued by the
trial justice, arguing that she went beyond the power of Rule 16
and that she abused her discretion in invoking "trial
management" authority. 49 The State assigns error to the
requirement of a definitive list of witnesses and summaries of
their anticipated testimony, the specification of Oster's prior
statements it intended to use, the specification of the precise trial
exhibits it intended to use, and a list of 404(b) material it intended
to introduce. 50
The Supreme Court held that Rule 16 only requires a
summary of witness' expected testimony when there is no prior
testimony or written statements of the witness. 51 Furthermore,
neither rule 16 nor trial management considerations are sufficient
to justify requiring the State to provide such specific details about
the testimony of expected witnesses. 52 Finally, the Court
distinguished State v. Verlaque, finding that it was inapplicable to
45. Id.
46. Id. at 162.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 163.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 164.
52. Id. at 165.
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the case at bar, and that it did not increase the State's discovery
obligations. 53
Although the State has a duty to provide the defendant with a
list of witnesses it plans to present, it neither has to specify which
document their testimony is based on nor does it have to specify
portions of testimony it intends to use. 54 The Court reiterated its
holdings in State v. Woodson 55 and State v. Williams56 that Rule
16 requires a written summary of the expected testimony only
when there is no prior testimony or written statements from that
particular witness, and in neither case is a detailed narration
necessary. 57 Here, the State had already provided a list of
witnesses and summaries of their expected testimonies, and the
Court's holding did not require the State to provide the types of
detailed explanatory notes called for by the discovery order.58
Oster argued that because Verlaque required the list of witnesses
to be a list of those who will actually testify at trial, the caveat in
the State's narrowed list of witnesses that reserved the right to
call additional witnesses rendered it illusory and inadequate. 59
The Court distinguished Verlaque, holding that it was
inapplicable and did not increase the State's discovery
obligations. 60 Verlaque addressed the State's failure to timely
comply with discovery orders, recognizing that a list of fifty-three
witnesses delivered on the eve of trial could be just as useless as
no list at all. 61 Here, Oster had sufficient time to examine the
witness list. 62
The Court accepted the State's argument that it should not be
required to specify which of the defendant's own statements it
intended to introduce at trial. 63 Rule 16(a)(1) requires the State to
provide the defendant with "all relevant written or recorded
statements . . . or written summaries of oral statements or
53. Id. at 165, 167.
54. Id. at 164.
55. 551 A.2d 1187, 1192 (R.I. 1988).
56. 752 A.2d 951, 953 (R.I. 2000).
57. Oster, 922 A.2d at 164.
58. Id. at 165.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 165, 167.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 165.
63. Id. at 166.
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confessions made by the defendant. ' 64 The Court reasoned that
Rule 16 required summaries of defendant's statements only when
there was no written record of them. 65 Accordingly, because the
Court held that the State's obligation did not extend beyond Rule
16, it vacated the portion of the order demanding itemization of
witness testimony.66
The Court held that it was erroneous for the trial justice to
have ordered the State to "specify the documents and specific
tape-recorded telephone calls that [it] intend[ed] to introduce at
trial. ' 67 The Court turned to its decision in State v. Mollicone68 for
guidance, and reasoned that by providing Oster with access to all
the documents and wiretap evidence long before trial, the State
had complied with Rule 16(a)(4). 69 As long as the State provides
the defendant with access to all the evidence and ample time to
inspect it, no need exists for it to reveal the specifics of its case-in-
chief before trial. 70
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the portion of the
discovery order directing the State to reveal any 404(b) material it
intended to introduce at trial was erroneous. 71 Rule 404 is an
evidentiary rule, and not a vehicle for discovery. 72 Nothing in Rule
16 even refers to Rule 404 evidence. 73 The Court noted that rule
404(b) evidence must be dealt with through objections and
motions in limine made during trial, and that it would be
"repugnant to the adversial underpinnings of [the] criminal justice
system" to force the State to go beyond its Rule 16 obligations. 74
COMMENTARY
Going to great lengths to recount the wiretap tapes' chain of
custody, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Oster
emphasizes the tremendous importance of maintaining the
64. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. Pro. 16
65. Oster, 922 A.2d at 166.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 166-67.
68. 654 A.2d 311 (R.I. 1995).
69. Oster, 922 A.2d at 167.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 168.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
integrity of such surreptitiously obtained evidence. Because the
State did not even challenge the alleged sealing violation, the
Court could have dealt with this case simply by affirming Oster's
standing to challenge the evidence's admissibility. Though it
ultimately took this route, the Court did not get there without
first criticizing the State's "shocking" negligence in the handling of
the evidence. 75 Even the iteration of the facts themselves seemed
superfluous, for the only facts crucial to the decision were that
there had been a sealing violation that prompted Oster to seek the
exclusion of the evidence. Though the ultimate decision was
certainly an important one, the Court went beyond what was
necessary and seized an opportunity to caution against such
atrocious evidence handling practices.
The Court's opinion ultimately decided that it was
unnecessary for Oster to be an "aggrieved person" in order to
challenge the admission of improperly sealed and stored wiretap
evidence. However, the opinion seemed to strongly hint that if it
was necessary, the Court could easily find Oster to be aggrieved. 7 6
In light of this, the Court could have simply disposed of this case
by finding that Oster had standing because he was an "aggrieved
person." It seems evident that by choosing to circumvent the
necessity of being an "aggrieved person," the Court was interested
in protecting a wide class of defendants from improperly stored
and sealed wiretap evidence.
By deciding to not require the State to comply with the trial
justice's discovery orders, the Supreme Court has placed some
outer limits on the State's liberal discovery mechanisms. The
Court distinguishes between liberal discovery that will prevent a
"trial by ambush,"7 7 and discovery that will ultimately require the
prosecution to do the defendant's work for him. 7 8 Though the
Court seems to be proud of the State's liberal discovery
mechanisms, its opinion here clarifies that it will not tolerate their
abuse. One prominent form of such abuse is an attempt to force
the prosecution with "an evidentiary road map of its case-in-
chief."7 9
75. Id. at 162.
76. Id. at 161 n.18
77. Id. at 163.
78. Id. at 164.
79. Id. at 167.
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CONCLUSION
By recognizing that §12-5.1-8(a) creates an independent
condition precedent to the use of wiretap evidence, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that regardless of whether a defendant
is an "aggrieved person," he has standing to seek exclusion of
wiretap evidence that had not been properly sealed and stored.
The Court also placed limits on its liberal discovery mechanisms
by not requiring the State to do anything beyond its Rule 16
obligations.
David Casale
Evidence and Criminal Law. State v. Kenneth Day, 925 A.2d
962 (R.I. 2007). The crimes of robbery and carjacking are but two
objects of the same conspiracy when the same evidence is used to
prove the two conspiracies and where the people, places, and time
during which the activities took place are essentially the same.
Furthermore, under the "same evidence" test, the substantive
offenses of carjacking resulting in death and robbery merge into a
single offense when the elements of the two crimes are proven by
the same evidence. Finally, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confront witnesses is not violated when a court admits prior
recorded testimony where defendant had ample opportunity and
"had in fact seized the opportunity" to confront the witness
through thorough cross-examination at the prior trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On the evening of June 8, 2000, twenty-year-old Jason
Burgeson picked up Amy Shute, his twenty-one-year-old
girlfriend, in his white 1991 Ford Explorer, and the two headed
into Providence. 1 There they met up with two friends at Tommy's
Bar and Grill downtown, at around 10:30 p.m. 2 The group next
moved on to Bootleggers, a dance club in Providence, via Jason's
Explorer. 3 Later the four headed from Bootleggers to where Jason
had parked his car. 4 Jason then drove the four back to the
parking lot at Tommy's Bar and Grill where they sat in another
car for approximately twenty minutes before Jason and Amy
headed back to Jason's Explorer. 5
In the early afternoon hours of June 9, 2000, a groundskeeper
at Button Hole Golf Course discovered two bodies, ultimately
identified as those of Jason and Amy. 6 Johnston Police found
"spent handgun casings and a live round of handgun
1. State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 968 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 969.
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ammunition", among other things, but did not locate any
handgun. 7 Upon further investigation, the police learned that
Jason had been driving a white 1991 Ford Explorer on the night of
June 8. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on June 9, police pulled over a
car fitting the Explorer's description and detained its driver,
Gregory Floyd.8The police then executed a search warrant on the
home where Floyd lived with the defendant (Day).9 The police
seized a .40 caliber handgun and took the defendant into
custody. 10
The court believed the testimony of Gregory Floyd to be the
"most detailed account" of the happenings of early June 9, 2000.11
According to Floyd, he and defendant ventured downtown in the
late afternoon hours of June 8 with gun in tow. 12 The two met up
with acquaintances Burdick, Anderson and Sanchez and scoured
the streets of Providence for potential robbery victims. 13 Shortly
after midnight, according to Floyd, the five men spotted Jason and
Amy and hatched a plan to rob them and carjack the Explorer.14
The plan saw Floyd and Burdick successful in the carjacking, with
Floyd driving the Explorer and Jason and Amy held at gunpoint in
the back seat. 15 The others followed in the Sanchez vehicle and
eventually the two cars found their way to the Button Hole Golf
course. 16
The men then exited the cars and according to Floyd,
defendant suggested raping Amy and urged Floyd to kill both Amy
and Jason. 17 Next, Jason and Amy were set on the ground in
front of the Explorer where they remained "frightened, crying, and
pleading for their lives" until Floyd ended it all by pulling the
7. Id..
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 970.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 971.
14. Id. 'The defendant denied that he himself had intended to
participate in the robbery" of Jason and Amy, "noting that he had just
received his paycheck." Id. at 969.
15. Id. at 971-72.
16. Id. at 972.
17. Id. The defendant, in his statement to police, maintained that it was
Floyd who wished to kill Jason and Amy. Id.
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trigger "about three times". 18
On December 18, 2000, the grand jury indicted the five men
for (1) conspiracy to commit carjacking and (2) carjacking with
death resulting in violation of federal statutory law. 19 While the
four others entered plea agreements in order to avoid the
possibility of a death sentence, the defendant opted to go to trial
where a judge granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal.20
On August 29, 2003, the State indicted the defendant on the
following nine counts: (1) conspiracy to commit robbery; (2)
conspiracy to commit carjacking; (3)conspiracy to commit murder;
(4) and (5) first-degree robbery; (6) and (7) carjacking of a motor
vehicle resulting in death; and (8) and (9) first-degree murder. 21
On June 10, 2004, a jury found the defendant guilty on all nine
charges. 22 The judge denied the defendant's motion for a new
trial and Day timely filed an appeal. 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The defendant raised seven issues on appeal to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court contending (1) that the trial justice
exceeded his authority in imposing four consecutive sentences of
life imprisonment without parole; (2) that the trial justice erred in
denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) that
defendant's conviction on both murder and the underlying
carjacking felony violated the double jeopardy clause; (4) that the
trial justice violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation when he admitted the recorded testimony of a
witness who had testified in an earlier criminal trial in federal
court; (5) that the trial justice erred in allowing the introduction of
evidence of a conversation between that same witness and
defendant while they were in custody; (6) that the trial justice
erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; and (7) that
18. Id. at 972-73. Defendant's version of the same event had him
running away from the scene as soon as Floyd shot Jason allowing him to
only hear the shooting of Amy. Id. at 970.
19. Id. at 973.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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defendant's sentence was excessive. 24 This survey will tackle
issues (2) and (4) as the most important to future decisions. 25
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
The defendant's contention that the trial justice erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy to
commit murder charge was discarded by the court on the ground
that "[i]t is well settled that issues that were not raised at the
trial level 'are not properly preserved for appellate review."' 26
The defendant also argued that the court erred in denying his
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy to commit
carjacking. 27  Defendant believed that insufficient evidence
existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had entered
into two separate conspiracies and therefore insufficient evidence
existed to prove that he conspired to carjack the two victims. 28
The court adopted the United States Supreme Court's "same
evidence" test 29 as employed by the First Circuit in the context of
conspiracy charges. 30 The five factors considered by the court in
determining "whether or not two or more conspiracy charges are,
in actuality, reducible to a single conspiracy are: "(1) the time
during which the activities occurred; (2) the persons involved in
the conspiracies; (3) the places involved; (4) whether the same
evidence was used to prove the two conspiracies; and (5) whether
the same statutory provision was involved in both conspiracies." 3 1
In applying the five factors to the case at bar, the Court
"conclude[d] that the robbery and the carjacking were but two
objects of the same conspiracy."32 The Court reasoned that the
two criminal conspiracies occurred over the course of the same
night, involved the same people, in the same place (downtown
24. Id. at 968.
25. The Court afforded no relief to the defendant on the five grounds of
his appeal not dealt with in this survey. Id. at 989.
26. Id. at 974. (quoting State v. Cardoza, 649 A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1994)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 976 (R.I. 2007)(citing Blockberger v. U.S.,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
30. Day, 925 A.2d at 976 (R.I. 2007)(citing U.S. v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27,29
(1st Cir.1982)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 976.
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Providence) and were proved by the same evidence. While the
fifth factor was not present in the case, the Court nevertheless
found only one conspiracy and therefore "direct[ed] a judgment of
acquittal with respect to the conspiracy to commit carjacking. .. "33
The defendant then argued that because the State utilized the
same evidence to prove both the substantive robbery and
carjacking offenses, the two merge into a single offense entitling
him to a judgment of acquittal on the robbery counts. 34 The Court
again employed the "same evidence" test to determine whether
two offenses constitute two separate offenses or merge into one
single offense. 35 The Court considered "whether each provision
required proof of a fact which the other [did] not. ' 36 The Court
outlined and compared the elements of the common law felony of
robbery and the statutory crime of carjacking resulting in death
and could not conclude that each offense "requires proof of a fact
which the other does not."' 37 The Court afforded heavy weight to
language in the carjacking statute that essentially "equat[ed]
carjacking to robbery." 38 The Court therefore had "no choice but
to direct a motion for a judgment of acquittal" on the robbery
counts. 39
Prior Recorded Testimony
The defendant next argued that the trial justice violated his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when he admitted the
recorded testimony of Gregory Floyd from defendant's federal
trial.40 First the defendant argued that the trial justice wrongly
33. Id. at 976-77.
34. Id. at 977.
35. Id. (citing Blockberger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
36. Id. at 978. (quoting Blockberger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
37. Id. at 978(quoting Blockberger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
38. Id. The relevant portion of the carjacking resulting in death statute
reads:
"(a) Every person who shall unlawfully seize a motor vehicle from its
lawful owner, lessor, or occupant by use or threat of use of a
dangerous weapon against the owner, lessor, or occupant resulting in
serious bodily injury * * * shall be guilty of first degree robbery * *
*." Id. (quoting R.I. GEN LAws § 11-39-2 (1956)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 979. The trial justice allowed the testimony in reliance on Rule
804(b)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Id.
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determined that the witness was unavailable. 41  The Court
rejected the argument on familiar grounds, holding that the
defendant had failed to properly preserve the issue for review. 42
The Court based its holding on the fact that defendant had limited
his objection solely to the adequacy of his opportunity to cross-
examine Floyd at the earlier trial.43
The defendant, therefore, did properly preserve his objection
that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to confront
Floyd.44 He based his argument on the fact that his only cross-
examination of Floyd had occurred during a federal trial
"concerning a different charge. '45 He rests his argument on Sixth
Amendment language that "the accused should enjoy the right..
.to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ' 4 6 However, the
Court noted that Rule 804(b)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence allows previous sworn testimony of an unavailable
witness to be admissible if the party against whom admission is
sought was afforded an adequate opportunity to cross examine the
witness. 47 The Court required "only that there be a substantial
identity of issues and of parties before former testimony will be
deemed admissible. ' 48 The Court then concluded that "[w]hile the
specific crimes at issue in the two trials differed slightly, both
trials related to the same sequence of events" thereby constituting
a substantial identity of issues and parties.49
The Court proceeded to hold that the trial justice had not
abused his discretion in admitting Floyd's prior recorded
testimony for the testimony did not violate the confrontation
clause because the defendant "not only had ample opportunity to
cross-examine Floyd, but... had in fact seized the opportunity."50
The Court noted that not only was defendant present to confront
41. Id. Floyd was present but refused to testify at the state trial. Id. at
979 n.25.
42. State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 979 (R.I. 2007).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 980.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI.).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing State v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124, 131(1972))(emphasis in
original).
49. Id. at 980-81.
50. Id.
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the witness at the federal trial but had questioned Floyd as to the
events prior to, during, and after the carjacking, a cross
examination that spanned 222 pages of transcript. 51 The Court
held that this cross-examination of Floyd easily "constitute[d] a
sufficient probing of the witness's credibility" and rejected the
defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge. 52
COMMENTARY
Day involved a rather senseless and extremely tragic
sequence of events that ended with the execution-style murders of
Jason Burgeson and Amy Shute. The Rhode Island Superior
Court heard the charges against Day only after the federal
government failed to make its case against Day on charges of
conspiracy to commit carjacking and carjacking with death
resulting in violation of federal statutory law. After a lengthy
recitation of the facts of the case, which relied considerably on the
testimony of Gregory Floyd, Day's friend and co-conspirator, the
court conducted a thorough analysis of the defendant's nine count
appeal.
The court appeared reluctant to grant defendant's motions for
judgment of acquittal as to the conspiracy to commit carjacking
and robbery charges and acknowledged that the "same evidence"
tests as applied to the facts of each case had forced their hand.
While the court arguably had some room to maneuver here-most
notably the absence of the fifth Boone factor and the defendant's
failure to raise his substantive merge argument in a motion before
commencement of the trial- they wisely erred on the side of
caution. These were but small, almost inconsequential battles.
For it was clear that the most important issue before the court
in determining the fate of Kenneth Day lay in its determination
whether to allow the prior recorded testimony of Gregory Floyd
into evidence. The state's case against Day relied heavily, if not
exclusively, on Floyd's testimony. Day argued that the trial
judge's decision to allow the testimony violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses. The court properly
disagreed, invoking Rule 804(b)(1) before determining that
51. Id. at n. 29.
52. Id.
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defendant had had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
Floyd at the federal trial. The court cited the length and depth of
that cross-examination in holding that its admittance did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. In addition, as a practical
matter, the defendant was facing a possible death sentence should
he have been convicted of the federal charges, a strong incentive to
cross-examine Floyd not only adequately, but exhaustively.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court used the "same evidence"
test, albeit in different contexts and in slightly different forms, to
grant defendant's motions for a judgment of acquittal on the
conspiracy to commit carjacking and robbery counts. 53  In
addition, the court held that the Confrontation Clause was not
violated by the admission of a witness's prior recorded testimony.
Tim St. Lawrence
53. Id. at 976-77, 979. Defendant was unsuccessful on all other counts of
his appeal. Id. at 989.
Family Law. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). A
same - sex couple, properly married in Massachusetts, may not
seek a divorce from the Rhode Island Family Court. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the Family Court's limited
statutory jurisdiction does not grant it the power to divorce a same
- sex couple validly married in another state. The Supreme Court
further suggested that the proper forum for this discussion is the
General Assembly, not the courts.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Following Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the
landmark decision in Massachusetts allowing same - sex couples
to marry, Rhode Island residents, Margaret Chambers and
Cassandra Ormiston, traveled to Fall River, Massachusetts and
were properly married there on May 26, 2004.1 They returned to
Rhode Island and resided together, as a married couple, until they
decided to dissolve their marriage two years later.2 On October
23, 2006, Ms. Chambers filed a petition for divorce in the Rhode
Island Family Court. 3 Thereafter, on October 27, Ms. Ormiston
filed an answer and counterclaim. 4 Since Rhode Island is one of
the few states that lacks any legislation on same - sex marriages,
whether permissive or prohibitory, the Family Court was unsure
how to proceed. Consequently, on December 11, 2006, the Family
Court certified a question to the Supreme Court as to whether it
had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the Chambers - Ormiston
petition for divorce. 5
The Supreme Court considered the certified question in two
separate conferences on January 4, 2007 and January 10, 2007,
ultimately deciding to send the question back to the Family Court
1. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2007) (citing
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
2. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d at 958-59.
3. Id. at 959.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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for more fact finding. 6 Specifically, the Supreme Court asked the
Family Court justice for findings of facts on the following three
questions: (1) whether the case presented an actual case or
controversy, (2) whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution was relevant to the case, and (3)
whether the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000)
was pertinent. 7 The Family Court responded February 21, 2007,
answering that the case did present an actual case or controversy,
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was relevant and finally,
that the Defense of Marriage Act had only "nominal" effect.8 The
Supreme Court decided to hear the case on May 23, 2007 and
worded the question to be answered as follows: "May the Family
Court properly recognize, for the purpose of entertaining a divorce
petition, the marriage of two persons of the same sex who were
purportedly married in another state?"9 On October 9, 2007, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments from the parties with
respect to the certified questions. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Justice Robinson wrote the opinion for the Court, which
included Chief Justice Williams and Justice Flaherty. The
majority held that the Family Court, a court of limited statutory
jurisdiction, was without jurisdiction to entertain the Chambers -
Ormiston divorce petition. 11  Thus, the Court answered the
question presented in the negative. 12 The Court relied on the
definition of marriage when the General Assembly created the
Family Court to arrive at its conclusion. Justice Suttell, along
with Justice Goldberg dissented.
The Court began its analysis by looking to the General Law
that created the Rhode Island Family Court in 1961.13 The
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 958.
10. 935 A.2d at 959. It is also of note that the Supreme Court received
over twenty-seven amici curiae briefs due to the controversy surrounding this
case, although none of the parties representing the briefs were permitted to
argue before the Court during oral arguments.
11. Id. at 958.
12. Id.
13. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d at 959 ("General Laws 1956 § 8-10-
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relevant language from that the statute centered on the Family
Court's power to hear and determine a "divorce from the bond of
marriage."' 4 The Court's task then became to determine what
was the meaning of "marriage" within the Rhode Island statute
that granted the Family Court the power to hear divorces.' 5 More
specifically, the Court needed looked back to1961 to determine
exactly what the General Assembly meant when it included the
word "marriage" into the law at issue.
The Court then made it clear that the role of the Supreme
Court is to be the final arbiter with respect to statutory
construction.16 The Court explained how it addresses statutory
construction: it must first determine whether the statute at issue
is ambiguous. Again, the issue here was whether the word
"marriage" was a clear meaning or rather, ambiguous. Justice
Robinson cited to three separate dictionaries that existed at the
time that the General Assembly created the Family Court to
determine that the definition of marriage was clear.' 7 The word
"marriage" within the 1961 dictionaries was meant to refer solely
to the union between a man and a woman.18 Although the Court
made it quite clear that the law only needed a plain meaning
analysis, the Court went on to reason in the alternative as
well.The Court suggested that even if the statute were viewed as
"ambiguous," it nevertheless would have reached the same
result.1 9  Citing the Noscitur a Sociis Canon of Statutory
Construction, which guides courts to look at other words
associated with the one in question, the Court again determined
that the meaning of "marriage" within the General Assembly's law
3(a) reads in pertinent part as follows: 'There is hereby established a family
court, consisting of a chief judge and eleven (11) associate justices, to hear
and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage * *
(Emphasis added.)").
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing New England Expenditure-Providence, LLC v. City of
Providence, 773 A.2d 259, 263 (R.I. 2001)).
17. Id. at 962.
18. Id. (see Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English
Language, the American College Dictionary, or Funk & Wagnalls Standard
College Dictionary.
19. Id. at 963 (the Court's main reason for taking this unusual turn of
reasoning in the alternative appears to be the controversial nature of the
case, see footnote 16).
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have referred to man and woman. 20
The majority concluded by discussing the proper role of the
judiciary. The Court noted that since it had clearly applied the
definition of "marriage" from 1961 to the statute, any other
outcome would be to usurp the legislative function.21 Citing to
previous cases, the Court elaborated on it's role: "the role of the
judicial branch is not to make policy, but simply to determine the
legislative intent as expressed in the statutes enacted by the
General Assembly. ' 22 While the Court appeared to be concerned
with its role as the judicial branch, it acknowledged the "palpable
hardship" its ruling may have on any married same - sex couples
seeking a divorce in Rhode Island. 23
Dissent
The dissent was written by Justice Suttell and joined by
Justice Goldberg; they concluded that the plain meaning of the
statute, along with other legal principles, would have allowed the
Family Court to grant this divorce. 24 Unlike the majority, which
based its entire decision on the 1961 definition of marriage, the
dissent was nearly silent on that issue. More specifically, the
dissent was concerned that the majority overlooked one critical
fact: that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston were lawfully married
under the laws of Massachusetts. 25 The dissent added that basic
principles of comity, as well as the Family Court divorce statute
itself, should have allowed to Court to hear this divorce. 26 To be
precise, the dissent noted that the statue that created the Family
Court included a catchall provision that allows the Family Court
20. Id. at 964-965 (More specifically, the Court looks to applications for
marriage licenses, polygamy and bigamy laws and also, incest laws).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 965 (citing Little v. Conflict of Interest Comm'n, 397 A.2d 884
(R.I. 1979)).
23. Id. at 966.
24. Id. at 967.
25. Id. at 968 (the dissent also cited to Massachusetts ruling in Cote-
Whitacre v. Department of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006)
holding that same-sex marriage was not prohibited in Rhode Island and
couples married in Massachusetts but residing in Rhode Island shall have
their marriages processed, for more on how this applies to Rhode Island law,
see Kevin Lewis, 2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law Cases, Family Law, 12
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 604 (Winter 2007)).
26. Id. at 972.
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to hear all divorces, whether void or voidable by law. 27 Therefore
regardless of the definition of marriage under Rhode Island law,
the Family Court should have been able to entertain this divorce.
The dissent also took into account the reality of what the
majority's holding would mean, stating that now Ms. Chambers
and Ms. Ormiston will literally have to move out of the state and
reside in Massachusetts for one year before seeking a divorce
there. 28 To conclude, the dissent was arguing that Rhode Island
should recognize and respect valid court decisions of other
states. 29 Similar to the majority, the dissent concluded that the
proper place for the greater same - sex marriage debate in Rhode
Island rests at the State House.30
COMMENTARY
When deciding "controversial" decisions, courts must walk a
fine line between maintaining their constitutionally - mandated
role to "say what the law is" and avoiding actual lawmaking.
31
However, a case like this one brings those two roles into conflict
because of the increased attention brought to the Court's decision.
Further, as one can tell from reading both the majority and the
dissent in this case, the Supreme Court was clearly concerned
with its role as the judicial branch. It is intriguing that both sides
of the opinion suggest and even more, urge the General Assembly
to take up this issue, perhaps demonstrating that neither side
wanted to venture into this area of the law. 32
On the one hand, the Supreme Court should read and apply
the law as it is written. On the other hand, in this particular case,
the majority appears to go out of its way to focus on one particular
27. Id.
28. 935 A.2d at 973 ("The result of the majority's opinion, in our view,
places the parties, and all those similarly situated, in an untenable position.
They are denied access to the Family Court and thus are left in a virtual legal
limbo, unable to extricate themselves from a legal relationship they no longer
find congenial without establishing the domicile and residency requirements
of some other jurisdiction.").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 974.
31. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 166, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
32. Id. at 966 (the majority, while speaking of the General Assembly:
"That body is free, if it so chooses, to enact divorce legislation that it might
possibly deem more appropriate.").
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word in the Family Court statute, "marriage." While the dissent
takes the opposite approach and instead bases its reasoning on
"any," as in the Court should be able to grant any divorce. 33 Of
course, there is also an entirely different way to approach this
entire issue. The Rhode Island Supreme Court could have also
considered the very real effect this ruling will have on everyday
Rhode Islanders that have entered into same - sex marriages in
Massachusetts. 34
Whatever one's opinion may be on the larger issue of whether
Rhode Island should have same - sex marriage or its equivalent
(civil unions), it is clear that the Court believes this debate resides
for the members of the General Assembly. 35 That said, at least
one of the attorneys representing the parties has not yet given up
the battle. Shortly after the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Chambers v. Ormiston, Louis Pulner, attorney for Ms.
Chambers, re-filed his client's complaint in Superior Court,
perhaps realizing that the Supreme Court's holding was based
entirely on a procedural definition. 3 6 Pulner thinks that the
Superior Court's broad, "extraordinary equitable jurisdiction" will
allow these two women to seek a divorce here, because as he put
it: "I cannot fathom that there is not a forum in the state of Rhode
Island for a legally married couple to dissolve their marriage." 37
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Family Court,
a court of limited statutory jurisdiction, was without jurisdiction
to entertain a divorce petition involving a same - sex couple that
33. Id. at 970 ("The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Family Court does
not turn on the gender of the parties; rather it turns on their status as a
married couple.").
34. Gary J. Gates, Geographic Trends Among Same Sex Couples in the
U.S. Census and the American Community Survey, The Williams Institute,
November 2007 (In a recent study by the Williams Institute at the UCLA
School of Law ranked ranked Rhode Island as tenth in a survey determining
the top ten states of same sex couples per thousand households).
35. It is at least interesting to note that this may be one of the only
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court where both parties were urging
the Court to rule the same way, and they did not.
36. Edward Fitzpatrick, Despite ruling, woman asks court for same-sex
divorce, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, December 14, 2007.
37. Id.
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was legally married in Massachusetts. 38 Both the majority and
dissenting opinions suggest that this battle does not belong in the
court system, but rather in the General Assembly. 3
9
Kimberly Ahem
38. 935 A.2d at 958.
39. Id. at 967, 974.
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Judicial Ethics. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline,
916 A.2d 746 (R.I. 2007). Due process is not violated by members
of the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline who
participate in preliminary hearings and in adjudication on the
merits because the Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately has
the plenary and exclusive power to discipline judges.
Additionally, in the absence of a finding of bad faith, bias, or
willful disregard for fundamental rights, legal error is not enough
to charge a judicial officer who is attempting to faithfully and
impartially discharge her or his judicial responsibilities with
ethical misconduct. However, the Constitutional rights of
arrestees, not accused of new offenses but who have been
apprehended on costs warrants, cannot be compromised.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 26, 2002, defendant Patrick Sprague (defendant)
appeared before Judge Robert K. Pirraglia (Pirraglia) in Newport
District Court in connection with an outstanding bench warrant
issued for defendant's failure to appear in court and pay court
costs and fines from several criminal convictions. 1  After
reviewing defendant's record, Pirraglia suggested that defendant
admit to being in contempt of court in exchange for a six-month
jail sentence. 2 During the course of this interaction, defendant
asked whether he could speak to a member of the Public
Defender's office. 3 Pirraglia acquiesced to the request, but warned
defendant that his offer would not remain open if defendant
sought counsel. 4 As a result, defendant accepted the offer without
conferring with an attorney and was sentenced to a period of
incarceration. 5
On October 10, 2002, John Hardiman, the Public Defender,
1. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 747-48
(R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Tenure and
Discipline (Commission), alleging that Pirraglia had denied
defendant his constitutional rights. 6 Following a finding of fact,
the Commission concluded that Pirraglia had engaged in a
threatening behavior and coercive actions that violated
defendant's constitutional rights. 7 Ultimately, the Commission
concluded that Pirraglia had violated Canons 2A, 3B.2, 3B.8, and
3B.9 of Article IV of the Code of Judicial Conduct of the Supreme
Court Rules. 8  As a result, the Commission unanimously
recommended that the Rhode Island Supreme Court censure
Pirraglia. 9  Pirraglia then filed a petition to reject the
recommendation of the Commission pursuant to § 8-16-6, arguing
that his actions did not rise to a level of judicial misconduct. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In his appeal, Pirraglia contended that his due process rights
were violated by the Commission's practice of having a
subcommittee conduct preliminary investigation and then
allowing the members of that subcommittee participate in the
public hearing. 11 Pirraglia also argued that he was denied
appropriate discovery into the Commission's internal practices. 12
6. Id. at 748-49.
7. Id. at 749 (R.I. 2007).
8. Id. Canon 2A states that:
"[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all
times in a matter that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. at 749, n. 1. Cannon 3B.2
states that: "[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by
partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism." Id. Cannon
3B.8 states that: "[a] judge shall accord to every person who has a
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be
heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider
ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to
the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or
impending proceeding..." (exemptions omitted) (alternation in
original) Id. Canon 3B.9 states that: "[a] judge shall dispose of all
judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly." Id. at 749, n. 1.
9. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 749
(R.I. 2007).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 749-50.
12. Id. at 750.
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Finally, Pirraglia alleged that he did not violate Canons 2A, 3B.2,
3B.9, and 3B.9, and that even if his actions amounted to a legal
error, this single instance did not constitute judicial misconduct. 13
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
Commission's procedures were unambiguous and fair. 14 The
Court reached this conclusion based on its opinion that the
Commission is designed in such a way that any complaints
against judges are addressed fairly and expeditiously by an
unbiased tribunal of limited authority. 15 Here, the Court relied
on the precedent set forth in La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode
Island Comm'n for Human Rights,16 that the mere existence of a
combination of both investigatory and adjudicative roles in a
single administrative body does not amount to a denial of due
process rights.17 Moreover, the Court reasoned that there was no
violation of due process rights because the Commission's role is
restricted to making recommendations while it is the Rhode
Island Supreme Court who ultimately has the exclusive and
plenary power of the to discipline judges. 18
Furthermore, the Court refused to examine the denial of
Pirraglia's motion to compel more responsive answers to his
requests for discovery. 19 Here, Pirraglia declared the purpose of
these requests was to discover which Commission members
participated in the preliminary investigation. 20 However, because
the Court found that no merger exists between the prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions of the Commission, the denial of the
request for discovery was inconsequential. 2 1
Finally, the Court disagreed with the Commission that
Pirraglia engaged in threats or coercive conduct and held that not
every single incidence of error of law would automatically deserve
discipline. 22 Here, the Court could not find a single point at which
13. Id.
14. Id. at 751.
15. Id..
16. Id. (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for
Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1980)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 752.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 753-54.
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Pirraglia's statements to defendant rose to the level of threats, or
a point where Pirraglia's conduct exceeded the bounds of judicial
propriety. 23 Moreover, because the phrase "to coerce" implies the
use of force or threat of force, the Court refused to hold that
Pirraglia's conduct rose to the level of coercion. 24 Furthermore,
because this was a single incident, and the Court recognized that
at times judges err, the Court agreed with the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court 25 that not every error of law automatically
deserves discipline, even when that error is one that a reasonable
and competent judge would avoid. 26 Instead, the Court reasoned
that when determining whether a judge has engaged in judicial
misconduct, the Court should apply a reasonableness test where a
judge's action constitutes judicial misconduct when a reasonably
prudent and competent judge would consider the conduct wrong in
all circumstances. 27
COMMENTARY
This case will be held near and dear to the hearts of many
members of the judiciary because the Rhode Island Supreme
Court used it as a vehicle to "safeguard the independence of our
judiciary."28 But alas, there is a rub, the Court also took this case
as an opportunity to reminds us that judges are not infallible, and
do occasionally make legal mistakes. Nevertheless, our esteemed
judges will be able to sleep soundly at night as the court sets the
precedent that a judicial officer who is attempting to faithfully
and impartially discharge her or his judicial responsibilities
should not face a charge of ethical misconduct for a legal error. In
spite of this, any fears of a runaway judiciary can be assuaged
because the Court was quick to clarify that an error of law that
"clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of
23. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 916 A.2d at 752-54.
Here the court referred to Black's Law Dictionary to define a threat as a
"communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or another's property,
esp[ecially] one that might diminish a person's freedom to act voluntarily or
with lawful consent[.]" (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1519 (8th ed. 2004))
(emphasis in original) Id.
24. Id. at 753.
25. Id. (See Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Me. 1985)).
26. Id. at 754 (R.I. 2007).
27. Id. at 755.
28. Id. at 754.
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authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard
of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of
judicial duty," may constitute ethical misconduct. 29 Additionally,
the Court made clear that citizens are entitled to a fair proceeding
by an impartial judge, by concurring with the commission that
constitutional rights of those who are not accused of new offenses
but have simply been apprehended on costs warrants, cannot be
compromised.
To avoid inevitable quagmires of applying judicial misconduct
sanctions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted a
reasonableness test. Under this test, "[i]f a reasonably prudent
and competent judge would consider that conduct obviously and
seriously wrong in all the circumstance," the judge's action rises to
the level of judicial misconduct. 30 In the case at hand, the court
did not find that Pirraglia's actions rose to the level of threats or
coercion, yet the reasonableness of Pirraglia's actions weighed
towards something more than legal error, but less than something
meriting censure. It would perhaps be remiss not to also note that
the Court took into account Pirraglia's twenty-plus years of
exemplary judicial service when declining to impose the sanction
of censure. Interestingly, however, what place "exemplary judicial
service" has in a reasonableness test for judicial misconduct is
something the Court did not explore. Then again, perhaps this is
also something that this author, who has the utmost respect for
judges, should not delve into either.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately the Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the
Commission that Pirraglia's conduct in depriving defendant of the
opportunity to consult with counsel violated Canons 2A and 3B.2.
Although the Court rejected some of the Commission's findings as
being overly broad, the Court did agree that Pirraglia's actions
amounted to more than legal error. Here, the Court was making
certain that the constitutional rights of arrestees, like defendant,
are not compromised. Nevertheless, the Court declined to impose
the sanction of censure, taking into account that the Court
modified several of the Commission's findings of fact and also
29. Id. at 754-54 (quoting In Re Curdia, 49 P.2d 255, 258 (Alaska 2002)).
30. Id. (quoting In Re Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Me. 1985)).
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Pirraglia's distinguished service to the judiciary and to the people
of Rhode Island.
L. Evan Van Gorder
Labor law. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379 (R.I. 2007).
Retired members from the City of Providence's fire and police
departments sued the city over a Cost of Living Adjustment
("COLA") the argued was attached to their pension funds. The
city attempted to withdraw the COLA because they did not retire
under an appropriately ratified Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA"). However, the plaintiffs did retire under a city ordinance
that provided them with an annual five percent-compounded
COLA. Because the court must refer to a retirement plan's
provisions at the time of retirement and COLA benefits vest once
retirement occurs, the city ordinance applied; however, the
retirees waited five years before they filed a lawsuit and therefore
are only entitled to the COLA adjustment from the filing of the
lawsuit under the theory of laches.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The City of Providence received home rule in 1980 and the
City Council ("Council") replaced the General Assembly as the
body creating the City's municipal pension program. 1 However,
the council never used its power to legislate retirement benefits
until 1991 and during that gap the Fraternal Order of Police
("FOP") and the International Association of Firefighters ("IAFF"')
engaged in collective bargaining separately. 2 Prior to enactment
of a 1989-91 police CBA and a 1990-92 fire CBA, police officers
and fire fighters contributed 8 percent of their salaries with a 3
percent non-compounded COLA after they retired. 3  The new
CBAs changed this amount, however the CBAs needed approval
from the General Assembly because the council had not
implemented its authority over the pension system. 4 The city
eventually adopted the changes to the pension plan in the City of
Providence Ordinance, ch.1991-5. 5
1. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 382 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 383. The new pension plan involved an increase in
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Problems developed with the 1993-95 police CBA and 1992-95
fire CBA when both Mayor Vincent A. Cianci ('Mayor") and the
respective union presidents signed the CBA without completing
the necessary step of receiving approval from the council. 6 The
council attempted to limit the Mayor's power through Providence
City Ordinance 401 limiting the mayor's ability to enter into valid
labor contracts for more than one year. 7 In the resulting power
struggle, the mayor violated that ordinance by entering into a
CBA with the Laborers' International Union of America ("Local
No. 1033 CBA") while refusing to submit the contract to the
council for ratification. 8 The city sought a declaratory judgment
forcing the mayor to comply, however the Superior Court found for
the Mayor declaring Local No. 1033 CBA valid but limiting the
term of the CBA to one year.9 Both parties appealed and the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the council had the right to
require ratification and that the Mayor's failure to seek that
ratification made the CBA invalid.10 The result of this judgment
was to make the 1993-95 police CBA and the 1992-95 fire CBA
invalid as well. 11 The council, knowing full well of the judgment's
effect, passed City of Providence Ordinance, ch. 1995-17 which
reduced the COLA benefit of current and former employees to a 3
percent simple COLA. 12 In an effort to further reduce the tension
on the pension fund, the council passed City of Providence
Ordinance, ch. 1996-4 reducing COLA benefits to certain
employees even further. 13 This cause of action developed when
the city applied the COLA calculations from the 1995-17 and
1996-4 ordinances to police and fire retirees whom retired before
the effective dates of those ordinances. 14 On May 4, 2001, the
contributions from 8 to 9.5 percent in return for a two-part COLA increase
resulting in a 5 percent compounded COLA. Id. at 382.
6. Arena, 919 at 383.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See also Providence City Council v. Cianci, 650 A.2d 499 (R.I.
1994).
10. See Cianci, 650 A.2d at 503.
11. Arena, 919 A.2d at 383.
12. Id. at 383-84.
13. Id. at 384.
14. Id.
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plaintiffs filed their complaint.1 5 While a total of eighty-one
plaintiffs were involved in the appeal, the court divided them into
four separate groups: those who retired between July 1, 1993 and
June 30, 1995 while a non-ratified CBA was in place, a twenty-two
year veteran of the fire department who eventually took a civilian
position and retired in 1992, firefighters who retired between July
1, 1992 and June 30, 1993, and firefighters who retired between
July 1, 1993 and June 30, 1995 under a non-ratified CBA.1 6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The defendants argued that the trial court erred when it
found the Superior Court had jurisdiction to decide the COLA
dispute.1 7 Further, the defendants argued that the Firefighter's
Arbitration act ("FFAA") applied regarding the plaintiffs
contractual rights, the plaintiffs were not eligible for COLA
benefits as defined in a Providence ordinance and the defendants
could adjust this ordinance as they saw fit. 18 On cross appeal, the
plaintiffs argue that the terms of the last ratified CBA govern
their COLA benefits. 19
Jurisdiction
The standard of review for this case, because it involves
applying the law to the facts, is de novo.20 First, the court
analyzed the jurisdictional issue and the use of the FFAA in
determining an appropriate remedy for the retirees. 21 Despite the
15, Id. It is important to note that the litigation surrounding this case
also involved both consent decree litigation in 1990 and federal court
litigation in 1998. See Id. at 384-86. The consent decree litigation did not
affect this case because the plaintiffs retired after an adjudicated effective
date for specific COLA benefits. Id. at 385. The federal litigation had no
bearing on this case because the court dismissed the case under lack of
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lack of standing, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. Id. at 385-86. Because of numbers of
lawsuits and time spent on litigation (approximately 17 years), Justice
Williams analogized this case to a scene in Dickens' Bleak House. Id. at 384.
16. Arena, 919 A.2d at 386-87.
17. Id. at 381.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 387.
21. Id.
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ruling by the Superior Court that it had subject matter
jurisdiction, an interest arbitration panel was formed
approximately eight months after the decision at the request of
the IAFF. 2 2 The panel only dealt with the claims from group
three who retired during the first year of the non-ratified CBA. 23
The panel eventually resolved the COLA controversy and the
defendants argued in Superior Court that the trial justice should
defer to the arbitration panel's decision.24 Rather, the trial judge
held that the Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction and
rejected any authority alleged by the arbitration panel. 25 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the FFAA was controlling
authority because an arbitration panel's authority extended to
rights of retirees and the trial court erred by finding the panel had
no bearing on its decision. 26
To support its claims, the defendants cited to City of East
Providence v. Local 850, International Association of Firefighters,
AFL-CIO ("Local 850') and Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode
Island State Labor Relations Board ("Lime Rock'). 27 Both cases
addressed the FFAA; Local 850 held that decisions made by an
arbitration panel are binding when involving unresolved collective
bargaining issues and Lime Rock held a union must exhaust
mandatory arbitration remedies before it files an unfair labor
practices claim. 28 The court distinguished both Local 850 and
Lime Rock from the present case because the plaintiffs are not
unions nor do unions represent them.29 Because of their status as
retired firefighters the FFAA does not apply to their claim. 30
Further, the plaintiffs do not qualify as employees because the
word "employees" does not encompass retirees in the National
Labor Relations Act. 31
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 388.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations
Bd., 673 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1996); City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, 366 A.2d 1151 (R.I. 1976).
28. Arena, 919 A.2d at 388.
29. Id. at 389.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local
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Next, the court held that the public policy behind the FFAA
does not apply to retirees because the purpose of the FFAA is to
provide "some alternative mode of settling disputes where
employees must, as a matter of public policy, be denied the usual
right to strike."32 Here, the possibility of a strike simply does not
exist and the retirees cannot pressure the city to support their
COLA demands by forcing a work stoppage. 33 Finally, the term
"firefighter" in the FFAA does not include retirees because current
employees do not have the same interest regarding the COLA
benefits. 34
Terms of the Last Ratified Collective Bargaining Agreement
The plaintiffs argued two potential sources for their
appropriate COLA percentage: the terms of their last ratified CBA
or Ordinance 1991-5. 35 First, the plaintiffs point to prior Rhode
Island State Labor Relation Board ("SLRB") decisions holding that
an expired CBA should control while a new agreement is still
pending negotiation. 36 The court disagreed with this contention
holding that the only organization to determine whether the terms
of an expired agreement control during a dispute pending a new
agreement is the SLRB itself. 37 The court cannot "stand in the
place of the SLRB to make such a determination." 38 Further, the
plaintiffs point to provisions in the Municipal Police Arbitration
Act ("MPAA") and the FFAA stating that the terms of CBAs shall
continue into the following CBA unless they are changed. 39
However, the court held that no authority allows the court to take
terms from an expired CBA to "fill a gap" between CBAs
particularly when the time frame is more than one year. 40
Therefore, the court held the last ratified CBA could serve as the
Union No. 1 v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
32. Id. at 390 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws §28-9.1-2(c)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 391. Note that both the last ratified CBA and Ordinance 1991-
5 provide for a 5 percent compounded COLA adjustment. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 392.
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source of COLA benefits. 41
Reduction of Retirees' COLA Benefits by Ordinance AFTER their
Date of Retirement
Both parties and the court agreed that Ordinance 1991-5
governed the COLA benefits at the time of the plaintiffs'
retirement. 42  However, the court analyzed the different
interpretations of the parties regarding whether it was a vested
pension benefit or whether it was a gratuitous benefit that could
be reduced by future ordinance. 43 When dealing with pension
benefits, most jurisdictions define them as contractual or
gratuitous. 44 If they are deemed contractual, they are viewed as a
piece of the actual employment contract that vests once the
contract is signed. 45 Pensions are gratuitous when they are
"springing from the appreciation and graciousness of the state"
allowing reduction or elimination of such benefits without
recourse. 46 The court adopted a middle ground called the mixed
contract/deferred compensation theory by holding that "pension
benefits vest once an employee honorably and faithfully meets the
applicable pension statute's requirements."47
The court acknowledged that the city has broad powers to
change pension plans of firefighters and police officers whom have
yet to retire.48 However, the issue in this case was whether the
council can retroactively change the terms of a pension plan.49
Ordinance 1991-5 states that retirement benefits eligibility begins
on the last day of a retiree's employment and defines a pension as
"annual payments for life derived from appropriations provided by
the City of Providence under the provisions of this ordinance. ' 50
Despite the fact that separate COLA classifications were added to
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Haverstock v. State Public Employees Ret.
Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)).
47. Id. at 393. See also In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375,1386 (R.I. 1992).
48. Arena, 919 A.2d at 393.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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subsequent revisions of Ordinance 1991-5, the court refused to
read it as a gratuitous benefit. 5 1  The court held that the
conditions of Ordinance 1991-5 support the "plaintiffs' vested
interest in a lifetime 5 percent compounded COLA."' 52
In support of its holding, the Court pointed to federal case law
addressing similar labor disputes while coming to the same
conclusion. 53 In Shaw v. International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, the Ninth Circuit was asked
to decide whether a "living pension" similar to a COLA adjustment
was an accrued benefit or an ancillary benefit. 54 The court held
that it was a promised benefit and to reduce it in any way violated
the plaintiffs' right to receive a vested pension. 55 Additionally,
the Court addressed Howell v. Anne Arundel County where the
court held that while an ordinance can prospectively change
COLA benefits, it still dismissed the case brought by the retiree
for lack of standing because he was totally unaffected by the
COLA changes. 56 The rationale was the retiree's right to have his
pension determined by the original COLA formula vested at his
retirement and could not be modified. 57 Finally, in Board of
Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Fourth Circuit held that a
court must look a retirement plan's provision at the time of
retirement to determine the appropriate benefits. 58 In Sheet
Metal, the court determined that a COLA cutback could occur
because the plaintiffs original pension did not have a COLA
benefit and they would have no reason to expect that benefit going
forward.59 Sheet Metal is distinguishable from the current case
because the plaintiffs had a "reasonable expectation at the time
they retired that they would receive a 5 percent compounded
51. Id. at 394.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also Shaw v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Pension Plan 750 F.2d 1458,1466 (9th Cir. 1985).
55. Arena, 919 A.2d at 394.
56. Id. at 394-95. See also Howell v. Anne Arundel County, 14 F.Supp.2d
752, 754 (D.Md. 1988).
57. Arena, 919 A.2d at 395.
58. Id. See Also Bd. of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l
Pension Fund v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 318 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2003).
59. Arena, 919 A.2d at 395.
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COLA that would vest upon retirement. '60
Remedy
While the Court held that the council exceeded its authority
by reducing the retirees' COLA benefit, the court also held that
the retirees sat on their rights by waiting five years before seeking
a declaratory judgment. 61 In response, the court applied the
equitable doctrine of laches limiting the amount the plaintiffs
could recover.62 The plaintiffs could only receive the COLA
benefit from the date of the filing of this action and could not
recover any past COLA adjustments. 63  Further, the COLA
adjustment for the year 2001 when the suit was filed should be
prorated, excluding payments that would have been received
between January and May. 64
COMMENTARY
The almost seventeen year battle between the City of
Providence and the retired firefighters and police officers involved
the federal courts, the Mayor, almost 80 plaintiffs and ultimately
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. In the words of Chief Justice
Williams, "It is time for this litigation to end."' 65 While this
litigation could be classified as a long and drawn out battle, it does
provide the State with valuable precedent. This case is significant
because it outlines Rhode Island's interpretation of pension
benefits, specifically COLA benefits, and when they vest. While
the court does not view them as entirely gratuitous it holds that,
"a COLA is a vested pension benefit when a jurisdiction has
adopted a mixed contract/deferred compensation theory of pension
benefits. ' 66  By describing pension benefits as a mixed
contract/deferred compensation agreement, it provides both
businesses and retirees with a framework to help them
understand how their benefits will be interpreted by the courts.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 395-96.
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id.
64. Id. The action was officially filed on May 4, 2001. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 394.
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This allows for efficient planning when CBA's or other types of
employee benefit contracts are being negotiated.
Further, this case is significant because the court reinforces
its position that it will not help people who "sleep on their
rights." 67 While the court ultimately found for the firefighters and
police officers, it chastised them for failing to initiate their cause
of action sooner. The consequences of this was a loss of the five
percent COLA increase from 1996 when the reduction in benefits
began until May of 2001 when the case was filed. 68 This serves as
a warning for all potential plaintiffs that one must begin to fight
their legal battles sooner rather than later. The Court held that
the consequences of waiting to file suit involve a limitation on the
remedy sought.
CONCLUSION
The court held that the retired police and firefighters were
entitled to a five percent compounded COLA adjustment based on
the agreement that was in place when the group retired. The
court rejected the argument of the City of Providence that the
group was not operating under a ratified CBA and therefore the
city could reduce COLA benefits as it saw fit. Further, the court
held that pension benefits are interpreted under the mixed
contract/deferred compensation theory and the benefits vest once
retirement occurs. However, because the plaintiffs waited almost
five years before they filed their cause of action, the remedy will
be limited to a reinstatement of COLA benefits from the time the
suit was filed.
Katherine A. Sulentic
67. Id. at 395.
68. Id. at 396.
Labor Law. State of Rhode Island (DOA) v. Rhode Island
Council 94, 925 A.2d 939 (R.I. 2007). An overtime provision
included in a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that does
not directly contradict with a merger statute constitutes an
arbitrable grievance. The provisions of the CBA will govern
unless those provisions directly contravene state law, or where the
CBA and the statute cannot both be applied to resolve the issue.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In July 2001, the Rhode Island General Assembly decided to
merge the Rhode Island Sheriffs and Marshals into one office, the
Division of Sheriffs. 1  Previously, the sheriffs and marshals
fulfilled distinct duties and responsibilities, belonged to separate
unions, and underwent different training programs. 2 The new
"merger statute" permitted the director of the Department of
Administration (DOA) to delay merging the functions of the two
offices as long as necessary, as long as the DOA transferred all of
the functions to the new Division of Sheriffs within three years. 3
Prior to the merger, the marshals had almost exclusively
performed the function of extraditing prisoners, and so the
marshals received all the overtime from extraditions. 4 However,
the sheriffs and marshals generally shared other inmate
transports between courts or other places. 5 The merger statute
provided for a special operations unit to perform the extraditions,
among other duties, but this never materialized. 6 Instead, the
Inmate Transportation Unit (ITU) carried out extraditions, where
the marshals continued to extradite prisoners "to the exclusion of
other qualified members of the division." 7 Plaintiff Council 94
1. State of Rhode Island (DOA) v. Rhode Island Council 94, 925 A.2d
939, 941 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. (citing G.L. 1956 § 42-11-21 (d)(2)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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became the bargaining representative of the employees of the two
unions, and consequently the State of Rhode Island and the.
employees signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 8
Council 94 asserted that the State breached the overtime
distribution clause of the agreement by continuing to exclude the
sheriffs from the opportunity to get overtime pay from
extraditions, and thus it took the matter to arbitration. 9 During
arbitration, the State contended that the merger statute
permitted the director to limit the extradition work to the former
marshals. 10 The State reasoned that permitting the sheriffs, who
had not done extraditions before would imperil the public as
well. 11 Furthermore, the State argued that the conflict between
the merger statute and the CBA was not an arbitrable grievance
according to court precedent. 12
On November 29, 2004, the arbitrator handed down his
decision. 13 He ruled in favor of Council 94, because it was only
seeking extradition work for those sheriffs with the appropriate
training. 14 The arbitrator did not find that the CBA provision
conflicted with the merger statute, because the director had never
actually "exercised his statutory discretion to postpone
transferring any functions to the division." 15 The arbitrator found
that the facts of the present dispute did not fall within the ruling
in State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social Services Employees,
Local 580, SEIU, where the overtime policy in question was in
direct conflict with a statute governing overtime eligibility. 16 In
contrast, here the State refused to allow all members of the
bargaining unit to perform extradition work, even qualified
members and those who had performed extraditions in the past. 17
Therefore, the arbitrator held that all qualified sheriffs and
marshals had to be included in the rotation for extradition
8. Id. at 941-42.
9. Id. at 942.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing State v. R.I. Alliance of Social Serv. Employees, Local 580,
SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I. 2000).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 943 (citing Local 580, SEIU, 747 A.2d at 468).
17. Id.
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overtime shifts. 18
The State filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award, but
Council 94 objected to this, and thus the matter went to the state
Superior Court. 19 At the Superior Court, the judge found that the
issue was non-arbitrable, because the CBA effectively breached
state law and the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by
ignoring the relevant statute. 20 Consequently, the Superior Court
vacated the arbitration award.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the arbitrability
issue de novo when it came before the Court on appeal. 22 Council
94 contended that the State had to comply with the CBA unless
there was a "direct conflict between the language of the relevant
statute and the CBA and that no such direct conflict existed in the
case."23 The Court agreed with the State that where a "statute
provides for nondelegable or nonmodifiable duties.. .in connection
with the functions of state government," the state does not have to
comply with a contrary CBA provision. 24 However, the Court held
that no language in the merger statute forbade the sheriffs from
performing extradition work. 25 As the arbitrator had noted in his
own finding, the merger statute did not dictate how the
extradition work should be distributed. 26 Had the director of the
DOA actually established a "special operations unit," the director
would have had "exclusive authority" to select who could do
extradition work, but the DOA never formed this unit.27
Furthermore, sheriffs currently performed other functions that
had originally assigned to the "special operations unit," such as
executing warrants and transporting inmates, even though they
18. Id. (The arbitrator also granted a "make-whole remedy" to those
members who had been qualified to perform extraditions after April 4-6,
2002, but who were not permitted to take the overtime shifts.).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 943-44.
22. Id. at 944.
23. Id. at 945.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 946.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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were not a part of the ITU.28
The merger statute provided that "initially" the "special
operations unit" would be comprised of the state marshals, but the
arbitrator found that this no longer applied once new vacancies
opened up. 29 The Supreme Court agreed with this finding, and
upheld the arbitrator's decision to fill these vacancies according to
the CBA provisions. 30  The Court also rejected the State's
contention that adhering to the CBA would threaten public safety,
since only qualified members with the proper training would be
allowed to perform extraditions and receive overtime. 31
Therefore, the Court ruled that the grievance was arbitrable,
because the CBA provisions did not directly conflict with the
merger statute. 32  The judgment of the Superior Court was
reversed and the arbitration award for plaintiff affirmed. 33
COMMENTARY
The Court correctly found for the plaintiffs here, because the
language of the merger statute was ambiguous and inapplicable.
The State sought to use only the parts of the statute that suited
its purposes, even though it had failed to implement a majority of
the statute's provisions, such as creating a "special operations
unit." The State complained that the director of the DOA should
have full discretion in determining which members of the Division
of Sheriffs could perform extradition work, but as the arbitrator
noted, this would only be the case if the State had actually formed
the "special operations unit. ' 34 In fact, the director serving at the
time that the state passed the merger statute commented that he
found it "unacceptable" for only the marshals to receive
extradition overtime, demonstrating that the DOA supported the
idea of using sheriffs to perform extradition work. 35
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 947.
34. Id. at 946.
35. See id.
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Arbitration and Public Policy
The State's other major contention, that it had the
prerogative to regulate the extradition overtime based on its duty
to promote public safety, had little evidentiary support. Rhode
Island law recognizes the authority of the State in matters of
public policy, particularly for public health and safety priorities. 36
Where the Court finds a public safety issue, the Court will be
more willing to hold void the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. 37
The safety issue, however, was not a real factor in this case.
Undisputedly, the sheriffs already performed work of the same
nature as extraditions, such as transporting high-risk offenders
and executing warrants, yet no one claimed that the sheriffs
executed these functions improperly or in a manner that
endangered the public. Nor was Council 94 demanding that every
sheriff receive the opportunity to gain overtime from extradition
work. Council 94 only requested that those sheriffs with sufficient
training, including weapons certification, be admitted in the
rotation for extradition overtime shifts. Because the sheriffs and
marshals performing extraditions would have the same training
background, the State's public safety argument was not logically
valid.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that where a CBA
does not directly contradict a statutory provision, the provisions of
the CBA will prevail unless there is some overriding public policy
issue. In this case, the State could not show that the CBA's
redistribution of extradition overtime, previously reserved to the
marshals, conflicted with the merger statute, because the DOA
never enacted relevant portions of the statute, and nothing in the
statute explicitly forbade the sheriffs from performing extradition
work. The State was unable to show that a valid public safety
issue existed, since the agreement allowed only qualified sheriffs
to share extradition overtime with the marshals. Therefore, the
36. City of Central Falls v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees, 2003 WL 22048737, at *4 n.8 (R.I. Super.,2003).
37. Id.
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Court reinstated the arbitration award for Council 94, which had
been overturned by the Superior Court.
Andrea Harrison
Labor Law. Unistrut Corp. v. State of R.I. Dept. of Labor and
Training, 922 A.2d 93 (R.I. 2007). A steel support structure for
various electrical equipment was not one of the uses of an
"apparatus *** for carrying or using electricity" that required a
licensed electrician for installation under R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 5-
6-2, assuming that when the contractor completed its support
structure, no electrical components were attached to it. When
interpreting statutory terms such as "apparatus", context in the
statute and practicality should be taken into account.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arose from the construction of a new emergency
room for Rhode Island Hospital. 1  Capco Steel, the general
contractor, hired Unistrut Corporation ("Unistrut"), a
subcontractor with over 60 years experience, to construct and
install a "steel support system upon which certain surgical
equipment, including lighting, would be mounted."' 2 A complaint
was made to the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training
(the "Department") that Unistrut employees were performing
electrical work on the job site without proper permit or license. 3
After investigation, notices of violation were issued to the project
manager and three other individuals at the job site (petitioners)
on September 30, 2004. 4 Unistrut continued construction and two
additional violations were issued to petitioners on October 1 and
6, 2004. 5
Additionally, the assistant director of the Department issued
cease-and-desist orders on October 5, 7, and 8, 2004.6 The orders
sought to stop construction and installation of the steel support
1. Unistrut Corp. v. State of R.I. Dept. of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d
93, 94 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 95.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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system and levied fines totaling $19,2007 for violations of § 5-6-2.8
On the advice of counsel, Unistrut completed the construction and
installation of the steel support structure. 9
Petitioners appealed both the fines and cease-and-desist
orders to the Director of the Department ("Director") and the
Board of Examiners of Electricians (the "Board") held a hearing,
pursuant to § 5-6-32, on November 17, 2004.10 The court noted
three facts that were demonstrated by the record of that
hearing." First, the purpose of the structure was to "support
lights and other electrical equipment in the emergency room", but
that this equipment was to be attached by a separate electrical
contractor. 12 Second, no electrical components had been installed
on the structure upon completion of Unistrut's work.' 3 Third, the
"electrical code requires that electricians provide adequate
support for any electrical devices, fixtures, or appliances they
install."' 4 The board made three findings based on that hearing:
(1) that the structure that Unistrut built was an
"apparatus * * * for carrying or using electricity" as
described in § 5-6-2; (2) that Unistrut was required to
obtain an electrical permit to install the structure; and (3)
that the workers who installed the structure were
required to be licensed electricians. Consequently, the
board recommended to the director that both the cease-
and-desist orders and the fines be enforced.' 5
Based on these findings and the recommendation of the board,
the Director affirmed the cease-and-desist orders and the fines for
7. Fines levied in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 5-6-32.
8. Id. at 95. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-6-2(a)(1): No person, firm, or corporation
shall enter into, engage in, solicit, advertise, bid for, or work at the business
of installing wires, conduits, apparatus, fixtures, electrical signs, and other
appliances for carrying or using electricity ... unless that person, firm, or
corporation shall have received a license and a certificate for the business,
issued by the state board of examiners of electricians of the division of
professional regulation of the department of labor and training in accordance
with the provisions set forth in this chapter."
9. Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 95.
10. Id. at 95-96.
11. Id. at 96.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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each of the petitioners in decisions issued on December 10, 2004.16
Unistrut appealed these administrative decisions, 
17
challenging the validity of the fines levied before an
administrative hearing had taken place as required by §5-6-3218.
Also, petitioners alleged that the board erred in its determination
that the installation of the support structure constituted electrical
work that statutorily required a license. 19
In a decision dated March 28, 2006, a Superior Court
magistrate ruled that the fines were "impermissibly levied
because Unistrut had not been afforded a hearing before they
were assessed. ' 20 However, he affirmed the issuance of the cease-
and-desist orders, agreeing that the steel support structure
constituted an "apparatus" under §5-6-2.21 Judgment was entered
in accordance with that decision on April 3, 2006.22 Unistrut then
petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
on April 13, 2006, challenging the judgment. 23 The Supreme
Court granted the petition and after a show cause hearing, the
Court held that cause had been shown and agreed to hear the
case.
24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
As this case concerned an issue of statutory interpretation,
the court applied a de novo standard of review. 25 However, before
embarking on this quest, the court was careful to note that,
although neither side had raised the issue, the controversy at
hand was moot. 26 In this case, the fines levied had already been
vacated by the Superior Court and construction was complete,
leaving the fate of the cease-and-desist orders irrelevant to the
16. Id.
17. Id. at 97. Appealed decisions pursuant to authority in R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-35-15 (1956). Id.
18. Id. at 98.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Marques v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 915 A.2d 745, 747
(R.I. 2007))
26. Id. at 99.
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parties. 27 The court chose to review this case despite its mootness
as it "involves the right of an individual to earn a livelihood. '28
The Court focused mainly on the interpretation of the term
"apparatus" as it applies to §5-6-2. The Court began by noting
that absent a relevant statutory definition both the board and the
Superior Court magistrate relied on a series of dictionary
definitions of the term. 29 The Court went on to discuss a Ninth
Circuit case relied upon by the Superior Court which used
Webster's Dictionary to define "apparatus" as "a collection or set of
materials *** [or] *** appliances ** * designed for a particular
use."
30
The court used two Rhode Island Supreme Court cases to
exemplify the canon of statutory interpretation to be used when
considering questions of whether to give deference to agency
interpretation of a statute.31 The first, McConaghy,32 involved a
dispute over whether a voucher (given in lieu of a paycheck)
intended to be cashed by the employer, at the place of
employment, constituted an "instrument" under the relevant
check-cashing statute. 33 The court determined that the statute
was ambiguous and capable of multiple interpretations. 34
Therefore, the court held the regulating agency was entitled to
deference to its reasonable interpretation of the statute.35 In
Rossi,36 a case involving a dispute over whether an employee was
27. Id.
28. Id. Mootness was overcome in this case as this right to earn a
livelihood arises in a situation that is both capable of repetition and likely to
evade review, due to the inherent short-term nature of such construction
projects. Id. (citing Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 823 A.2d 1144, 1146-47
(R.I. 2003)).
29. Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 99-100.
30. Id. at 100 (quoting U.S. v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003)).
The court foreshadowed its decision in this case in the corresponding footnote
when it pointed out in no uncertain terms that the magistrate's discussion of
Migi overlooked the fact that the word "apparatus" was modified by the
phrase "intended for the use of children." Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at n.14
(quoting U.S. v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2003)).
31. Id. at 100-01 (citing Labor Ready Northeast v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d
340 (R.I. 2004) and Rossi v. Employees' Ret. Sys., 895 A.2d 106 (R.I. 2006)).
32. Labor Ready Northeast v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340 (R.I. 2004).
33. Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 100 (citing McConaghy, 849 A.2d at 342).
34. Id. (citing McConaghy, 849 A.2d at 345-46).
35. Id. (citing McConaghy, 849 A.2d at 345-46).
36. Rossi v. Employees' Ret. Sys., 895 A.2d 106 (R.I. 2006).
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eligible for a disability pension, the court found that the statute
had been interpreted erroneously as "aggravate" and "reinjure"
could not be defined synonymously, as the legislature would not
have added the second term with the intent of redundancy. 37
Therefore, the court held that the language was unambiguous, not
open to multiple interpretations and, consequently, the Court
need not give deference to the agency's interpretation of statutory
terms. 38
Applying another canon of statutory interpretation, the court
first determined that given the plain meaning of "apparatus",
accepted by both the board and the Superior Court, the term is
unambiguous and not open to multiple interpretations. 39 As a
result, the court is under no obligation to give deference to the
agency's interpretation, reasonable or not.40 More significantly,
the court declined to give deference to the agency's interpretation
of "apparatus" due to the fact that the agency made this
interpretation out of context. 41 The court held that because the
administrative body in question had generally interpreted the
word "apparatus" alone, and failed to interpret the phrase
"apparatus for * * * carrying or using electricity," as a whole,
when making its determination, the judgment of the Superior
Court must be reversed. 42
The court goes on to clarify that the phrase "apparatus for * *
• carrying or using electricity" is unambiguous. 43 By again
applying the plain meaning of the word apparatus, this time in
context, the court found that the specific use defined by the
statute is use by carrying or using electricity. 44 Providing support
for the electrical equipment in question is not included as a use of
an apparatus that would require an electrician for installation
under § 5-6-2. 45 The record of the hearing before the board showed
that when Unistrut completed its work no electrical components
37. Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 100-01 (citing Rossi, 895 A.2d at 108-13).
38. Id. at 101 (citing Rossi, 895 A.2d at 113-14).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing McConaghy, 849 A.2d at 345-46)
41. Id.
42. Id. (see Rossi, 895 A.2d at 113-14).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 101-02
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had been attached to the structure.46 Therefore, the Court held
that the statute clearly and unambiguously does not include the
work done by Unistrut in this case and vacated the cease-and-
desist orders. 47
COMMENTARY
The refusal of the court in this case to defer to the statutory
interpretation of the governing agency 48 strikes a blow to the
often seemingly omnipotent power of the executive branch. This
case allowed the judiciary to stake its claim as an influential force,
not just in the law but in issues affecting society. The approach
taken by this court shows that an administrative agency does not
have the power to enforce laws that are seemingly unjust or to
manipulate statutory language to serve their means. Rather, the
court here took a step to remind administrative agencies that
their job is just that, to administer the law and not to rewrite it.
In this case, the Court required the Department to enforce the
statute in the manner intended by the legislature upon
enactment.
This issue was of obvious import to the court. One indication
of this fact was that the court chose to hear and decide this case
despite the fact the issue had become moot. As easily as the court
found that this was a case that "involves the right of an individual
to earn a livelihood" and meets the criteria to overcome
mootness, 49 the issue could have been framed narrower and the
case merely rejected as moot.
Interesting to note is the fact that the court, in its closing
remarks, specifies that the "statute clearly and unambiguously
does not include within its ambit the work done by the carpenters
employed by Unistrut".50 This phrase clearly indicates that the
court was taking a step to protect honest workers whose livelihood
was being put at risk by the Department's restrictive
interpretation of the statute. This statement seems to exclude
even the idea that the intention of the court and its opinion is to
46. Id. at 102.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 99.
50. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
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protect those electricians and other workers who lack a proper
permit or license to complete work that the statute was intended
to apply to. The Court attempted to ensure a just application of
the law, not a loophole for those who want to drive the cost of
building up by requiring work to be completed by individuals who
are unnecessarily overqualified, and consequently, there services
more expensive.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a steel structure
used only to support electrical equipment, and with no electrical
equipment attached at the completion of the contractors work, was
not one of the uses of an "apparatus *** for carrying or using
electricity" that requires an electrician for installation under R.I.
Gen. Laws § 5-6-2. The interpretation of this phrase of the state is
that it applies to what would otherwise be considered apparatus
under the general definition that in addition serve the purpose of
carrying or using electricity.
Alexandra Wilcox
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Municipal Law. Town of Smithfield v. Churchill & Banks
Companies, LLC, 924 A.2d 796 (R.I. 2007). The Town of
Smithfield sought judicial review of the State Housing Appeals
Board's (hereinafter "SHAB") decision that the application of a
private developer was substantially complete before the town
imposed a temporary moratorium on development. The town
claims SHAB ignored the explicit language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-
53-6 which imposed a moratorium on all applications of for-profit
developers that were not substantially complete prior to February
13, 2004. The statute was a response to the over-development of
the town. In its decision, SHAB took into account the fact that the
local zoning board denied Churchill & Banks Companies, LLC, the
private developer, an opportunity to present expert testimony at a
zoning board meeting, which may have completed its application
prior to the moratorium date. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held SHAB made errors of law in ignoring the plain language of
the statute and by taking extrinsic evidence into account to form
an exception for the lost opportunity when no such exception
exists in the statute. The Court held the application was not
substantially complete as of the moratorium date, and therefore
the zoning board was under no obligation to continue hearings for
this permit.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Churchill & Banks Companies, LLC, a private construction
company, submitted a petition to the Smithfield Zoning Board for
a zone change in order to construct 336 apartment units on 28
acres of land in Smithfield. 1 The Smithfield Zoning Board denied
this petition on June 3, 2003.2 In response, Churchill & Banks
changed their original plans and designated 25 percent of the
units as affordable housing. 3 On July 22, 2003, Churchill & Banks
1. Town of Smithfield v. Churchill & Banks Companies, LLC, 924 A.2d
796, 797 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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filed a new application with the zoning board for a comprehensive
permit to construct the units on the same parcel, but this time
under the "fast track" approval process of R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-
4.4 The parties agreed to begin hearings on the Churchill & Banks
application on October 8, 2003, and the hearings continued into
early 2004. 5 Churchill & Banks was one of five private developers
seeking expedited approval for five separate projects in the Town
of Smithfield. 6 Because the potential impact of these five projects
was significant, on February 5, 2004, the General Assembly
responded to the large number of applications for new
development by enacting R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-4(b)(1), which
imposed a temporary moratorium on applications by for-profit
developers if the applications were not substantially complete by
February 13, 2004. 7
The board members and Churchill & Banks's counsel believed
the moratorium legislation had been passed on February 5, 2004,
so at the February 11, 2004 zoning board meeting they focused on
the impact the moratorium would have on the Churchill & Banks
application instead of dedicating the meeting to completing the
Churchill & Banks application. 8 Unfortunately, the moratorium
did not become effective until February 13, 2004, so Churchill &
Banks could have used the February 11, 2004 zoning board
meeting to present experts and move its application closer to being
substantially complete prior to the moratorium taking effect. 9
Regrettably, at the February 11th meeting, both the zoning board
and Churchill & Banks incorrectly assumed the moratorium
would not apply to the Churchill & Banks application due to the
amount of money and time it had spent in reliance on the zoning
board's continued advancement of the application. 10 At the next
scheduled zoning board meeting on March 10, 2004, the town
solicitor expressed his view that the moratorium did apply to the
Churchill & Banks application and, as a result, the board tabled
further progress until after the moratorium was due to expire on
4. Id.
5. Id. at 798.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 798.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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January 31, 2005.11
Churchill & Banks filed an appeal with SHAB asserting the
moratorium should not affect its application because the
application was substantially complete under the terms of §45-53-
6(0(1) before the February 13, 2004 meeting. 12 On December 29,
2004, SHAB considered the memoranda, heard oral arguments,
and ruled that the Churchill & Banks application was
substantially complete as of February 13, 2004, and the zoning
board had acted in a manner demonstrating it considered the
application to be substantially complete.13 The SHAB remanded
the matter to the zoning board and ordered it to consider the
application under the pre-moratorium guidelines. 14 The Town
appealed SHAB's ruling to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and
filed a writ of certiorari to include SHAB's rulings on the
Churchill & Banks application. 15 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and stayed SHAB's orders. 16 The Supreme Court
ordered SHAB to hold a rehearing de novo. At this hearing the
town alleged the application of Churchill & Banks was deficient in
six of the ten areas set forth in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J).17
However, SHAB also found Churchill & Banks was prepared to
present evidentiary findings at the February 11, 2004 meeting,
but the zoning board denied it the opportunity because both
parties incorrectly assumed the moratorium was already in
effect.18 SHAB felt Churchill & Banks should not be punished for
this lost opportunity. On November 14, 2004, SHAB issued a
decision holding the application was substantially complete as of
the moratorium date, and reiterated the previous holding that the
zoning board had treated the application as though it was
substantially complete. 19
On April 3, 2006, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in New
Harbor Village, LLC v. New Shoreham Zoning Board of Review
ruled there is no right of appeal to this court from an adverse
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 798-99.
14. Id. at 799.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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ruling by SHAB on the substantial completeness of an application
submitted under § 45-53-4. 20 As a result, the Court denied the
town's appeal but assigned the case to the "show cause" calendar
on the issues which Churchill & Banks preserved for appeal by
virtue of the earlier grant of certiorari.
2 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ordered the parties to
address three specific issues:
1) whether it was an error of law for SHAB to consider any
information which would have been provided by Churchill &
Banks on or before February 13, 2004 if they had been given the
opportunity to present evidence; 2) If the SHAB impermissibly
considered such evidence, whether Churchill & Banks submitted
sufficient to the board on or about February 13, 2004 to sustain
SHAB's finding of substantial completeness; and 3) whether
sufficient evidence exists to hold the zoning board acted in a
manner demonstrating it considered the application to be
substantially complete. 2 2 The Court applied de novo review with
regard to the first issue because the decision turned on statutory
interpretation. 2 3  Although the statute does not define
"substantially complete", the legislature provided ten criteria to
guide the assessment of whether a permit application is
''substantially complete" before the moratorium took effect on
February 13, 2004.24 The court reviewed the application as it
stood on this date and determined it was not substantially
complete because it did not meet the criteria set forth in the
statute.
25
The second issue was whether SHAB considered any
information not in the Churchill & Banks application as of
February 13, 2004, or granted deference to Churchill & Banks for
its lost opportunity to present additional evidence at the February
20. New Harbor Village, LLC v. New Shoreham Zoning Bd. of Review,
894 A.2d 901, 909 (R.I.2006).
21. Town of Smithfield, 924 A.2d at 799.
22. Id. at 799-800.
23. Id. at 801.
24. Id. at 800, 801 n5 (setting forth the statutory criteria in § 45-53-
6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J)).
25. Id. at 805.
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11, 2004 meeting. 26 The statute clearly excludes from SHAB's
review any information not included in an application prior to the
February 13, 2004.27 The court ruled that SHAB needed to
consider the Churchill & Banks application as it stood on
February 13, 2004, and could not speculate as to what would have
been included had they not lost their opportunity to present
evidence at the February 11, 2004 board meeting.28 Churchill &
Banks failed to make an offer of proof at the February 11, 2004
meeting or submit documents into the record, which would have
furthered the application. 29 However, the court ruled no lost
opportunity could overcome the clear language of the statute. 30
The Court recognized the fact that Churchill & Banks had seven
months between the time when it first submitted its application
and the beginning of the moratorium. 31 The court reviewed the
record of SHAB's hearing which clearly indicated SHAB's partially
based its decision on the fact Churchill & Bank's inability to
present additional expert testimony at the February 11, 2004
meeting and ruled by taking this into account, SHAB ignored the
explicit language of the statute and made an error of law. 32
The final issue was whether the zoning board had treated the
Churchill & Banks application as if it was substantially
complete. 33 The standard of review on this issue was more
deferential. The court held the SHAB ruling that the zoning board
treated the application as if it was "substantially complete" would
be entitled to deference by court if there was legally competent
evidence to support that ruling. 34 The court defined legally
competent evidence as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; more than
scintilla but less than preponderance". 35 The statute states if the
zoning board acted in a manner demonstrating it considered the
application to be substantially complete for reviewing purposes
26. Id. at 802.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 803.
32. Id. at 803.
33. Id. at 805.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 806.
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then the SHAB shall also consider it substantially complete. 36
Churchill & Banks did not debate this issue, and there was no
fact-finding before the SHAB decision. SHAB based its decision
on the fact that the zoning board had held two hearings on the
application, and had neither certified as incomplete, nor halted
the hearings due to deficiencies in the application. 37 The Court
struck this claim down because the zoning board conducted these
hearings over the course of seven months, and the moratorium
took effect prior to the enactment of the certification process of
declaring an application incomplete and notifying the party. 38 The
court also noted the zoning board sent Churchill & Banks a memo
in October of 2003 and put them on notice that its application was
deficient in twelve areas. 39 Based on these facts, and the reasons
for enacting the moratorium, the Court held there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding the zoning board acted as if the
application of Churchill & Banks was substantially complete. 40
This effectively left Churchill & Banks without legal recourse
because the Smithfield Zoning Board was no longer under an
obligation to hear the permit application of Churchill & Banks. 41
COMMENTARY
The lesson to be learned from this case is that developers need
to be cognizant of any moratoriums which pose a threat to the
permits. Unless there is an ambiguity in the statute, the court will
not read between the lines and ignore the plain language. It is
unfortunate Churchill & Banks did not to use the February 11,
2004 board meeting to present expert testimony to further its
application, but the statute does not make an exception for such
lost opportunities. The plain language of § 45-53-6 required all
applications of for-profit developers to be substantially complete
prior to the February 13, 2004 moratorium.
Furthermore, Churchill & Banks was put on notice well
before the February 13, 2004 deadline that its application was
36. Id. at 805.
37. Id. at 806.
38. Id. at 806-07.
39. Id. at 808.
40. Id. at 805, 808 (setting forth the legislature's reasoning for imposing
the moratorium).
41. Id. at 808.
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deficient in several respects. If Churchill & Banks had used due
diligence it would have known the effective date of the legislation,
and would have taken all necessary steps prior to this date to
insure its application would not be harmed by the passage of this
legislation. In the absence of an express exception in the plain
language of the statute for such lost opportunities the Court and
the SHAB were powerless to grant an exception for Churchill &
Banks. If Churchill & Banks should be given an exception based
on the unusual facts presented in this case it must come from the
legislature in the form of an amendment to the statute to allow
the court to use discretion in determining if an application is
substantially complete.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled the
SHAB decision, which held the application submitted by Churchill
& Banks to build 336 apartment units within the town of
Smithfield was substantially complete under the criteria set forth
in R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-6. The court ruled SHAB ignored the
explicit language of the text of the statute, and took into
consideration extrinsic evidence, which was expressly prohibited
by the statute. The court looked no further than the plain words of
the statute to determine the application was not substantially
complete by February 13, 2004, and was therefore subject to the
terms of the temporary moratorium imposed by R.I. Gen. Laws §
45-53-6.
Meaghan E. Kelly
Property Law. Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005 (R.I. 2007).
A party who signs an instrument demonstrates his or her assent
to the document and the party's unreasonable reliance on others'
misrepresentations does not void the document. Unless specified
in writing or through clear actions, common law principles of
cotenants control and each cotenant holds an equal interest in the
property which does not grant them authority to exclude other
cotenants from enjoying their own equal privilege.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The challenged property in this case is a one-acre lot located
at 20 Snell Road in Little Compton, Rhode Island. 1 On December
18, 1990 the owners of the property, Ronald A. Manchester, Jr.
(Ronald) and his wife Anna Manchester (Anna), conveyed the
property in a quitclaim deed to their son, Ronald Manchester
(Roald).2 In the same deed Ronald and Anna reserved a life estate
in the property and Roald agreed to support and care for his
parents for the rest of their lives. 3 At the time of this transfer
Ronald and Anna lived in the house on the property while Roald
and his wife Judy lived in the trailer on the property as well.4
In 1991, Anna's son from a prior marriage, Joseph Pereira
(Joseph), moved into the house with his mother and Ronald. 5 In
return for Joseph's agreement to help financially support Ronald
and Anna, on June 19, 1991, Roald conveyed his remainder
interest in the property to himself, Judy and Joseph. 6 After this
conveyance in 1991, the interests in the 20 Snell Road property
were as follows: Ronald and Anna held a life estate; Roald, Judy,
and Joseph held the remainder interest. 7 Joseph married in 1993
and moved his new family into the house on Snell Road; Ronald
1. Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1006-07 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id. at 1007
3. Id.
4. Id. (a camper was also located on the property).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Id.
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and Anna subsequently moved out of the house into the camper on
the lot. In 1994, Joseph and his family moved to Georgia. 8
Regardless of these developments, Ronald, Anna, Roald, Judy, and
Joseph's respective interests in the property remained the same
until 1998.9
In 1998 Roald and Judy borrowed money through Equity
Concepts, Inc. (Equity Concepts).10 Equity Concepts extended a
loan to Roald and Judy with the requirements that (a) Roald,
Judy, and Joseph grant Equity Concepts a mortgage in the Snell
Road property and (b) that Ronald and Anna relinquish their life
estate interest.11  The resulting quitclaim deed had clear
unambiguous language stating that Ronald and Anna terminated
their life estate interest and transferred their entire interest in
the property to Roald, Judy, and Joseph as tenants in common.12
Ronald, Anna, Roald, and Judy all signed the quitclaim deed,
while Joseph granted a power of attorney allowing Roald to carry
out all necessary documentation on Joseph's behalf because he
still lived in Georgia at the time of this transaction. 13 Each family
continued residing on the property-Ronald and Anna in the
camper, Roald and Judy in the trailer-and when Joseph returned
from Georgia shortly after this 1998 deed, he and his family
moved back into the house on Snell Road. 14
In 2001, the parties executed the final relevant deed for this
property.15 In June, Roald, Judy, and Joseph apportioned their
interests to give Joseph an undivided one-half interest and
themselves the other undivided one-half interest.1 6 This deed
contained no mention or reference to a life estate interest. 17 Later
in 2001, in the process of obtaining a home-improvement loan,
Joseph and his wife Debbie saw the 1998 quitclaim deed for the
first time.18 Ronald did not appear to remember this deed when
8. Id.
9. See Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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they showed it to him, and each party continued living on the
property: Ronald in the camper, Roald and Judy in the trailer, and
Joseph and his family in the house. 19
The impetus of the conflict and resulting lawsuit occurred in
the Summer or Fall of 2004 when Joseph and his family moved
out of the Snell Road house again. 20 Over the objections of
Ronald, Roald, and Judy, Joseph allowed his niece, Monique
Medeiros (Monique), and her family (including Travis Cory
"Travis") to move into the house. 21 Ronald, Roald, and Judy
initiated suit in October 2004, and after an amended complaint in
November, they alleged Joseph was guilty of fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract and sought "(1) a mandatory
injunction to enjoin Joseph from transferring any interest in the
property and to enjoin Monique and Travis from depriving Ronald
of complete access to the house; (2) a declaration that Monique
and Travis are trespassers; (3) an order requiring Joseph to
execute a deed evidencing a life estate in Ronald; (4) a declaratory
judgment regarding the rights and obligations of all the parties. ''22
On November 12, 2004, the trial justice denied the plaintiffs'
motion for injunctive relief because they did not have a
substantial probability of prevailing on the merits.23 The nonjury
trial began in April 2005 and each party testified in turn as to his
or her understanding of the effect of the 1998 quitclaim deed, as
well as to the alleged breaches. 24 Ronald, Roald, and Judy each
testified to their belief that the 1998 quitclaim deed was never
going to be recorded and that Ronald and Anna would retain their
life estate interest in the property as long as the mortgage
payments were made on time.25 Roald further testified that he
19. Id. at 1007-08 (Anna had died in 1999).
20. See id. at 1008.
21. Id.
22. Id. (the plaintiffs also sought partition however by mutual agreement
of the parties the partition count was dismissed).
23. Id. (note also that after filing this suit Roald and Judy conveyed to
Ronald a life estate interest in Roald and Judy's interest in Snell Road
property. All parties and trial justice agreed this execution was immaterial
concerning the ongoing trial).
24. See id. at 1008-11.
25. See id. at 1008-10. ("the signed quitclaim deed was needed so that 'if
[she and Roald] missed three consecutive payments or defaulted on [their]
mortgage, than the bank had the right to come down and take the property"').
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did not inform Joseph of the quitclaim deed in 1998 because of his
belief of its insignificance, and that the true nature of the deed
was first brought to his attention in 2004 as a result of the conflict
over Monique's residence in the house. 26 Ronald testified as well
to first learning of the implications of the 1998 quitclaim deed in
2004, and emphasized he never intended to relinquish his interest
in life estate in the Snell Road property. 27 Joseph testified that he
first saw and learned of the 1998 quitclaim deed in 2001 while
searching for documents for a home-improvement loan, and
acknowledged he did not understand that Ronald had given up his
life estate in the property. 28
On May 25, 2005 the trial justice denied and dismissed all of
the plaintiffs' claims and make the following declarations:
(1) Joseph holds a present "undivided one-half interest in
fee in common" in the 20 Snell Road property; (2) with
respect to the house on that property, Joseph has rights
of use and control (which include the right to allow
tenants, guests, and other invitees to enter and occupy) to
the exclusion of Ronald, Roald, and Judy; (3) Roald and
Judy hold an undivided one-half interest in the property
but their interest is subject to a life estate held by
Ronald; and (4) Joseph and Roald are contractually
obligated to continue performing on the 1991 agreement
by paying to or for the benefit of Ronald a total of $75,000
each in $400 monthly increments. 29
As the result of an eviction proceeding initiated by the
plaintiffs, on June 16, 2005 the trial justice reiterated that
"Joseph Pereira's rights of use and control of the single-family
residence on the property include the right to allow tenants,
quests and other invitees, including Monique Medeiros and Travis
Cory, to enter upon the property and occupy the house."30  On
October 27, 2005, the trial justice denied the plaintiffs' motion for
26. Id. at 1009 ("Debbie bluntly told Roald that Ronald no longer had a
life estate in the property and that 'there's nothing [Roald could] do about
it"').
27. Id. at 1010.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1011.
30. Id.
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a new trial. 31 The plaintiffs then filed a timely appeal contending
(1) that the 1998 quitclaim was voidable because Ronald had
relied on a misrepresentation by a fiduciary at the time of signing;
(2) that Joseph had breached his fiduciary duties and therefore
they are entitled to a constructive trust on the property; (3) that
by deciding issues not before her the trial justice exceeded her
authority; and (4) that the trial justice erred in denying the
motion for a new trial. 32
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Misrepresentation
In addressing the plaintiffs' claim of misrepresentation, the
Supreme Court stated that in accordance with established case
law, the plaintiff must show justified reliance on the
misrepresentation in order to succeed on a claim of
misrepresentation. 33 The Court concluded that Ronald's reliance
on Roald's representation that the 1998 quitclaim would not
dissolve his life estate interest was neither justified nor
reasonable. 34  The Court first points to the straightforward
language of the deed: "THE PURPOSE OF THIS QUIT-CLAIM
DEED IS TO DISSOLVE THAT CERTAIN LIFE ESTATE
GRANTED TO GRANTORS AS RECORDED ON JUNE 21,
1991." 35 The meaning of this clause is transparent, and the court
easily determined that "no reasonable person would have signed
this document based merely upon another person's secondhand
assurance that the document would not dissolve the life estate."36
Adding weight to their decision, the court also noted the long
settled principle that once a party signs a document he or she has
then demonstrated assent, regardless of whether he or she later
claims not to have read or understood the document. 37
Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice's decision
to deny the plaintiffs' claim of misrepresentation. Consequently,
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1011, 1006.
33. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the validity of the 1998 quitclaim stands and Ronald's interest in
life estate in the Snell Road property dissolved in 1998.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The central concept behind of a constructive trust is "the
equitable prevention of unjust enrichment of one party at the
expense of another in situations in which legal title to property
was obtained by fraud or in violation of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship." 38 Ronald, Roald, and Judy contended that Joseph
established a fiduciary relationship in 1991 by agreeing to support
Ronald and then breached this duty by exploiting Ronald's alleged
misunderstanding of the 1998 quitclaim deed. 39 A court imposed
constructive trust requires a plaintiff to prove by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that a fiduciary duty existed between the
parties and (2) that either an act of fraud or breach of a promise
occurred as a result of that relationship. 40 The Supreme Court
foreclosed themselves from ruling on the question of the existence
of a fiduciary relationship since they found no breach had
occurred. 4 1 Because they previously decided that Ronald was
unreasonable in his reliance on any representation concerning the
1998 quitclaim deed, it followed that there could be no breach of
alleged fiduciary duties. 42
Trial Justice's Alleged Overreaching
Under this the claim, the plaintiffs argued that the only issue
in the case was whether Ronald's life estate, dissolved in 1998,
should be reconveyed to Ronald. 43 As a result they contended the
trial judge overreached herself when she gave the following
judgment: "that Joseph possessed rights of use and control over
the house on the Snell Road property to the same extent as would
a 'sole owner in fee simple absolute.'' 44 The Supreme Court first
noted the common law principles of cotenantency: (1) unless
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1012-13.
40. Id. at 1013.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1013-14.
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otherwise specified, cotenants possess equal shares of the property
and (2) that a cotenant may not use the property in such a manner
that excludes the other cotenants from enjoying their rightful and
equal interests. 45 Under these principles, the Supreme Court held
that the trial justice erred in declaring Joseph had the authority
to rent the property and exclude from the house Ronald, Roald,
and Judy.46 While Ronald, Anna, Roald, and Joseph never
created a written document of the 1991 agreement, the trial
justice gave the actions of the parties weight, specifically how they
had been respectively residing at 20 Snell Road. 4 7 The Supreme
Court ruled, however, that despite the living situations,
insufficient evidence exists to support the judgment that the
plaintiffs had agreed to let Joseph not only live in the house, but
also to permit other tenants or guests in the house on an
exclusionary long-term basis.4 8 Given the absence of evidence to
augment the executed deed interests, the Supreme Court abided
by common law principles, reversed the trial justice's judgment,
and concluded that as a result of their cotenant relationship,
Joseph, Roald, and Judy hold exactly the same rights with respect
to the Snell Road property and its dwellings. 
49
Motion for a New Trial
In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial, the plaintiffs
needed to demonstrate that there was either (1) a clear error in
the judgment based on the existing evidence; or (2) that new and
significant evidence is available.5 0 Ronald, Roald, and Judy's
contention for a new trial argued only that there was a clear error
in judgment. 5 1 The court dealt with this claim quickly, holding
that the only error in the trial justice's judgment was her ruling
concerning Joseph's authority to exclude others from the house,
5 2
which had already been reversed through the court's application of
45. Id. at 1013; see also Lucchetti v. Lucchetti, 127 A.2d 244, 248 (R.I.
1956); Silvia v. Helger, 67 A.2d 27, 28 (R.I. 1949).
46. Id. at 1014.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1015.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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common law. 53 Consequently, the court denied affirmed the trial
justice's denial of the motion for a new trial.54
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that notwithstanding a
reasonable reliance on a misrepresentation, if the signed legal
instrument has clear unambiguous language the party is held to
the language of the instrument. 55 In this case, the Court held
Ronald responsible for his own actions when he signed the 1998
quitclaim deed that clearly stated its purpose to dissolve Ronald's
life estate interest. 56 While such a holding may in other cases
completely suspend a party's interest in property, Ronald was able
to resurrect a life estate interest in the property even before the
case went to trial. 57 Pitting certain family members against other
family members, this case attempted to render justice in the midst
of a family quarrel. Relying on multiple default common law
principles, the Supreme Court sliced through the family history
and rendered a judgment based on simple principles of contract
and property law. Adherence to the long-standing rule that
cotenants share equal divisions of the property not to the
exclusion of the other cotenants ultimately rendered justice by
positioning each family member on rightful equal footing with
which to go forth. The Supreme Court reaffirmed foundational
rules of property and contract law, and made clear that regardless
of elaborate family drama the court must apply and allow legal
standards to prevail. Where the trial justice erred by conflating
the parties' entwined and varied history with standard legal
procedures, the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on
fundamental principles to hold each party responsible to their
respective legal actions.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that clear
unambiguous language in a deed forecloses a claim of
53. See supra discussion in text and notes 41-45
54. Id. at 1015.
55. Id. at 1012.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1008.
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misrepresentation because of the requirement of unreasonable
reliance. Further, upon signing a legal document, a party cannot
later claim confusion because he or she did not read or understand
the instrument. The Court also held that unless specified in
writing or with sufficient supporting evidence, the common law
principle that cotenants share equal interests and cannot use
their interest to the exclusion of other cotenants prevails.
Maureen McCrann
Property Law. New England Development, LLC v. Noel Berg,
913 A.2d 363 (R.I. 2007). § 45-23-40(e) of the Rhode Island Land
Development and Subdivision Review Enabling Act requires that
a town planning board issue a written decision, to approve,
approve with changes, or deny a master plan, within one hundred
and twenty (120) days of certification of completeness. However,
the absence of a sanction in this section makes it directory as
opposed to mandatory. Conversely, § 45-23-40(f) provides a
sanction for the board's failure to act in the requisite time period.
This section merely requires that the board take action within the
statutorily requisite time period and does not require a written
decision. Therefore, the planning board cannot be sanctioned for
the failure to produce a written decision within the 120 day time
period if the board takes action to approve, approve with changes,
or deny the master plan.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
New England Development (NED) filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel Noel Berg, the administrative officer for the
Tiverton Planning Board, to issue a certificate of the Planning
Board's failure to act pursuant to § 45-23-40(f) of the Rhode Island
General Laws. 1 NED wanted approval to build a shopping center
in Tiverton to be known as Tiverton Commons. 2 On September 3,
2004, pursuant to the Rhode Island Land Development and
Subdivision Review Enabling Act of 1992, NED submitted a major
land development master plan to the Tiverton Planning Board.3
On October 27, 2004 the board issued a Certificate of
Completeness for the application which set in motion a one
hundred and twenty (120) day time period in which the statute
required the planning board to approve of the master plan as
submitted, approve with changes and or conditions, or deny the
1. New England Dev., LLC v. Noel Berg, 913 A.2d 363, 367 (R.I. 2007);
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-23-40(f) (1956).
2. Berg, 913 A.2d 366.
3. Id.
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application. 4 NED consented to eight different extensions of the
statutory deadline, eventually agreeing on an ultimate deadline
set for December 30, 2005. 5 The Planning Board, following
numerous discussions of the application at regularly held
meetings and workshops held jointly with NED, voted
unanimously to deny the master plan.6 The board filed a written
decision on January 13, 2006, clearly subsequent to the December
30, 2005 deadline.7
NED contends that the planning board's failure to file a
written decision in accordance with the statutory deadline
triggered its entitlement to a certificate of the planning board's
failure to act and the resulting approval of its master-plan
application pursuant to § 45-23-40(f).8 On January 3, 2006, NED
requested that Berg issue a certificate of the planning board's
failure to act which would have resulted in the approval of the
master plan. 9 Acting on behalf of the Planning Board, Noel Berg
refused to issue that certificate and NED, on January 10, 2006,
petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of mandamus to compel
the issuance of the certificate.1 0 In addition, NED filed a timely
appeal of the decision to deny the master plan to the Tiverton
Board of Appeals. 11 Trial was held in Superior Court on the
petition for writ of mandamus on February 28, 2006.12
NED asserted that § 45-23-40(e) and (f) required the planning
board to issue "a written decision and file it with the town clerk
with respect to its vote on the master plan application by the
conclusion of the statutory time period."'13 NED contended that
failure to file such written decision by that date triggers a
ministerial duty on the part of the administrative officer for the
planning board, Berg, to issue the certificate of the planning
board's failure to act, and the resulting approval of the master
4. Id. at 366.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 367.
7. Id.
8. Id. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-23-40(f) (R.I. 2007).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Appeal to the Tiverton Board of Appeals stayed pending the outcome
of this appeal. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id at 367-368.
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plan. 14
The planning board responded that the requirement for the
board to reach a decision by the statutory deadline did not involve
the requirement of a written decision to be issued within that
period.15 The board contended that the November 21st vote to
deny the master plan was all that was required to satisfy the
requirements. 16 Therefore, the board contended NED had no right
to the certificate and mandamus was unavailable. 17 Alternatively,
the planning board argued that the mandamus was unavailable
because all administrative appeals had not been exhausted as
NED has filed for an appeal to the Tiverton Board of Appeals. 18
Standard of Review
For mandamus to lie NED must show (1) that it had a clear
legal right to the relief sought; (2) that Berg has a ministerial duty
to perform the requested act without discretion to refuse; and (3)
that NED has no adequate remedy at law. 19 Once these
prerequisites have been shown, the Superior Court has sound
discretion to issue the writ.20 The "existence of unexhausted
administrative remedies" however, may "prevent the issuance of a
writ of mandamus." 21
Superior Court Holding
The Superior Court held that mandamus was unavailable to
NED because an administrative remedy had not been exhausted,
namely, an appeal of the denial by the planning board to the
Tiverton Board of Appeals.22 NED timely appealed to the Rhode
14. Id. at 368.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A ministerial function is one that is to be performed by an official in a
prescribed manner based on a particular set of facts without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done. Id. See
Union Station Associates v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 193 (R.I. 2004).
20. Berg, 913 A.2d at 369; See Martone v. Johnston School Comm., 824
A.2d 426, 429 (R.I. 2003).
21. Id.; See Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 849 A.2d 359, 363 (R.I. 2004).
22. Berg, 913 A.2d at 368.
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Island Supreme Court. 23 In addressing the merits of the case, the
court found that the plain language of the statute required "the
planning board to approve of the master plan as submitted,
approve with changes and or conditions, or deny the application"
within 120 days of issuing the certificate and mandated that the
planning board issue a written decision within the statutory time
frame. 24 The court "further found that because the planning
board failed to issue a written decision by the deadline, the statute
imposed a mandatory duty on the administrative officer, at the
request of the applicant to issue the certificate of the planning
board's failure to act."'2 5
Parties' Arguments
On appeal, NED argued that the trial justice erred when he
decided the writ of mandamus. 26 NED argued that the statutory
scheme provides for a clear legal right to a certificate of the
planning board's failure to act and that therefore a ministerial
duty was imposed on Berg to issue that certificate without any
exercise of discretion. 2 7 In fulfillment of the second element for a
writ of mandamus, NED contends that it has "no other adequate
remedy at law to obtain the relief it sought. ' 28 The planning
board, through Berg, asserts that NED did not have a clear legal
right to the issuance of the certificate because the planning board
denied the application within the statutory time limit by voting to
do so at its meeting on Nov. 21, 2005 and that there was no
requirement that this decision be in writing.29 Furthermore, even
if NED did have a right to the certificate, NED did not exhaust
other administrative remedies, namely the appeal, and therefore
had other adequate remedies at law. 30 The planning board
offered additional arguments which were not addressed by the
Supreme Court.3 1
23. Id. at 369.
24. Id. at 368. See R.I GEN. LAws § 45 23-60 (e) (R.I. 2007).
25. Id. See R.I GEN. LAWS § 45 23-60 (f) (R.I. 2007).
26. Id. at 369.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 369 n.11.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, and held
that NED did not have a clear legal right to the issuance of the
certificate based on the statutory requirements, but did not adopt
the trial court's interpretation of the applicable statutes.
3 2
§ 45-23-40(e) requires the planning board to produce a written
decision within 120 days
§ 45-23-40(e) requires that the "planning board shall, within
[120] days of certification of completeness, or within a further
amount of time that may be consented to by the applicant,
approve of the master plan as submitted, approve with changes
and or conditions or deny the application according to the
requirements of § 45-23-63. ' ' 33 § 45-23-63 requires that the "all
records of the planning board proceedings and decisions shall be
written and kept permanently available for public review." 3 4 The
court found that this language was unambiguous and therefore
requires that under § 45-23-40(e) the planning board is required to
produce a written decision within the 120 day time period. 3 5 The
court found that this court has previously held that "statutes
imposing apparently mandatory time restrictions on public
officials are often directory in nature" when there are no sanctions
provided for the failure to perform that duty. 36
§ 45-23-40(f) provides a sanction, in the form of a certificate
constructively approving the master plan, for the failure to act
within the 120 day time period
§ 45-23-40(f) states that the "failure of the planning board to
act within the prescribed period constitutes approval of the master
plan, and a certificate of the administrative officer as to the failure
of the planning board to act within the required time and the
resulting approval will be issued on request of the applicant. '3 7
32. Id.
33. Id. at 370-71; See R.I GEN. LAWS § 45-23-40(e).
34. Berg, 913 A.2d at 371; See R.I GEN. LAWS § 45-23-63(a).
35. Berg, 913 A.2d at 371; See R.I GEN. LAWS § 45-23-40(e).
36. Berg, 913 A.2d at 371; See Washington Highway Dept., Inc. v.
Bendick, 576 A.2d 115, 117(R.I. 1990).
37. Berg, 913 A.2d at 371; See R.I GEN. LAWS § 45-23-40(f).
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The court found that the requirement under the statute "to act" is,
according to its plain meaning, the requirement to do something
and does not require a written decision. 38 Therefore, although §
45-23-40(e) requires a written decision, the failure to produce a
written decision by the time limit does not result in a sanction
under § 45-23-40(f). 39 § 45-23-40(f) merely requires that the board
take action to approve, approve with changes, or deny the master
plan. 40
Policy Argument
In support of the court's statutory interpretation the court
refers to legislative intent. 41 The court stated that it did "not
believe that the legislature intended to tacitly remove the
authority of municipalities to control development within their
borders when they have timely voted to deny a master plan
application but failed to file a written decision within the
prescribed period. '42 The court goes on to state that although the
statute requires a written decision, it would be overly burdensome
to require by threat of sanction that this decision be written and
filed with in the 120 time period. 43 The court cites the policy and
goal of the legislature in ensuring consistency in local
development regulations, as support for these assertions. 44 The
court found that in this case the board's decision was filed within
a reasonable time after the statutory limit had expired and did not
interfere with NED's right to an appeal. 45
The court held that although § 45-23-40(e) does include a
requirement that the planning board file a written decision in 120
days there is no sanction to render the requirement mandatory
and is instead merely directory. 46 On the other hand, the court
held that § 45-23-40(f) is a mandatory requirement that the
planning board act on the application within the statutory time
38. Berg, 913 A.2d at 371.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 373.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 370-371.
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limit and that failure to act would result in constructive approval
of the master plan and require the administrative officer to issue
the certificate of the planning board's failure to act. 4 7
In this case the planning board took action in voting to deny
the master plan clearly within 120 day period fulfilling statutory
requirement under § 45-23-40(f) which provides for the sanction
requested by NED.48 Therefore NED had no clear legal right to
the issuance of the certificate of the planning board's failure to act
and mandamus can not lie.49
Dissent
Justice Goldberg wrote separately to concur in the result but
dissent to the interpretation of the majority. 50 In her opinion,
Justice Goldberg agrees with the holding of the Superior Court in
which Mandamus was denied on account of NED's failure to
exhaust its administrative and legal remedies. 51 Furthermore,
although finding it unnecessary for the purposes of deciding this
case, Justice Goldberg finds that § 45-23-40(e) does not require the
planning board to issue a written opinion. 52
Justice Goldberg finds the statutory scheme of § 45-23-40(e) is
unclear and ambiguous and requires the application of the usual
rules of statutory construction. 53 She reasons the requirement
that the decision, in 120 days, be in the form of a written decision
means that the planning board would have less than 120 to
"review and pass upon" the major development project. 54 Justice
Ginsburg applies the intent of the General Assembly and reasons
that there is no intent to provide less than 120 days for the
planning board to decide the application. 55 Furthermore, Justice
Ginsburg reasons that § 45-23-40(f) requires that the board must
within 120 vote for or against application and that a written
decision must be provided within a reasonable time. 56
47. Id. at 371.
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 373.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 375.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in failing to adopt the
holding of the Superior Court ignored the Rhode Island precedent
for ruling on a petition for a writ of mandamus. Both the trial
justice and Justice Goldberg in the dissent point to Krivitsky II,
849 A.2d at 363 in which the Supreme Court "vacated an order of
mandamus upon [the] determination that he plaintiff failed to
exhaust its administrative appeals to various town officials. '57
Furthermore, the dissent points out that "if the license ultimately
was denied by the town, the plaintiff could seek review in [The
Supreme Court] by way of certiorari. ' 58
In choosing to break from precedent, by not performing an
exhaustion analysis first, the Supreme Court was able to interpret
the statute to give other town planning boards predictability in
the procedures of land development, so as not to overly burden
planning boards or to unduly sanction taxpayers. The court
looked to both traditional concepts of statutory interpretation and
to social policy to interpret the statute for the benefit of the town
planning board, and ultimately the taxpayers.
The Supreme Court statutory interpretation reflects the text
of the statute. § 45-23-40(e) explicitly states that decisions should
be "according to the requirements of § 45-23-63," which requires
that "all records of the planning board proceedings and decisions
shall be in writing." The text of the statute leaves little room for
interpretation. However, by holding that the sanction in § 45-23-
40(f) does not apply to subsection (e) the court is able to emphasis
a social policy of protection for the planning board and the tax-
payers of the town.
The majority decision points out that a sanctionable
requirement to file a written decision within 120 days would be
overly burdensome on the planning board. As pointed out by the
dissent, the 120 days are provided to allow the planning board to
solicit input from numerous agencies, ranging from the police and
fire departments to adjacent communities and environmental
stakeholders in order to make an informed decision beneficial to
57. Id. at 374.
58. Id.
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the town and creating the least impact on the tax payers of the
town. 59 If the 120 day time limit required the board to not only
make a decision but also to write a decision this function would
not be carried out. Furthermore, the policy behind the statute is
to keep decisions in the hands of the local officials. If the sanction
could be implemented for failure to file a written decision it would
be likely that the sanction would be implemented more often
resulting in construction projects which were not explicitly
approved by the planning boards and were instead approved
constructively.
Ultimately, the policy behind the statute is for the benefit of
taxpayers. The Supreme Court is protecting the people in the town
of Tiverton from being unnecessarily burdened with the
construction of a major shopping center which had been denied by
the Town Planning Board. The Supreme Court is setting the
precedent to defer to the discretion of the local officials who have a
better understanding of the needs of the town.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held under the Rhode
Island Land Development and Subdivision Review Enabling Act a
town planning board must, pursuant to § 45-23-40(e), provide a
written decision approving or denying the plan within 120 days of
the approval of the master plan application. However, the court
further held that this requirement is not sanctioned under § 45-
23-40(f). Instead, § 45-23-40(f) merely imposes the sanction of
constructive approval for the failure of the board to act in making
a decision to approve or deny the application. In this case, the
Tiverton Planning Board acted in voting to deny the application
within the 120 day time period and therefore NED does not have a
clear legal right to the sanction of constructive approval and the
associated certificate of the board's failure to act. For these
reasons NED's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the
issuance of the certificate of the board's failure to act is denied.
Siobhan Gannon
59. Id. at 375.
Property Law. Warwick Housing Authority v. McLeod, 913 A.2d
1033 (R.I. 2007). The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
codifies the rule that existed at common law that deemed a
landlord's unqualified acceptance of rent to be a waiver of any
breach in the lease of which he was aware.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1996, Barbara McLeod ("McLeod") began living in
Meadowbrook Terrace, a housing facility providing subsidized
housing primarily for elderly residents. 1 In 2002, WHA began
receiving complaints from McLeod's neighbors that she had
allowed her adult son Mark Anthony to live with her in violation
of her rental agreement. 2 An investigation by WHA officials
followed where they concluded that Mark Anthony was in fact
living in McLeod's apartment.3 Also, on January 4, 2005, Mark
Anthony was arrested at McLeod's apartment for first-degree
sexual assault, among other crimes, against his ex-wife who had
been visiting. 4 Mark Anthony stated to police that the apartment
at Meadowbrook Terrace as his address. 5 On January 8, WHA
sent McLeod notice that her rental agreement would be
terminated as of January 31 because of her son's criminal activity
in the apartment (WHA did not seek to terminate on the grounds
that he simply resided there in violation of the rental
agreement). 6
Despite being notified that her rental agreement would
terminate as of January 31, McLeod paid February's rent, which
WHA accepted without reservation. 7 Again, WHA sent McLeod
notice on February 2 that her rental agreement would be
1. Warwick Housing Authority v. McLeod, 913 A.2d 1033, 1034-35 (R.I.
2007).
2. Id. at 1035.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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terminated as of February 28th because McLeod had pled nolo
contendere to an identity fraud charge on November 17, 2004.8
WHA claimed that this was another violation of her rental
agreement, however McLeod paid rent for March and continued to
pay rent while this litigation has been pending, and each month
WHA accepted the rent unconditionally. 9
WHA filed a complaint for eviction in the District Court on
February 24, 2005 and the agency obtained a judgment against
McLeod on June 7, 2005.10 Defendant McLeod appealed on June
10, 2005 and again lost in Superior Court. 11 During the trial
WHA argued that (1) McLeod had breached her rental agreement
and (2) at all relevant times McLeod was on actual notice that
WHA was prosecuting an eviction against her.12 McLeod argued
that the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act applies and sets out
the circumstances in which a landlord waives the right to
terminate a lease by accepting rent:
"Acceptance of rent with knowledge of a default by the tenant.
.constitutes a waiver of the landlord's right to terminate the
rental agreement for that breach unless the landlord gives written
notice within ten (10) days."'13 McLeod argues that WHA waived
its right to evict her on the grounds of either her son's criminal
activity or her own plea to a criminal offense because WHA
continued to accept her rent without written reservation after
discovering those breaches of the rental agreement. 14
The trial court relied on R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-14, a general
notice provision, which provides that a person has notice of a fact
"(i) if he has actual knowledge of it (ii) has received notification or
(iii) from all the facts and circumstances known to him or her at
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1036 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-41).
14. Id. (The court was skeptical that either of those transactions, the
son's arrest and McLeod's plea to identity fraud, even qualify as grounds to
terminate the rental agreement because the agreement requires tenants and
guests to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors'
peaceful enjoyment of the premesis. McLeod was not home when her son was
arrested, and there was no evidence that McLeod's identity fraud disturbed
any of her neighboring tenants).
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the time in question he or she has reason to know it exists." 15 The
trial court reasoned that because McLeod had notice of WHA's
continuing efforts to evict her, the requirement that WHA notify
her in writing of such continuing efforts after accepting her rent
each month was obviated. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, McLeod maintained that the trial justice erred in
holding that she had notice of the eviction under § 34-18-14 and
that WHA, in failing to comply with the specific notice provisions
of R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-41, waived its right to pursue this
eviction action. 17
WHA also pursues two new arguments on appeal. First, that
the provision of the rental agreement that says that the waiver by
the landlord of one breach does not constitute a waiver of another
abrogates the effects of § 34-18-41.18 Second, that a different
statute, § 34-18-36 (f) frees WHA from the notice requirement if it
wants to evict a tenant for a crime of violence.19 The court, using
the well-established "raise or waive" rule, refuses to consider
WHA's new arguments because WHA failed to raise either of those
contentions at trial. 20 Thus,the only issue the court addressed
was whether "a landlord who is aware that a tenant is in breach of
a rental agreement [is] estopped from pursuing an eviction action
against a tenant for that breach if he accepts rent without a
written reservation of that right, even though the tenant has
actual notice of the pending eviction action." 21
The court answered that question positively using a long
history of case law: As early as 1896 the court had held that a
landlord who accepts rent after learning of a breach waives his
right to pursue eviction for that breach. 22 Over the past century
15. Id. at n. 4.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1037.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1038.
22. Id. (citing Smith v. Edgewood Casino Club, 19 R.I. 628, 629-30
(1896)).
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the court has abided by that rule.23 Since the cases upon which
the court relied were decided the Rhode Island legislature passed
the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, § 4-18-41 of which "is
crystal clear in requiring that the landlord give written notice of
his intention to continue termination proceedings to the tenant
within ten days of accepting rent. ' 24 The court finds that this
statute codified the common law rule deeming a landlord's
unqualified acceptance of rent to be a waiver of any breach of
which he was aware. 25
The court held that the trial justice made an error of law
when she held that since McLeod had "notice" as defined under §
34-18-14, the landlord was no longer obligated to deliver the
specific type of notice mandated by § 34-18-41.26 The court
reasoned that the specific mandate of § 34-18-41 cannot be
overcome by the general provisions contained in § 34-18-14.27
WHA continued to accept McLeod's rent after giving her two
notices alleging a breach of the rental agreement and purporting
to terminate the agreement but WHA did not reserve its right, in
writing, to terminate her tenancy for those breaches. 28 Thus the
court precluded WHA from pursuing the eviction action against
McLeod. 29
COMMENTARY
A landlord waives the right to terminate for a breach of which
he has notice when he accepts rent unless he reserves the right to
terminate for that breach in writing within ten days. Here, the
landlord continued to accept rent month after month without
reserving the right to continue eviction proceedings with a simple
letter. The court did not look favorably upon this landlord, who
failed to follow the clear rule and instead argued that the rule
requiring written notice was eviscerated by the fact that the
23. Warwick Housing Authority, 913 A.2d at 1038 (citing Cardi v.
Amoriggi Sea Foods, Inc. 468 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1983); Bove v. Kates
Properties, Inc. 444 A.2d 193, 195 (R.I. 1982)).
24. Warwick Housing Authority, 913 A.2d at 1038; § 34-18-41.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1039.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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tenant must have known that the eviction was still going to go
forward. It would be dangerous to any rule requiring a particular
type of notice if the court were to find that actual notice was
sufficient here. Thus, the landlord waived its right to evict
McLeod for any breach of the rental agreement of which it knew
because it failed to notify McLeod in writing of its intent to
continue seeking eviction with each month her rent was accepted.
CONCLUSION
The language of Rhode Island General Law § 34-18-41, which
requires the evicting landlord, within ten days of receipt of rent, to
notify the tenant that he does not waive his right to evict the
tenant, is mandatory. Thus a rent-accepting landlord is required
to notify a tenant in writing to preserve his right to evict even if
the tenant has actual notice that the landlord intends to continue
the eviction proceeding.
Kathryn H. Petit
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Tort Law. Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491 (R.I. 2007). A
property owner is not liable for injuries that a guest suffered while
on an owner's premises when that guest was engaging in an open
and obvious danger. In general, Rhode Island premise liability
law requires all property owners to exercise reasonable care for
the safety all people reasonably expected to be on their property.
However, that duty will not extend to guests who engage in open
and obvious danger where a property owner's warning sign would
have made no difference to the guest's actions. Additionally, the
state's Recreational Use Statute was not intended to apply to
private property owners since it would effectively shield them
from any liability occurring on the property.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Carol J. Hawkins is the owner of a parcel of lakefront
property located in Glocester. 1 While she is the record owner, Ms.
Hawkins typically only visits on summer weekends and has
allowed Patricia and Philip Gagnon to live on her property year
round.2  The Gagnon's son, perhaps taking advantage of a
weekend without his parents, decided to have some friends over
for a campout in August 1996, a decision that ultimately led to
this litigation. 3
On August 10, 1996, the plaintiff, Mr. Richard P. Bucki,
arrived at Ms. Hawkin's lake property to visit with his friend
Timothy Gagnon. 4 At approximately 11:30 p.m., plaintiff decided
it was an ideal time for a quick dive into the lake. Although
plaintiff would later testify that he had taken many dives of the
dock previously, it was this particular dive that resulted in a
tragic injury.5 Plaintiff proceeded to dive off the dock into the
dark lake below and hit his head on the bottom.6 What resulted
1. Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491, 493 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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from that tragic dive were a traumatic cervical spinal cord injury
and fracture and a significant amount of painful and costly,
medical work. 7
Richard Bucki filed this premise liability action against Carol
Hawkins, the Sand Dam Reservoir Association, Philip Gagnon and
Timothy Gagnon, alleging that the defendants breached their duty
to warn of unsafe diving, failure to maintain the premises in
reasonably safe manner, and for negligent supervision of guests on
the premises.8 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all defendants save
for Hawkins. 9 The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff though
finding him 90 percent comparatively negligent and awarded him
$60,300 plus interest. 10 Hawkins moved for a renewed judgment
as a matter of law and the trial justice agreed, finding, sua sponte,
that Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statue shielded defendant
from liability and further, that defendant did not owe plaintiff a
duty of care. 1 1 Plaintiffs subsequently filed a timely appeal to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred
when he relied on Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute.
13
Alternatively, plaintiff also argues that Hawkins did owe a duty of
care, which she breached. 14 Upon de novo review, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice's order of a
renewed motion as a matter of law, but on different grounds
finding that the defendant did not owe a duty of care. 15 The court
additionally held that the trial justice clearly erred by applying
the Recreational Use Statute because it was against legislative
intent and public policy.16
7. Id.
8. 914 A.2d at 493.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 494.
11. Id. (citing Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS §
6-32 (1956)).
12. Id. at 494.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 495, 497.
16. Id. at 498.
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Premises Liability
The Court principally focused on whether the defendant owed
a duty of care to Bucki, which is a question of law for the court
and not the jury.17 Rhode Island premises liability law imposes
an affirmative duty upon property owners to exercise a duty of
care to all people reasonably expected to be on the premises.' 8 In
addition to this basic duty of care owed, owning property also
comes with ". . . an obligation to protect against the risks of
dangerous conditions existing on the premises, provided the
property owner knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care
would have."'19 In order to determine if the property owner did
owe a duty of care in this particular situation, the court looks to
five factors to assist in determining negligence as well as
considerations of public policy and fairness. 20 The five factors are:
(1) the foreseeabiltiy of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the closeness of
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the
community for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach. 2 1
In this instance, the court dismissed the first two factors
quickly by holding that the plaintiffs harm was foreseeable and
there was indeed a serious injury that resulted.22 However, the
fatal flaw in plaintiffs case appears to be in the third factor since
defendant's "failure to warn" would have done little to prevent
plaintiff from diving off the dock.23  By the plaintiffs own
admission he had taken many other dives off the dock and doing
so at night was clearly an "open and obvious danger" that plaintiff
17. Id. at 495.
18. Id. (citing Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 133 (R.I.
1975)).
19. Id. (citing Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103, 1107 (R.I.
2004) (quoting Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 752 (R.I.
2000))).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 495-96 (quoting Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d
1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987)).
22. Id. at 496.
23. Id.
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should have taken greater responsibility for. 2 4  The Court
established an important precedent here, "The danger of diving
into shallow water was open and obvious to a twenty-four-year-old
man, regardless of whether a sign was erected alerting him to the
danger. Therefore, as a matter of law, plaintiff must be held to
have had knowledge and an appreciation of this risk.' ' 25 Applying
the fourth factor, the court found that the policy behind requiring
property owners to install warning signs would do little to prevent
plaintiffs, like Mr. Bucki, from engaging in such dangerous
activities. 26 Finally, while applying the fifth factor, the court
reiterated it would be of little good to require every waterfront
property owner in the community the burden of applying signs. 2 7
Recreational Use Statute
The Court began by restating that the trial justice invoked
this statute on his own accord, without either the plaintiff or
defendant raising the issue.28  The court held that the
Recreational Use Statute was misapplied to the case at bar and
ultimately finding error on the part of the lower court. 29
The Recreational Use Statute was passed to grant qualified
immunity to public property owners as the ultimate goal being
that more land would be opened for public recreational activity
while at the same time shielding those property owners from
potential liability.30  The Court stressed the importance of
applying the legislative intent to the current case. 3 1  Here,
Hawkins was not opening up her land for public recreational use;
rather it was for private use. The Court correctly applied the
legislative intent and found that the Recreational Use State
cannot apply to this case or that would effectively shield every
private property owner from liability while having any
recreational activity on their premises. 32
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 497.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 497-98.
30. Id. at 497 (citing Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713-14 (R.I. 2003)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 497-98.
2008]
888 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:884
COMMENTARY
This decision reinforces a general principle of tort law that a
plaintiff will be barred from recovery if there is no duty of care
owed, particularly when the plaintiff engages in an activity that is
an open and obvious danger. It perhaps best understood from a
policy perspective: if we allowed every plaintiff to recover for
accidents that are their own doing with the additional fact being
they were on someone else's property, then we would be dealing
with a significant amount of litigation that goes against basic tort
law principles. Here, the court makes it quite clear that it was
Mr. Bucki's own decisions preventing his recovery, stating,
"Ultimately, it was plaintiffs own behavior that caused his
injuries."3 3
It is important to realize that the court was not extending a
shield of immunity to all property owners in premises liability
actions. Rather, the court elaborated on an important caveat to
the general rule that property owners do in fact owe a duty of care
to all those people reasonable expected to be on the property. 34
The caveat is that in certain situations, when the danger is so
open and obvious that no reasonable person would have engaged
in it, regardless of a warning, then this will relieve the property
owner of liability. 35 Were property owners liable for the injuries
of their negligent guests, property owners would essentially
become full time watchdogs on their own land as well as insurers
of anyone that comes upon it. This duty would be nearly
impossible for most property owners and potentially deter
individuals from inviting guests over for activities. Using the case
at hand as an example, Ms. Hawkins was not even on the property
when this unfortunate accident occurred, however on numerous
occasions prior, the plaintiff had engaged in this same behavior
and did so again while it was completing dark outside.3 6 Holding
Ms. Hawkin's liable for negligent actions of visitors to her
property would set a bad precedent for Rhode Island.
Also of interest is the court's dismissal of the trial justice's
33. Id. at 496.
34. See id. at 495.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 493.
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misapplication of the Recreational Use Statute. 37 If the court had
simply affirmed the lower court's ruling, this too would set a
precedent contrary to legislative intent behind the statute. The
Recreational Use Statute is primarily to grant a limited statutory
immunity to public property owners who open their property for
recreational use and serves to clam property owner's fear of
litigation resulting from every accident that may occur.38
Extending this protection to private property owners that have
guests over for recreational use would be contrary to the
legislative intent and also lead to a very silly precedent indeed. If
the lower court's ruling were allowed to stand, it would transform
every visitor on private property into a trespasser with no duty
owed. This would be contrary to the general rule that property
owners do owe a duty of care to all visitors, that the court made
clear before discussing the caveat above.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that private property
owners do not owe a duty of care when individuals are engaging in
an open and obvious danger on the premises. 39 Additionally, the
court held that just because a private property owner opens their
land for recreational use, does not place them under the reach of
the state's Recreational Use Statute.40 If that were the case, then
all private property owners having a cookout or any other
recreational activity would be shielded from liability, a result
against the legislative intent of the statute. In this case, the
defendant property owner owed no duty to the plaintiff who was
injured while diving off defendant's dock into swallow water in the
middle of the night.
Kimberly Ahem
37. Id. at 498.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 497.
40. Id. at 498.
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